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The central question this paper addresses is what effect will the provisions to 
reduce non-marital births in the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity 
Reconciliation Act of 1996 have on non-marital birth rates? Data from state waivers 
prior to the 1996 legislation is used to capture the “policy environment” in which a 
non-marital birth occurred in several states between 1992 and 1996; and to assess 
variation(s) in fertility behavior among those states. Creation of policy variables based 
on state waiver data allowed for further estimates of the impact (in selected states) of 
the specific policy provisions in the PRWORA aimed at reducing out of wedlock 
childbearing, and subsequent welfare receipt.  
A review and summary of research regarding the strength of association 
between non-marital child bearing and welfare receipt is provided and includes both a 
brief review of general literature about non-marital births and a more focused review 
of literature specific to the antecedents of non-marital births. The empirical analysis in 
this work utilizes data from the Urban Institute’s National Survey of American 
Families (conducted in 1997 and 1999 after the Federal legislation was implemented) 
to examine two questions: whether or not the policy provisions and program efforts 
from the PRWORA accounted for the differences in determinants of non-marital births 
for teenage women and women over the age of twenty; and whether or not emphasis 
should have been placed on reducing teen pregnancy as a means to reducing welfare 
receipt and poverty in the 1996 PRWORA. Regression analysis estimated the impact 
of demographic variables on non-marital births in addition to the effect of specific 
welfare policies in selected states, and shows that the determinants of a non-marital  
birth differ by age of the mother, and the focus on reducing teen pregnancy is 
warranted despite the fact that adolescent women account for only 30% of non-marital 
births. Three areas in the legislation that require further analysis are identified and 
recommendations for addressing these shortcomings in the legislation are also offered 
to increase self-sufficiency of poor families in the context of legislative 
reauthorization, and future reform efforts.  
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CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION 
Passage of the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation 
Act (PRWORA) illustrates that the provision of the welfare benefits has always been a 
highly politicized issue. In addition, the specific provisions regarding family structure 
and childbearing signified a continued desire to regulate the fertility behavior of 
unmarried, low-income women dependent on welfare as a condition of governmental 
support. The intersection between the political problem of reforming welfare to satisfy 
public opinion and the moral principles underlying how we provide welfare benefits to 
support the poor renders welfare reform a seemingly intractable policy issue. This 
intractability has led to numerous attempts at reforming the welfare system, some high 
profile failures and some modest successes.  
As we entered the new millennium, many were espousing the great success of 
Bill Clinton’s 1996 law, as welfare rolls were down by unprecedented numbers. Many 
analysts speculated that the success was a result of strong economic conditions, while 
others still worried about the continued struggles of those families who left welfare, 
especially the hardships experienced by children.  
The central question this paper addresses is what effect will the PRWORA 
provisions to reduce non-marital births have on non-marital birth rates from 1996 to 
the present? The existence of state waivers in the majority of states prior to the 1996 
legislation presents the opportunity to both capture the “policy environment” in which 
a non-marital birth occurred in several states between 1992 and 1996; and to assess 
variation(s) in fertility behavior among those states. This assessment required a 
determination of how policy provisions differed by state, and if specific provisions 
were more effective than others for unmarried women; both teens and women over 20. 
Creation of policy variables based on state waiver data allowed for further estimates of  
  2
the impact (in selected states) of the specific policy provisions in the PRWORA aimed 
at reducing out of wedlock childbearing, and subsequent welfare receipt. More 
importantly, answering this question may provide a “snapshot” to policy makers with 
regards to whether or not program and policy efforts are on the right track in reaching 
the stated goal of reducing out of wedlock childbearing, and to the identification of the 
salient issues to address during the reauthorization of TANF with regard to non-
marital births.  
This analysis begins with a brief history of welfare policy, discussion of 
preceding welfare policies including AFDC, state waivers, the Family Support Act of 
1988 and the two opposing Senate bills that eventually became the 1996 PRWORA. 
Chapter 2 also offers a discussion of the PRWORA’s provisions, focusing on the 
sanctions and incentives regarding non-marital child bearing and teen pregnancy and a 
comprehensive look at the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Act, as well 
as a discussion of the debates, issues, political negotiations and other events that led to 
the eventual signing of a Republican bill by a Democratic President. Although there 
are several portions of the PRWORA that impact families receiving welfare, it is Title 
I that focuses on issues related to non-marital childbearing, and as such, will be the 
focus of this paper. 
A review and summary of research regarding the strength of association 
between non-marital child bearing and welfare receipt is provided in Chapter 3. This 
includes both a brief review of general literature about non-marital births and a more 
focused review of literature specific to the antecedents of non-marital births. Finally, 
underlying theories of pregnancy prevention programs are briefly explored in relation 
to the approaches taken in PRWORA to reduce teen pregnancy. 
After examining what is known about non-marital childbearing and teen 
pregnancy in Chapter 3, Chapter 3 also provides both an overview of the economic  
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and demographic hypotheses regarding a woman’s decision to bear a child out of 
wedlock found in the literature, and identifies factors that affect non-marital birth 
rates. Such factors are identified to highlight those variables related to non-marital 
fertility that are included in the estimated regression model analyzed in Chapter 4.  
Chapter 4 describes the methods used and findings from the regression analysis 
of policy effects utilizing data from the Urban Institute’s National Survey of American 
Families (NSAF), conducted in 1997 and 1999 after the Federal legislation was 
implemented. This required an assessment of whether or not the policy provisions and 
program efforts from the PRWORA accounted for the differences in determinants of 
non-marital births for teenage women and women over the age of twenty. A second 
issue examined in Chapter 4 is the emphasis placed on reducing teen pregnancy as a 
means to reducing welfare receipt and poverty in the 1996 PRWORA. This analysis 
shows that the determinants are different by age groups, and the focus on reducing 
teen pregnancy is warranted despite the fact that these women account for only 30% of 
non-marital births.  
The analysis in Chapter 4 also allows for exploration of whether or not it 
reasonable to assume that a non-marital birth causes poverty or is it likely that the 
poor conditions in which many women live reduces the opportunity cost of having a 
child outside of marriage. One could suppose that these factors exist concurrently, and 
that non-marital births are influenced most heavily by a set of mutually exogenous 
factors like race, family structure, religious activity, and place of residence. Analysis 
of the regression model(s) in Chapter 4 estimate the impact of all these variables on 
non-marital births in addition to the effect of specific welfare policies in selected 
states.  
The findings from both the literature review and empirical analysis inform the 
discussion in Chapter 5, which identifies three areas in the legislation that require  
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further analysis. Recommendations for addressing these shortcomings in the 
legislation are also offered, and this work concludes with an assessment of the most 
promising measures to increase self-sufficiency of poor families in the context of 
legislative reauthorization, and future reform efforts.  
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CHAPTER TWO 
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY 
WELFARE REFORM AND NON-MARITAL CHILD BEARING  
Introduction 
Reforming our nation’s welfare system has been a part of mainstream political 
discourse for as long as AFDC (now TANF) has existed. The current debates do not 
differ substantively from those that occurred from the very beginnings of social 
welfare policy. There are four factors that keep welfare policy on the forefront of 
political debates: the cost to the public of benefit provision; the threats to the 
American work ethic; threats to family values; and threats to the social order.
1 These 
four factors are key to understanding the infusion of moral judgment into legislative 
sanctions to modify the “irresponsible” behavior of single parents (primarily women) 
in the PRWORA.  
In the early 1990s, Americans became more frustrated with increased 
government spending on these policies, which was coupled with an increase of the 
welfare rolls and no clear reductions in poverty resulting from welfare programs. 
These trends led a long standing fear (on the part of policy makers and the public) that 
the system was creating dependency, especially among single women with children. 
The long history of social welfare policies, dating back to the Elizabethan Poor 
Laws, shows that the underlying assumption behind welfare is that a family’s financial 
status is directly linked to its members’ well-being. Therefore it follows that it is in 
our society’s best interest to try to help those in need get “back on their feet.” 
Consequently, legislative efforts were (and continue to be) designed to provide the 
means by which families experiencing financial hardship could become economically 
self-sufficient. The earlier parts of welfare history have been documented and 
                                                 
1 Joel F. Handler, The Poverty of Welfare Reform (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1995).  
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discussed in several well-known works and will not be discussed in depth in this 
chapter.
2 Rather, this brief history begins with the events just prior to the criticism of 
Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) and the resultant efforts to address 
those faults through reforms of welfare policy. 
AFDC was designed primarily for unmarried women with children under 18 
years old in their household.
3 Eligibility was based on income level, and if a female-
headed family had income and assets below their state’s specific level, they were 
entitled to a cash transfer amount to increase their income to the guaranteed income 
level. Once a family receiving AFDC benefits had an increase in their income, their 
benefit levels were reduced at a federally determined reduction rate. Thus, the Federal 
government (with some state flexibility in setting their own minimum income 
requirements) monitored AFDC in partnership with states that were responsible for 
implementing welfare policy provisions. This state flexibility in income levels led to 
considerable variation among program recipients in different states; for example, in 
1989, benefits in California totaled $788 monthly for a family of four, while they were 
only $144 a month in Mississippi.
4  
In addition to the cash entitlement through AFDC, there were a variety of in-
kind benefits such as food stamps and Medicaid. Other in-kind benefits such as 
housing assistance and job training supported welfare recipients, but were not 
considered entitlements. To further complicate the system, both the federal and state 
governments funded and administered these various programs and different state 
agencies had responsibility for the specific types of benefits. Finally, child support 
                                                 
2 For example, see Frances Fox-Piven and Richard Cloward, Regulating the Poor: The Functions of 
Public Welfare (New York, NY: Vintage Books, 1993); Linda Gordon, Pitied but not Entitled: Single 
Mothers and the History of Welfare (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1994). 
3 About half of the states also had an AFDC-UP program for which married families who met income 
requirements were eligible for benefits if they met certain requirements. 
4 For example, Charles Murray, Losing Ground: American Social Policy, 1950–1980 (New York, NY: 
Basic Books, Inc., 1984); or Robert Moffitt, “Incentive Effects of the U.S. Welfare System: A Review,” 
Journal of Economic Literature 30 (1992), 3.  
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policies varied state by state, with no means for interstate enforcement, and highly 
variable formulas for establishing support amounts and enforcing orders among state 
courts. As a result, the welfare system lacked coordination among state agencies and 
was embedded with conflict among different levels of government, which led to an 
uncoordinated, complex system of service delivery.  
In the mid 1980s criticisms of the Aid to Families With Dependent Children 
(AFDC) program included charges that it was administratively cumbersome, provided 
disincentives to work for its recipients, lacked provisions for adequate support services 
to facilitate self-sufficiency, did not adequately collect and enforce child support 
obligations for women dependent on welfare, and penalized two parent families, 
which encouraged the breakup of the “traditional” family unit. Many people saw the 
system as a handout to the poor, which required no mutual obligation on the part of the 
recipient or the state. Others viewed the system as ignoring a recipient’s need for basic 
human dignity by encouraging dependency rather than self-sufficiency and the 
fulfillment of human potential.  
The disincentives for work were two fold. First, the marginal tax rate on 
earnings for welfare recipients was virtually 100%, for every dollar earned, the 
recipient lost one dollar in benefits, (e.g., food stamps or AFDC cash assistance). 
Second, the jobs that recipients were trained for through the job training programs 
were low skilled minimum wage jobs – a level of earning that did not pull a family out 
of poverty. For example, in 1993 a full time worker earning $4.25 per hour (minimum 
wage) would have a gross annual salary of $8,840, while the poverty line for a family 
of two was $9,500 and $11,600 for a family of three.
5 Thus, a woman with two 
children could receive the more money by staying on public assistance or taking a full-
time minimum wage job. In addition, when a welfare recipient found employment 
                                                 
5.Jean Hopsfenberger, “Poverty’s Price: $4.25,” Star Tribune, March 29, 1993, 1B.  
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he/she could lose health insurance, incur extra expenses for day care and 
transportation, and thus significantly reduce take home earnings through employment. 
Although the expansion of the Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC) has remedied some 
of this problem, it will not be discussed in depth in this analysis.  
In addition to the disincentives to work, disincentives toward marriage also 
existed in the welfare system. The penalties for marriage levied on welfare recipients 
reduced the financial gains of marriage, and perpetuated the increases in the single 
parent homes. This also reduced the likelihood that children would be able to live with 
both their parents. The broader, ethical considerations involving the effects of 
marriage disincentives on well-being of the children in lower income households are 
too complex to address here. It is important to note that the reduction of benefits after 
marriage pushed a family further below the poverty line because of marriage, which 
subsequently encouraged living together, and in essence, cheating the system. Note 
also that at the time, family courts handled child support issues and there was no 
interstate ability to enforce orders or standard procedures in place to help women on 
assistance collect support. As a result, child support became one major impetus for the 
1988 reform of the welfare system. 
To better understand the current policy debates about our nation’s welfare 
system, it is necessary to explore how the current system was established. To 
accomplish this task, a detailed legislative history is provided of the two most recent 
legislative overhauls of the welfare system – the Family Support Act of 1988 (FSA) 
and the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996 
(PRWORA).  
Family Support Act of 1988 
Reforms of the welfare system under President Reagan were aimed at creating 
mutual responsibility by requiring able-bodied recipients to either work or prepare for  
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work in return for their benefits. In his 1986 State of the Union address, President 
Reagan announced a new study on welfare to try to achieve “lasting emancipation” 
from the cycle of dependency that had become so prominent among its recipients. 
Signed on October 13, 1988 the Family Support Act was viewed by both the public 
and legislators as a major legislative overhaul of the welfare system. Critics of the 
legislation believed that passage of the Family Support Act of 1988 (FSA) continued 
the paternalistic nature of AFDC by placing greater emphasis on both personal 
responsibility to support one’s children and the importance of work as a means to get 
off welfare.  
Legislative Provisions 
The Family Support Act set forth the following three objectives: 
1.  To strengthen the federal child support enforcement program to 
guarantee children are supported by both parents;  
2.  To provide basic education and training services through the new 
Job opportunities and Basic Skills (JOBS) Program to enable 
families receiving AFDC to move towards self sufficiency; and  
3.  To provide supportive and transitional assistance to AFDC families 
leaving welfare. 
To accomplish these objectives the FSA included seven titles
6 each of which 
delineated rules, procedures and regulations to be imposed upon the states, federal 
government, or individuals. It also assigned primary responsibility for the 
implementation, monitoring and evaluation of the provisions contained in the Act to 
the Department of Health and Human Services, Family Support Administration.  
                                                 
6 (e.g., child support and establishment of paternity, job opportunities and basic skills training program, 
supportive services for families, etc.)  
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The Family Support Act embodied the assumptions that parents are responsible 
for supporting their children, recipients should be assisted in employment training and 
finding jobs, and public assistance should be temporary. Increased child support 
enforcement (Title I), participation in JOBS (Title II) and the provision of transitional 
services (Title III) were the substantive titles that modified the existing means by 
which welfare benefits were delivered. Each of these Titles included extensive 
changes in both eligibility for and delivery of these benefits to increase personal 
responsibility and promote employment among welfare recipients.  
The cornerstone of the Family Support Act of 1988 was the extensive efforts 
made to increase child support orders in courts for women on public assistance, 
mandatory paternity establishment for women on welfare (as a condition to receive 
benefits), stricter enforcement of delinquent fathers, and the establishment of interstate 
computer systems to address the common occurrence of non-custodial parents simply 
changing their state of residence to avoid paying child support. The underlying 
assumption of these measures was simple – when possible, both parents should be 
held accountable for the financial support of their children – both to improve the 
quality of life for children in single parent homes and to offset the cost of proving 
assistance to their mothers. The Family Support Act of 1988 established a 
comprehensive; much needed system of enforcing and collecting child support orders 
for women on welfare.  
The legislation also focused on better job training (Title II: JOBS), maintaining 
transitional benefits for parents who become employed, as well as health insurance for 
a period of time determined by each state. However, the Family Support Act of 1988 
did little to rectify the disincentives toward marriage. This further perpetuated the 
disadvantages associated with marriage for women receiving assistance, and thus, did  
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not impact the trends towards both greater cohabitation and children living in single 
parent households. 
At the time of the FSA’s passage, the problem that plagued the welfare system 
was not one of inadequate services (the Federal government spent a total of 203 billion 
dollars on family programs alone in 1989), but ineffective services. Despite the 
programs that were in place, the poverty rate, unemployment, the welfare rolls, and 
single-parent households were all rising. The question was why wasn’t this huge 
network of services effectively meeting the needs of our nation’s poor? As a result, 
many states began seeking alternative ways to deliver its programs, and sought Federal 
approval to engage in demonstration projects. 
Welfare waivers  
In the late 1980s states began applying for welfare waivers from the U.S. 
Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS). A “waiver” was simply when 
DHHS granted permission to states to design and implement their own welfare 
programs guided by state, not Federal policy requirements. Those states granted 
waivers were not held to federal government requirements in the administration of 
their AFDC initiatives.  
Examples of waivers include: 
•  Minor parent provision: A requirement of teen mothers to live at home or 
with a responsible adult;  
•  Stay in school: the requirement of teen mothers to attend school to receive 
benefits; 
•  Paternity Establishment: A mandatory 25% benefit reduction imposed on 
unmarried mothers who do not help with paternity establishment;  
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•  Time limits: the state sets a maximum time that any family may receive 
welfare benefits, this is imposed on all families and ranged from 1 to 5 
years depending on state of residence;  
•  Work requirements: Minimum hours and/or job training participation that 
must be fulfilled to receive welfare benefits (includes sanctions for non-
compliance); and 
•  Family cap: the refusal of benefits for additional children born to women 
receiving public assistance. 
Many states applied for more than one waiver, and generally, the combination 
of several waivers by one state began to be known as a “demonstration project.”  
States began applying for substantially more welfare waivers toward the end of 
George Bush’s presidency (1988-1992). According to Horvath and Peters
7, between 
1987 and just before passage in 1996 of the PRWORA, 46 states had received 
approval and implemented welfare waivers to amend either their AFDC or Job 
Opportunities and Basic Skills (JOBS) programs.  
In the early 1990s many states continued to apply for waivers as a way to reach 
their goals to increase child support collections and work participation of welfare 
recipients. In addition, the increased use of welfare waivers clearly illustrated the 
growing trend to devolve authority over social programs from the Federal government 
to states. This shift in authority signaled a change from the centralized authority that 
characterized many social policies to one in which states were treated as equal partners 
in decision-making.
8  
Criticisms of the welfare system carried over into the 1990’s and played a key 
role in shaping President Clinton’s domestic policy agenda. The continued rise in the 
                                                 
7 Anne Horvath-Rose and H. Elizabeth Peters, Welfare Waivers and Non-marital Childbearin. (Ithaca, 
NY: Cornell University, September 1999). 
8 Charles McClintock and Laura A. Colosi, “Evaluation of Welfare Reform,” Evaluation Review 22, no. 
5 (October 1998): 668–694.  
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costs of welfare programs, the child poverty rate, the non-marital birth rate and 
subsequent number of people dependent on the system led to a noticeable frustration 
on the parts of both the government and the taxpayers. As Bill Clinton took office in 
1990, it was clear that the major disincentives of the welfare system had to be addressed 
by the new administration, to both reduce the deficit and the poverty rate. The question 
he faced was – how to remedy this situation? 
Legislative response to the issues of welfare was characterized by the same 
two important objectives in the FSA of 1988, enforcing parental responsibility and 
encouraging work. The 1996 legislation, however, included two important shifts in the 
way in which these goals would be accomplished: greater regulation of the program 
recipient’s behavior, and increased state flexibility (and responsibility) for program 
design and delivery through the TANF block grant.  
Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Act of 1996 (PRWORA)
9 
Presidential candidate Bill Clinton had promised to “end welfare as we know 
it,” and made his first attempt to accomplish this in the proposed 1994 Work and 
Responsibility Act, which toughened welfare provisions and added time limits on 
recipients’ benefits. In 1995, however, when the Republican Party won a majority in 
the Congress – the new majority in both the House (Personal Responsibility and Work 
Opportunity Act of 1995) and Senate (Family Support Act of 1995) drafted their own 
versions of the Work and Responsibility Act. Both pieces of legislation were tougher 
on welfare recipients, provided states greater flexibility in setting welfare policy, and 
less interference from the Federal government in program delivery. The 1995 
legislative proposals intended to reduce the reliance on the welfare system and 
increase self-sufficiency of the nation’s poor. It was the means by which to achieve 
                                                 
9 A detailed history of the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Act of 1996 is provided in 
Appendix A.  
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this goal that were key points of contention in the debates. Thus, discussion of the two 
legislative proposals prior to passage of the Personal Responsibility and Work 
Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996 (PRWORA) highlight both philosophical and 
structural differences regarding the underlying purpose of welfare benefits and the 
way in which the system of service delivery should be organized. 
The two major pieces of legislation proposed mirror the conservative and 
liberal perspectives on how to accomplish the twin goals of increasing work and 
personal responsibility of those in need. The Family Support Act of 1995, sponsored 
by Senator Moynihan, was the democratic version of welfare reform set forth in the 
104th Congress. The second, more conservative proposal was from the House of 
Representatives, the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Act of 1995 – a 
more extensive reform of the welfare system than the former – which gained a great 
deal of attention, as the Republicans controlled both the House and the Senate floors. 
To better understand the 1996 legislation, it is necessary to first describe these two 
proposals, and what each hoped to accomplish in the context of welfare reform. 
The Family Support Act of 1995  
The focal point of the FSA of 1995 was enforcement of child support as a 
means to increase monetary collections, which would subsequently reduce the costs of 
benefit provision to single women with children (the majority of the welfare 
population). Several other components of the Family Support Act of 1995 built on the 
provisions set forth in the original Family Support Act of 1988, and in effect, increased 
the requirements placed on recipients regarding the JOBS Program, the AFDC 
Program, and Child Support Enforcement.  
The provisions of Title I, geared at improving the JOBS Program included, but 
were not limited to:  
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•  Emphasized work by requiring states to encourage job placement 
by using performance measures that rewarded staff performance in 
placements, or other such management practice as the states chose; 
•  Provided for a job voucher program that used private for-profit and 
non profit organizations to place recipients in private employment; 
•  Eliminated certain Federal requirements to give States flexibility in 
operating their JOBS program; and 
•  Allowed States to provide JOBS services to non-custodial parents 
who were unemployed and unable to meet their child support 
obligations. 
The provisions of Title II: Aid to Families with Dependent Children, included 
several provisions that were tougher on recipient’s activities required to receive 
benefits:  
•  Required states agencies to assign each custodial parent under the 
age of 20 to a case manager responsible for assisting the teen parent 
in obtaining services and monitoring their compliance with program 
requirements; 
•  State agencies would require custodial parents under 20 who had 
not completed high school to (1) attend school (2) participate in a 
program combining classroom and job training or (3) work toward 
a high school education or its equivalent. After the completion of a 
high school education they could participate in state run JOBS 
program; 
•  Allowed states to provide both monetary incentives or penalties to 
encourage custodial parents under age 20 to complete their high 
school education, and participate in parenting activities;  
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•  Required individuals under 18 who had a dependent child or was 
pregnant to live with a parent, legal guardian, or other adult 
relative. If this was not feasible, they must live in a foster home or 
maternity home with payments made to the adult who had 
supervision; and 
•  Established an Interagency Welfare Review Board, as the central 
organization for coordinating the review of state applications for 
waivers, and the Board was to provide technical advice and 
assistance to the states. 
Title III of the Act addressed issues of Child Support Enforcement, and its 
provisions were quite extensive: 
•  Improved enforcement of interstate child support enforcement by 
providing uniformity in State laws and procedures, creating a 
framework for determining jurisdiction in interstate cases (required 
adoption of 1992’s Uniform Interstate Family Support Act by 
January, 1997); 
•  Required AFDC applicants and recipients to aid in establishing 
paternity in obtaining support payments, and strengthened the 
definitions of “cooperation” to include both the provision of a name 
and other information helpful to verify the identity of the father 
(this was a condition of AFDC benefits, but a state would not deny 
benefits while attempting to locate absent father); 
•  Required States to streamline their procedures for establishing 
paternity, and when paternity was clearly established (i.e. genetic 
test), the State could issue a temporary order that required the 
payment of child support (if father was unable to pay, he was  
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placed in a job training program and once employed his wages were 
garnished automatically); 
•  Established a “paternity outreach” program to encourage voluntary 
paternity acknowledgment through both information dissemination 
and education programs; 
•  States were allowed to suspend any professional licenses, (driver’s 
license, etc.) or a passport to delinquent parent; and 
•  Increased moneys available for programs to facilitate non-custodial 
parent’s access to and visitation of their children, through 
mediation, counseling, and education. 
There were many other child support provisions including; the review of orders every 
three years, the establishment of a National Commission on child support guidelines to 
study these issues, the establishment of a central registry for all child support orders 
and the creation of an automatic payment system for employers to use if needed, the 
expansion of the federal parent locator service, and finally, the establishment of a new 
hire directory (this is a database used for enforcement of orders).  
The Family Support Act of 1995 placed more restrictions on recipients as 
condition of benefit receipt, and capitalized on the system already in place for the 
delivery of services. In essence, the Democratic proposal represented an effort to “fine 
tune” the system in place rather than creating an entirely new system. This proposed 
legislation retained Federal standards while giving states more flexibility in program 
delivery. The bill had no floor action whatsoever (with the exception of its 
introduction by Senator Moynihan on May 18, 1995), the result of the Republican 
Congress’s focus on its own proposal – the Personal Responsibility and Work 
Opportunity Act of 1995.  
  18
The Personal Work and Responsibility Act of 1995.  
The Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Act of 1995 received the 
greatest consideration in both the House and Senate. The focal point of the Act was to 
restrict eligibility for many programs, and to establish time limits of benefits provided. 
It was an extensive piece of legislation, which proposed replacement of many 
programs (established under the Family Support Act of 1988) with block grant 
programs (in-depth discussion in this chapter will focus in the TANF block grant). The 
rationale for the shift to a block grant was to provide states a greater flexibility in 
meeting the needs of their poor population. 
By far the most controversial component of the legislation was Title I: Block 
Grants for Temporary Assistance for Needy Families. This was the section that 
dismantled the AFDC program entirely by replacing the AFDC program under Title 
IV of the Social Security Act with a single program of block grants to the States. This 
was known as the temporary emergency assistance (TEA) programs that operated 
statewide and included mandatory work, education, and job preparation requirements 
for needy families either already with or expecting a child as a condition of benefit 
provision. The purpose of TEA remained similar to that of AFDC – to assist such 
families in becoming self-sufficient. Other specific provisions in Title I of this 
proposed legislation were as follows: 
1.  Limited such families to no more than five years of TEA cash 
assistance, with certain exceptions; 
2.  Denied cash assistance for minor children born into families on 
TEA assistance who already had a child; 
3.  Required mandatory adult-supervised living arrangements for 
unmarried teenage parents; and  
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4.  Allowed states to terminate assistance to adults who refused to 
engage in work, educational or job training activities, regardless of 
whether they had children. 
This legislation drew upon many states’ experiences with welfare waivers, and 
now set forth Federal standards that involved mandatory work requirements, time 
limits, family caps, minor parent provisions and strict sanctions for non compliance 
with any of these requirements.  
In addition, the primary objectives set forth in this proposal were to reduce the 
costs of the system to substantially decrease the size of the population who were 
eligible for benefits, and placing time limits on benefits. The desire to lower the 
welfare rolls was also illustrated by Title IV, which restricted welfare and public 
benefits for aliens based on the notion that “it was a compelling government interest to 
remove the incentive for illegal immigration provided by the availability of public 
benefits.”
10  
The use of block grants was another way Congress hoped to reduce the costs of 
providing assistance, illustrated by Title VII: Child Protection Block Grants, which 
replaced Child Welfare Services with a block grant program to the States to implement 
(1) child protection programs regarding child abuse and neglect; and (2) child 
protection payments for foster care and adoption assistance.
11 In addition, Title VIII, 
Child Care and Development Block Grants Amendments of 1995, reduced the 
minimum amount made available for activities to improve the quality of child care 
from 20% to 3% of already established funds and amended the Child Care and 
Development Block Grant Act of 1990 to repeal authority for Federal payments to 
                                                 
10 The Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Act of 1995, 103
rd Congress, HR 4, Title IV. 
11 Ibid., Title VII.  
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Head Start agencies or certain local educational agencies for early childhood 
development and before and after school activities.
12 
In March 1995, the House’s Personal Responsibility Act of 1995 was 
combined with the Senate’s Work Opportunity Act (a similar bill in the Senate at that 
time) to become a joint resolution, H.R.4 The Personal Responsibility and Work 
Opportunity Reconciliation Act (PRWORA), which was then the only proposed piece 
of welfare legislation to be set forth into Congressional floor action.  
On December 29, 1995 the bill was sent to President Clinton, and there was a 
great deal of media speculation about whether or not the President could veto the 
legislation without contradicting his own campaign promise to “end welfare as we 
know it.” At the time, social researchers predicted that enacting the legislation would 
most likely place an additional one to two million children into poverty, and as a 
result, he vetoed the legislation on January 9, 1996. In his veto message, President 
Clinton cited two primary shortcomings in H.R. 4; it weakened several of the 
important work provisions that were vital to welfare reform’s success, and it was 
designed to meet an arbitrary budget target rather than to achieve serious reform.
13 In 
addition, the President stressed that his Administration would continue to “set forth in 
detail [their] goals for reform and [their] objections to this legislation.” He also 
emphasized his willingness to sit down in good faith to discuss welfare reform, and 
reiterated his belief that there was enough bipartisan support for the underlying goals 
of welfare reform that a successful reform of the system was possible.  
Areas of Contention 
If there was enough bipartisan support on the underlying purposes of welfare 
reform – increasing work and responsibility – then the question remained, why hadn’t 
                                                 
12 Ibid., Title VIII, Sections 807 and 808. 
13 U.S. Congress, House, Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Act of 1995—Veto Message 
from the President of the United States (H. DOC. NO. 104-164), January 22, 1996.  
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successful reform been accomplished? The debates between liberals and conservatives 
regarding welfare proposals raised several, broad – but important questions:  
•  What is the role of government in providing social welfare 
benefits?  
•  Which levels of government should be involved in these policies – 
federal, state or local? If more than one level is involved, what are 
the roles of each that characterize the intergovernmental 
relationship? 
•  What do the current debates reveal about the value placed on 
recipients – are they lazy people “milking” the system or potential 
human capital?  
•  What are the short and long term benefits of each proposal related 
to the cost involved? 
It was the resolution (or compromise) of these questions that would be the key to these 
two groups reaching equilibrium. This equilibrium, or the adoption of a policy, could 
only be achieved through bargaining, compromising and negotiating between the 
policy makers involved. 
The major points of disagreement with the proposed action involved the 
following: the purpose of welfare policy; how to achieve the objective(s) of welfare 
policy; and who had greater authority or responsibility for welfare policy and program 
delivery. Most politicians agreed that the purpose of welfare reform policies was to 
create self-sufficiency among those persons who were dependent on government 
assistance. However, conservatives tended to emphasize welfare as a temporary form 
of assistance, whereas liberals viewed it more as a form of social insurance. It was 
apparent that those who held a conservative view of welfare believed that the primary 
means to create self-sufficiency was through negative sanctions and imposing limits.  
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Those with a liberal view of welfare wanted to reduce dependency by providing 
services to people in need of assistance.  
Conservatives favored state responsibility for welfare programs, and on the 
whole, believed that the government had every right to be intrusive toward those 
persons on welfare. Liberals promoted Federal authority over welfare programs to 
guarantee consistency in benefits, the establishment of national standards, and 
congruence with other Federal objectives (e.g., anti-discrimination). 
Several key points of contention between the Democrats and Republicans 
stemmed from their beliefs on how to increase work and responsibility among welfare 
recipients, although they could not seem to agree on the appropriate way to 
accomplish these tasks. There was, however, one common goal among both 
conservatives and liberals, to reduce the costs of the welfare system. The liberal approach 
was characterized by short-term investments in programs for long-term gains in 
employment and self-sufficiency. The conservative approach involved immediate cuts in 
spending to push people off the system and into work – resulting in both short and long 
term savings. Regardless of one’s views on welfare, in 1996, it was clear that the current 
welfare system needed improvement and that the public expected a viable reform from 
the Clinton administration. Media reports alluded to pressure on the President to follow 
through on his campaign promises many years earlier, and on August 22, 1996 President 
Clinton signed the Republican bill, entitled, The Personal Responsibility and Work 
Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996 (PRWORA). 
The Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996 
The PRWORA was an expansive overhaul of the welfare system that 
resembled the Republican’s version of welfare reform more than any of the other 
proposed legislation. The most noted change embodied in the PRWORA was the 
elimination of the open-ended entitlement program, AFDC, replacing it with a block  
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grant program for states to provide time limited cash assistance to needy families 
under Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF).
14 This change to block 
grants gave states greater flexibility in welfare service eligibility and provision than 
they had previously under the FSA of 1988. Finally, many of the policies set forth 
under state waivers in the previous years were now Federal regulations.  
For example, the Federal government established a maximum time limit of five 
years of benefits per recipient, implemented requirements of teen mothers as a 
condition of benefit receipt, and instituted the family cap by no longer providing 
additional benefits for a subsequent birth to a mother on welfare. Many additional 
changes were made to the child support, childcare and child welfare systems. Table 
2.1 provides a summary of key provisions in each section of the legislation. 
                                                 
14 American Public Welfare Association [AWPA], The Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity 
Act: A Summary, 1996.  
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Table 2.1. General Provisions, Public Law 104-93. 
HR 3734 Section  General Provisions 
 
Title I: Block Grants for 
the Temporary 
Assistance to Needy 
Families (TANF) 
 
 
Amended the Social Security Act and numerous other acts to 
provide for comprehensive reform of the welfare system.  
    
Converted AFDC and Job Opportunities and Basic Skills 
training program and certain other welfare programs into a 
single block grant program to be used by States to provide 
cash and other benefits to needy families.  
 
Restricted welfare eligibility for unwed mothers under age 
18, families that have been on welfare for more than five 
years, and additional children born while families are on 
welfare.  
 
 
Title II: Supplemental 
Security Income 
 
 
Restricted supplemental security income (SSI) program 
eligibility of certain disabled children, and establishes 
incentives for State and local penal institutions for 
information that results in suspension of SSI benefits to 
prisoners.  
 
 
Title III: Child Support 
  
  
 
 
 
Revised rules governing distribution of child support 
collections among Federal and State governments and welfare 
families.  
 
Required each State to establish an automated registry of all 
child support cases in the State and a directory of new hires, 
and to provide the information to the Federal Parent Locator 
Service.  
  
Required all States to adopt uniform laws to expedite 
interstate child support collections and to enact certain laws 
concerning paternity establishment. 
  
Title IV: Restricting 
Welfare and Public 
Benefits For Aliens 
 
 
Restricted eligibility of certain aliens for Federal welfare, 
health, and other benefits 
 
 
Title V: Child Protection 
 
 
 
Granted authority to states to make payments to private 
childcare institutions. 
 
Extended matching funds for statewide child welfare 
information systems. 
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Table 2.1 (Continued). 
HR 3734 Section  General Provisions 
 
Title VI: Child Care 
 
 
 
 
Combined four Federal childcare programs for low-income 
families into a single block grant to States, the expanded 
Child Care and Development Block Grant program.  
 
 
Title VII: Child Nutrition 
Programs 
 
Amended the National School Lunch Act and the Child 
Nutrition Act of 1966 to revise child nutrition programs. 
 
Title VII: Food Stamps & 
Commodity Distribution 
 
 
  
Revised the methods for determining the value of energy 
assistance benefits and motor vehicles for food stamp 
program eligibility purposes.  
  
Authorized States to coordinate food stamp program rules 
with those of a new State program providing temporary 
assistance for needy families.  
   
Revised food stamp eligibility criteria, including 
establishment of work requirements for certain recipients.  
  
Required States to implement electronic benefit transfer 
systems for food stamps.  
 
Amended the Emergency Food Assistance Act of 1983 and 
other acts to consolidate and revise USDA commodity 
distribution programs providing food to State and local 
agencies and charitable organizations for distribution to low-
income persons. 
 
 
Title IX: Miscellaneous 
 
Restricted benefit eligibility for certain types of criminal 
activities. 
 
Established national goals to prevent teen pregnancies. 
 
Expressed the sense that laws regarding statutory rape must 
be aggressively enforced. 
 
Defined appropriate sex education programs, “abstinence 
only” that were eligible for Federal funds. 
 
Modified eligibility requirements for the earned income tax 
credit available to certain low-income working taxpayers who 
had dependent children or meet other qualifications.  
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Title I: TANF Block Grant 
The general purpose of the TANF block grant is to “provide assistance to 
needy families with children so they can be cared for in their own home and to reduce 
dependency by promoting job preparation, work and marriage
15“ States were also 
given specific flexibility to use funds to both reduce non-marital pregnancies and 
support the formation of two parent families. States were allowed to use block grant 
funds “in any manner reasonably calculated to accomplish the purpose of TANF.”
16 
The change to the block grant meant that states now have the ability to determine both 
eligibility and benefit levels.  
Provisions related to childbearing and marriage also include the establishment 
of the Illegitimacy Reduction Bonus Fund which earmarked $20 million per year to be 
disbursed annually in each fiscal year (beginning in 1999) to the 5 states that reported 
the greatest success in reducing out of wedlock births without increasing abortions in 
comparison to the previous two years. In addition, teen parents were required to 
remain at home or in an approved adult supervised setting, and participate in an 
educational activity towards the completion of a high school diploma or GED as a 
condition of benefit receipt. States were also given an option to deny assistance overall 
to unmarried teens with children.
17 
Other state options related to family formation and childbearing include the 
reduction or termination of benefits to women who fail to cooperate in the 
establishment of paternity for their children. States may also deny assistance to 
additional children born to a woman already on welfare by establishing a family cap. 
It is clear that the PRWORA focused on decreasing non-marital births 
(especially to teenaged women) and included specific discussion on the importance of 
                                                 
15 AWPA, The Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Act: A Summary. 
16 Public Law 104-193, 1996. 
17 Ibid.  
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marriage to reducing poverty. There are several portions of the PRWORA that impact 
families receiving welfare, but it is Title I that focuses on issues related to non-marital 
childbearing, and as such, are the focus of the remainder of this analysis. The 
PRWORA provisions under the Title I TANF block grant are expansive in scope and 
coercive in nature, as illustrated by the Federal regulations that allow states to turn 
benefits on and off as a way to change the behavior of welfare recipients (e.g., work 
requirements, time limits, family caps, minor parent requirements, and benefit 
reductions associated with non-compliance in paternity proceedings.) 
Non-Marital Childbearing 
The connection between welfare programs and non-marital childbearing stems 
from the simple idea that AFDC was designed to provide assistance to families with 
only one able bodied parent. A woman who had one or more children born out of 
wedlock heads most families receiving welfare. A great deal of research and 
evaluation of welfare policies focused on whether or not the welfare system itself led 
to the increase in non-marital births.
18 The public perception that followed was that the 
government (more specifically, taxpayers) had become a substitute for the traditional 
male provider in a household. This notion did not go unnoticed in the course of 
drafting and passing the 1996 welfare reform legislation. As such, one primary thrust 
of the PRWORA of 1996 was to reduce welfare dependence by decreasing non-
marital births, with a particular focus on teen pregnancies.  
The Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act 
(PRWORA) “express(ed) the sense of the Congress that prevention of out of wedlock 
pregnancy and reduction in out of wedlock births (were) important Government 
                                                 
18 Institute of Medicine Committee on Unintended Pregnancy, The Best Intentions: Unintended 
Pregnancy and the Well-Being of Children and Families (Washington, D.C.: National Academy Press, 
1995), 197.  
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interests.”
19 The Federal legislation implied that this reduction was crucial to the 
success of welfare reform in increasing self-sufficiency, not just reducing the welfare 
rolls and exploration of this assumption is critical to determining the prospect of 
welfare reform alleviating poverty overall. 
One third of all births in 1996 were non-marital, and children in one-parent 
families had an increased risk of abuse, poor academic achievement, behavior 
problems, unemployment, and poverty.
20 In addition, children born out of wedlock 
were more likely to become single parents themselves. Within 5 years of a non-marital 
birth, 75% of teens are (or have been) on welfare.
21 Between 1960 and 1996, the 
number of births to unmarried teens quadrupled from 87,000 to 376,000.
22 Despite this 
increase in births to teenaged women, most non-marital births (70%) were to women 
over 20 years of age and the majority of non-marital births (60%) were to white 
women.
23  
The prevention of out-of-wedlock pregnancies and births was a central goal of 
the 1996 Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act and prior 
state welfare reform efforts through welfare waivers. In 1996, the Congress made the 
following findings stated in the first section of the PRWORA:  
1.  Marriage is the foundation of a successful society; 
2.  Marriage is an essential institution of a successful society that 
promotes the interests of children; 
3.  The negative consequences of an out-of-wedlock birth on the 
mother, the child, the family, and society are well documented; and  
                                                 
19 Public Law 104-193, Title IV, Subtitle A. 
20 U.S. Congress, Committee on Ways & Means, Summary of Welfare Reform Made by P.L. 104-193—
Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996 and Associated Legislation 
(Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1996). 
21 U.S. Congress, Committee on Ways & Means, Summary of Welfare Reform. 
22 R. Wertheimer and K. Moore, “Childbearing by Teens: Links to Welfare Reform,” New Federalism 
Issue and Options for States, Series A, No. A-24 (Washington, DC: Urban Institute, August 1998). 
23 K. Moore, “Reducing Out of Wedlock Births: What States Need to Know” (Presentation given at the 
Virginia Forum on “The Commonwealth and You…Partners in Prevention!” November 1997, 1988).  
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4.  Therefore, in light of this demonstration of the crisis in our Nation, 
it is the sense of the Congress that prevention of out-of-wedlock 
pregnancy and reduction in out-of-wedlock birth are very important 
Government interests and the policy contained in part A of title IV 
of the Social Security Act (as amended by section 103(a) of this 
Act) is intended to address the crisis. 
24 
The justification for the focus on non-marital births was simple—the disadvantages of 
single motherhood frequently manifest themselves into poor outcomes for their 
children.  
The negative child outcomes associated with non-marital childbearing evoked 
a strong public interest in the issue and its connection to the cost of providing welfare 
benefits to unmarried mothers. Moreover, some scholars debate whether or not the 
provision of welfare benefits caused an increase in non-marital births, especially 
among teenage women.
25 The costs associated with non-marital births and particularly 
teen pregnancies are significant, and the costs were a primary catalyst for debating, 
drafting and passing the 1996 welfare reform legislation. 
Table 2.2 provides some costs associated with non-marital births to mothers, 
their children, and taxpayers highlighted in the Congressional findings in P.L.104-193 
(PRWORA): 
                                                 
24 U.S. Congress, House, Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996, 
HR 3734, 104
th Congress, Title I, section 101. 
25 Robert Moffitt, “Incentive Effects of the U.S. Welfare System: A Review,” Journal of Economic 
Literature 30 (1992), 3.  
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Table 2.2. Costs of Non-Marital Childbearing. 
Person(s) Affected  Associated Cost 
 
Taxpayers 
$6.9 billion each year to taxpayers due to increased medical care 
expenses, welfare and food stamps. 
 
53 percent of TANF funds dispersed goes to families formed by a teenage 
birth. 
 
 
Children 
Child of teen mother is 10 times more likely to live in poverty than a child 
born to a mother who is married, out of her teens and graduated from high 
school. 
 
The daughter of an adolescent mother is up to 83 percent more likely to 
become a teenage mother herself, and the son of an adolescent mother is 
2.7 times more likely to be arrested and imprisoned than the son of a 
mother who delayed childbearing until her early twenties.  
 
 
Mothers 
More than 80 percent of teen mothers become impoverished and 
dependent on welfare. 
 
Only three in every 10 adolescent mothers earn a high school diploma by 
the age of 30. 
 
During the first 13 years of parenthood, adolescents earn an average of 
about $5,600 annually, which is less than half the poverty level.  
Source: U.S. Congress, House, Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 
1996, HR 3734, 104
th Congress, Title I, section 101. 
As a result, reducing both the short and long term costs of non-marital births was an 
important part of the policy response embodied in the PRWORA. The Act included 
strict requirements of teen mothers as condition of receipt of their benefits (e.g., live at 
home, stay in school), family caps, time limits and reduction in benefits for non-
compliance in paternity proceedings. The Federal government also established specific 
annual numerical goals for preventing and reducing the incidence of these 
pregnancies, and States were granted increased flexibility in operating programs 
specifically designed to “prevent and reduce the incidence of out of wedlock 
pregnancies.”
26  
The PRWORA includes the following provisions to reduce the number of non- 
marital births:  
                                                 
26 Public Law 104-193, Title IV, Section 401.  
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a.  Teen mothers are required to live at home or with a responsible 
adult; 
b.  Teen mothers are required to attend school;A mandatory 25% 
benefit reduction is imposed on unmarried mothers who do not help 
with paternity establishment; 
d.  Funding was provided for abstinence education; 
e.  DHHS is required to rank states annually on their performance in 
reducing non-marital birth ratios;  
f.  $1 billion was provided over five years for performance bonuses to 
reward states that achieve goals of the Act; and 
g.  $400 million was provided in bonus payments to states that reduce 
their illegitimacy rates.The first two provisions are requirements of 
teen mothers as a condition of receipt of benefits, the third is a sanction against the 
mothers related to paternity establishment, and the fourth involves increased funding 
for abstinence only education ($50 million under Title V of the Social Security Act). 
The final three legislative provisions involve incentives for states to achieve the 
pregnancy reduction goals that were set forth in the legislation. Assessing the impact 
of the pregnancy reduction provisions of the legislation requires the exploration of the 
effect of the PRWORA provisions on non-marital birth rates from 1996 to the present.  
Conclusion 
Welfare reform will be at the forefront of political debates for many years to 
come. The legislative history of welfare policy illustrates the difficulties involved in 
reaching consensus on each major component of welfare programs. This is in large 
part due to: the administrative complexity of provision of benefits to over 2 million 
families; the disagreement between political parties on the means by which welfare 
can be made more efficient and more effective; and the moral principles revealed as  
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we decide who should receive services, what level of benefits they should receive and 
what the government can expect as a condition of benefit receipt. In essence, it is the 
content of welfare policies and the way in which programs and services are provided 
that reflects the public’s attitudes toward low-income families.  
At this time, increased regulation of the poor (particularly women with 
dependent children) in both policies and programs seems to be a political necessity, 
and as such the current welfare proposals demonstrate both the public’s dissatisfaction 
regarding the costs of welfare provision, and continued belief that the welfare system 
threatens both family values and the American work ethic.
27 The justification for these 
beliefs before and after PRWORA is partially due to an influx of social science 
research (see Chapter 3) on the relationship between non-marital births, poverty and 
welfare reform throughout the 1990s. Chapter 3 provides a review of the literature 
available prior to the passage of PRWORA, and in effect, the “evidence” by which 
many decisions were made by policy makers to address the continued impact of non-
marital childbearing on child outcomes. 
                                                 
27 Handler, The Poverty of Welfare Reform.  
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CHAPTER THREE 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
Teen Pregnancy Prevention Efforts, Family Planning, and Welfare Policy 
Introduction 
A review of the literature available prior to the passage of PRWORA provides 
the body of evidence many policy makers may have relied on to make legislative 
decisions to address the impact of non-marital childbearing on child well-being. The 
1996 legislation reforming welfare “expresse(d) the sense of the Congress that 
prevention of out of wedlock pregnancy and reduction in out of wedlock births are 
important Government interests.”
28 This emphasis on non-marital childbearing was in 
response to the increased number of single parent families dependent on welfare in the 
early to mid 1990s.  
In addition, a large body of social science research showed that children in 
one-parent families had an increased risk of abuse, poor academic achievement, 
behavior problems, unemployment, poverty, and were more likely to become single 
parents themselves. Changes to welfare rules to discourage non-marital childbearing 
began under welfare waivers in the early 1990s and continued after TANF in 1996.
29 
Many of the changes made were (and continue to be) based on an increased body of 
research about the relationship between welfare provisions and non-marital 
childbearing for both teens and adult women. For the most part, that research has 
failed to find a clear relationship between the two.
30  
Historically, measures to reduce out of wedlock child bearing have included 
public funding of contraception through family planning programs, the legalization of 
                                                 
28 Public Law 104-193, Title IV, Subtitle A. 
29 Paul Offner, “Reducing Non-Marital Births.” Welfare Reform and Beyond Policy Brief No. 5 
(Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, August 2001). 
30 R. Wertheimer, and K. Moore, “Childbearing by Teens: Links to Welfare Reform,” New Federalism 
Issue and Options for States. Series A, No. A-24 (Washington, DC: Urban Institute, August 1998); 
Offner, “Reducing Non-Marital Births”; Robert Moffitt, “Incentive Effects of the U.S. Welfare System: 
A Review,” Journal of Economic Literature 30 (1992): 1–61.  
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abortion, sex education programs
31 and numerous pregnancy prevention programs that 
were established and continue to be funded in all fifty states and the District of 
Columbia.  
The 1996 legislation changed the approach to reducing non-marital births by 
granting states an increased flexibility in operating their pregnancy prevention 
programs and by establishing “annual numerical goals for preventing and reducing the 
incidence of these pregnancies.”
32 As the legislation undergoes the reauthorization 
process, it is apparent that the first of the two primary objectives of welfare reform has 
been achieved – the welfare rolls are down by an unprecedented 53%. Reductions in 
non-marital childbearing are not as obvious, as the national percentage of births to 
unmarried women leveled off in 1998 and then began to rise slightly every year since. 
In some states, the rates have increased at more noticeable increments. Since 1994, 
however, there have been substantial decreases in teen pregnancy rates. While a large 
body of research
33 confirms the relationship between reducing both teen and adult 
non-marital births and improving child outcomes, there is little or no evidence that 
either pushing single mothers into the work force or off welfare altogether (due to time 
limits or sanctions) improves the well-being of their children. 
Policy measures such as time limits, family caps, increased work requirements, 
child support enforcement, minor parent provisions, and tougher sanctions for non-
compliance are all designed to make welfare participation less attractive. These new 
regulations are designed to discourage non-marital births, reduce long-term welfare 
dependence, and subsequently increase the ability of both parents to provide for their 
                                                 
31 K. Luker, Dubious Conceptions: The Politics of Teen Pregnancy (Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press, 1994). 
32 Public Law 104-193, Title IV, Section 401. 
33 Rebecca A. Maynard, ed., Kids Having Kids: A Robin Hood Foundation Special Report on the Costs 
of Adolescent Childbearing (New York: Robin Hood Foundation, 1996); Alan Guttmacher Institute. 
Teenage Pregnancy: Trends and Lessons Learned. Issues in Brief Series 2002, No. 1, 2002; U.S. 
Department of Health and Human Services, Report to Congress on Out of Wedlock Childbearing 
(Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1995).  
  35
children. Additionally, the relaxed rules for two parent families on welfare (in some 
states) are intended to encourage marriage and support two parent families in need.  
This chapter reviews the research and literature on the strength of association 
between non-marital childbearing, teen pregnancy and welfare dependence before and 
after the PRWORA passed in 1996. Note also that the research findings in Chapter 5 
examine the effect of policies and programs on non-marital childbearing and welfare 
participation, and are provided in conjunction with issues to consider in the context of 
reauthorization of the welfare law. 
Births to Unmarried Women 
In 2001, the percentage of births to unmarried women was more than one-third 
(33.4 percent),
34 and this percentage also varies from state to state – for example, non-
marital births in 2001 ranged from 17.4% of all births in Utah to 57.1% in the District 
of Columbia.  
The non-marital birth rate is defined as the number of births per 1,000 
unmarried women ages 15-44. In recent years non-marital birth rates increased for 
women ages 20-44, but declined for teenaged women. The Centers for Disease 
Control in 2002 reported a 5% decline in the national teen birth rate, from 48.5 births 
per 1,000 females aged 15-19 years in 2000 to 45.9 in 2001. Overall, the teen birth 
rate has declined 26 percent since 1991.
35 The greatest headway in pregnancy 
prevention has been made with younger teens (age 15-17), whose birthrate dropped 
8% in 2001, while the rate for older teens (18-19) also dropped, 4% in 2001.
36 The 
rates vary among states, although all states did show some decline as shown in Table 
3.1. 
                                                 
34 Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Births: Preliminary Data for 2001, NVSR Vol. 50, No. 
10, (PHS) 2002–1120, 2002. 
35 Ibid.  
36 Ibid.  
  36
In 2000 rates for teenagers 15-19 years ranged from 23.4 per 1,000 in New 
Hampshire to 72.0 in Mississippi. The highest rate was for the District of Columbia, 
80.7. Among younger teenagers (15-17 years), the rates ranged from 9.8 in New 
Hampshire to 45.0 in Mississippi; with the highest rate in the District of Columbia, 
60.7. Among older teenagers 18-19 years, the rates ranged from 44.5 in Vermont to 
114.1 in Arkansas.
37 
Race. The variation in non-marital birth rates also reflects differences in the 
composition of teenage populations in each state by race and Hispanic origin.
38 In fact, 
Wertheimer and Moore believe that most variation in non-marital birth rates among 
the states is due to racial composition in each state, given that Hispanic and African 
Americans have an increased number of teen pregnancies.
39 In general, rates for 
Blacks and Hispanics are much higher than that of White teens. Figure 3.1 shows that 
in 2001, the National Center for Health Statistics reported that 37.4 of every 1000 live 
births among White women ages 15-19 were to unmarried teens, whereas 71.4 per 
1000 births were to African American women ages 15-19, and 71.8 per 1000 to 
Hispanic women ages 15-19.
40  
                                                 
37 Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Teenage Births in the United States: State Trends, 1991–
2000, an Update, NVSR Volume 50, No. 9, (PHS) 2002–1120, 2002. 
38 S. Ventura, S. Curtin, and T. Mathews, Teenage Births in the United States: National and State 
Trends, 1990–1996 (National Vital Statistics System. Hyattsville, MD: National Center for Health 
Statistics, 1998). 
39 Wertheimer and Moore, “Childbearing by Teens: Links to Welfare Reform.” 
40 Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Births: Preliminary Data for 2001.  
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Table 3.1. Percent Births to Teenaged Women, Each State 1991 & 2000. 
  1991  2000  
         Percent change between 1991 
and 2000 
State  15-19 
years 
15-17 
years 
18-19 
years 
15-19 
years 
15-17 
years 
18-19 
years 
15-19 
years 
15-17 
years 
18-19 
years 
United States
a  62.1 38.7 94.4 48.5 27.4 79.2 -21.9  -29.2  -16.1 
Alabama  73.9 47.7 109.5  62.9 37.9 97.3 -14.9  -20.5  -11.1 
Alaska  65.4 35.3 111.7  42.4 23.6 69.4 -35.2  -33.1  -37.9 
Arizona  80.7 51.4 122.6  69.1 41.1 111.3  -14.4  -20.0  9.2 
Arkansas  79.8 49.4 122.8  68.5 36.7 114.1  -14.2  -25.7  -7.1 
California  74.7 46.9 113.6  48.5 28.6 75.6 -35.1  -39.0  -33.5 
Colorado  58.2 35.3 91.4 49.2 28.6 79.8 -15.5  -19.0  -12.7 
Connecticut  40.4 26.3 59.4 31.9 16.9 56.3 -21.0  -35.7  **-5.2 
Delaware  61.1 40.3 87.1 51.6 30.5 80.2 -15.5  -24.3  **-7.9 
District of Columbia  114.4  102.8  125.5  80.7  60.7  101.8  -29.5  -41.0  -18.9 
Florida  68.8 44.0 102.9  52.6 29.7 88.0 -23.5  -32.5  -14.5 
Georgia  76.3 50.6 110.9  64.2 36.8 104.3  -15.9  -27.3  -6.0 
Hawaii  58.7 34.7 91.5 45.1 24.7 70.5 -23.2  -28.8  -23.0 
Idaho  53.9 29.3 90.8 43.1 21.3 72.8 -20.0  -27.3  -19.8 
Illinois  64.8 40.6 99.1 49.5 28.5 81.1 -23.6  -29.8  -18.2 
Indiana  60.5 35.2 95.2 50.3 26.2 85.9 -16.9  -25.6  -9.8 
Iowa  42.6 22.8 71.5 34.7 17.4 60.3 -18.5  -23.7  -15.7 
Kansas  55.4 29.4 94.1 45.3 22.4 78.5 -18.2  -23.8  -16.6 
Kentucky  68.9 42.6 105.5  55.3 29.2 92.2 -19.7  -31.5  -12.6 
Louisiana  76.1 51.1 111.4  62.1 36.3 97.1 -18.4  -29.0  -12.8 
Maine  43.5 23.8 70.1 28.7 13.4 52.8 -34.0  -43.7  -24.7 
Maryland  54.3 35.2 79.8 41.6 23.8 68.8 -23.4  -32.4  -13.8 
Massachusetts  37.8 25.2 52.9 27.1 15.0 44.9 -28.3  -40.5  -15.1 
Michigan  59.0 35.5 91.1 39.2 21.3 66.3 -33.6  -40.0  -27.2 
Minnesota  37.3 20.7 61.4 29.6 15.6 51.0 -20.6  -24.6  -16.9 
Mississippi  85.6 60.1 120.4  72.0 45.0 109.9  -15.9  -25.1  -8.7 
Missouri  64.5 38.7 100.7  48.8 26.5 82.2 -24.3  -31.5  -18.4 
Montana  46.7 23.6 83.0 35.8 19.1 60.8 -23.3  -19.1  -26.7 
Nebraska  42.4 23.6 69.2 37.2 19.3 62.7 -12.3  -18.2  -9.4 
Nevada  75.3 43.9 119.1  62.2 34.2 106.7  -17.4  -22.1  -10.4 
New  Hampshire  33.3 17.1 53.8 23.4 9.8  45.4 -29.7  -42.7  -15.6 
New  Jersey  41.6 26.3 62.9 31.7 17.0 54.9 -23.8  -42.7  -15.6  
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Table 3.1 (Continued). 
  1991  2000  
         Percent change between 1991 
and 2000 
State  15-19 
years 
15-17 
years 
18-19 
years 
15-19 
years 
15-17 
years 
18-19 
years 
15-19 
years 
15-17 
years 
18-19 
years 
New  Mexico  79.8 50.0 124.4  66.2 40.2 105.1  -17.0  -19.6  -15.5 
New  York  46.0 29.1 69.0 35.6 20.1 58.1 -22.6  -30.9  -15.8 
North  Carolina  70.5 46.2 101.7  59.9 32.8 101.4  -15.0  -29.0  **-0.3 
North  Dakota  35.6 18.1 62.4 28.2 12.5 51.4 -20.8  -30.9  -17.6 
Ohio  60.5 36.2 93.8 45.6 24.1 77.2 -24.6  -33.4  -17.7 
Oklahoma  72.1 41.7 115.6  60.1 32.9 99.8 -16.6  -21.1  -13.7 
Oregon  54.9 31.3 90.7 43.2 23.5 72.8 -21.3  -24.9  -19.7 
Pennsylvania  46.9 29.2 70.5 35.2 19.6 58.8 -24.9  -32.9  -16.6 
Rhode  Island  45.4 30.1 63.6 38.4 21.3 64.0 -15.4  -29.2  **-0.6 
South  Carolina  72.9 48.0 105.4  60.6 36.7 92.9 -16.9  -23.5  -11.9 
South  Dakota  47.5 26.3 79.2 37.2 19.4 62.2 -21.7  -26.2  -21.5 
Tennessee  75.2 47.8 112.1  61.5 34.2 101.6  -18.2  -28.5  -9.4 
Texas  78.9 50.4 119.3  69.2 42.7 107.1  -12.3  -15.3  -10.2 
Utah  48.2 27.0 79.8 40.0 22.0 62.7 -17.0  -18.5  -21.4 
Vermont  39.2 21.3 62.0 24.1 10.6 44.5 -38.5  -50.2  -28.2 
Virginia  53.5 31.8 81.2 40.8 21.7 66.9 -23.7  -31.8  -17.6 
Washington  53.7 31.0 86.5 38.2 20.3 64.5 -28.9  -34.5  -25.4 
West  Virginia  57.4 32.4 93.2 46.4 22.8 79.8 -19.7  -29.6  -14.4 
Wisconsin  43.7 24.8 71.2 34.5 18.3 58.8 -21.1  -26.2  -17.4 
Wyoming  54.2 26.4 98.6 40.8 19.0 73.4 -24.7  -28.0  -25.6 
**Not significant at p < 0.05 
 
a Excludes data for the territories. Note: Birth rates by State shown in this table are based on population estimates provided by the U.S. Bureau of the 
Census, projected from the 1990 census; see reference 2. Therefore, the rates shown here may differ from rates computed on the basis of other population 
estimates. 
Source: National Vital Statistics Report, vol. 50, no.10, June 6, 2002. 
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Recently, the greatest reduction in teen birthrates was among African 
American teens, which declined from 108.5 births to unmarried teenage women in 
2000 to 71.4 per 1000 in 2001. Between 2000 and 2001, birthrates for Hispanic teens 
have not shown a similar decline, with a rate of 72.4 per 1000 births in 2000 to a 71.8 
per 1000 among teens in 2001.
41  
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Figure 3.1. Non-Marital Birth Rate, by Race, Women Age 15–19 Years,  
Selected Years. 
Source: National Vital Statistics Report, vol. 51, no.2, December 18, 2002. 
Other factors influence the non-marital birth rates more generally. For 
example, some researchers
42 have stressed overall changes in the population, 
specifically, the increased number of women of reproductive age that can influence 
birthrates. This demographic trend can increase all births, including those to unmarried 
                                                 
41 Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Births: Preliminary Data for 2001.  
42 For example, S. Ventura at the NCHS, I. Sawhill at Brookings Institution, and Kristin Moore of Child 
Trends.  
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women. Additionally, married women have had fewer children in recent years, which 
can lead to a corollary rise in the non-marital birth ratio.
43 
Consequences of Non-Marital Childbearing  
State efforts to prevent teen pregnancy and non-marital childbearing vary 
under the PRWORA, as each state has flexibility to design their own programs and 
implement specific measures (e.g., family caps, time limits) as a means to reduce out 
of wedlock births. The Congressional language in the PRWORA clearly articulates the 
need to reduce non-marital births, as childbearing by single women (not just 
adolescents) has many consequences for the child born outside of marriage. 
Additionally, children born to parents who marry after discovering a pregnancy are 
more likely to experience divorce, and as result, are likely to be brought up without 
one of their parents in their home. Finally, growing up in a single parent household has 
its own set of risks, including but not limited to; high school drop out, early 
childbearing, lower academic achievement, and behavior problems.
44  
Interestingly, those consequences of being born to an unmarried mother mirror 
the factors that predict early childbearing, as numerous studies have shown that school 
failure, behavior problems, family dysfunction and poverty increase the likelihood that 
a woman will have a child outside of marriage.
45 Thus, the same factors that predict 
early childbearing for the mother become risk factors for their children, establishing a 
strong likelihood of inter-generational incidents of non-marital births and welfare 
dependence.  
                                                 
43 Offner, “Reducing Non-Marital Births.” 
44 Institute of Medicine Committee on Unintended Pregnancy, The Best Intentions: Unintended 
Pregnancy and the Well-Being of Children and Families (Washington, DC: National Academy Press, 
1995). 
45 Wertheimer and Moore, “Childbearing by Teens: Links to Welfare Reform.”  
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Causes of Non-Marital Childbearing 
Despite all the research on the consequences and causes of early childbearing, 
there still remains widespread disagreement on what caused the increases in non-
marital childbearing in the 1990s. This led to debates among legislators and 
researchers on how to solve the problem, as different perspectives on the root cause of 
a social problem inevitably led to various proposed solutions.  
Several theories on the underlying cause of increases in non-marital 
childbearing were offered at the time leading up to the passage of PRWORA. First, 
many believed that non-marital births increased because of an incentive created by 
welfare provisions. However, evidence of this theory is mixed, as Moffitt found a 
slight majority of researchers who found an incentive effect in their research.
46 Others 
believed that as more women entered the workforce they were able to support 
themselves, and the financial necessity of marriage was reduced. Wilson posited that 
the marriage rate was down because the low employability of men made them less 
attractive to marry.
47 The evidence of this was also mixed, as research conducted by 
the Brookings Institution found that the marriage rates fell at the same rate among 
well-educated and less educated black men.
48  
Changes in social norms and values were also offered as a root cause of the 
increase in non-marital births, as Sawhill proposed that sexual mores changed such 
that marriage is no longer a prerequisite to pregnancy and/or childbearing.
49 Finally, 
many researchers believed that welfare policies themselves created the upward trend 
in births to unmarried women. In fact, they found that some welfare regulations 
                                                 
46 Robert Moffitt, ed., “The Effect of Welfare on Marriage and Fertility,” in Welfare, the Family and 
Reproductive Behavior (Washington, DC: National Academies Press, 1998). 
47 William Julius Wilson, The Truly Disadvantaged: The Inner City, the Underclass, and Public Policy 
(Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1987). 
48 Isabel Sawhill, “What Can Be Done to Reduce Teen Pregnancy and Out-of-Wedlock Births?” 
Welfare Reform and Beyond Policy Brief No. 8 (Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, October 
2001). 
49 Ibid.  
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created marriage penalties; as income increases benefits decline – which is common in 
means tested programs – but when coupled with the reductions in TANF, food stamps, 
Medicaid, and EITC, the total reductions can be as high as 85% per dollar of income.
50 
Sawhill contradicts this idea, as she believes there is little evidence that these 
provisions directly discourage marriage, because often people don’t understand the 
laws, or the penalties incurred are not a part of the marriage decision.
51 Although the 
scope of research provided about the increase in non-marital births in the 1990s was 
large, it did not lead to a consensus on causes of the upward trend and influenced the 
solutions proposed to reverse the trend. 
Efforts to Discourage Non-marital childbearing 
There are many possible approaches to reduce non-marital births. Obviously, 
the first is to prevent unintended pregnancy among unmarried women, especially 
teens. A corollary approach is to increase the education and employment opportunities 
of young women to make the opportunity cost of an early pregnancy higher. 
Prevention efforts that target unmarried men (especially ages 15–25) have also had 
some impact on teen pregnancy rates in local communities.
52 For some women, 
marriage incentives may be appropriate (e.g., removing monetary disincentives to 
marriage for women on welfare). Finally, encouraging unmarried couples to delay 
childbearing to a later age (preferably after marriage) may reduce non-marital births 
and increase the formation of two parent families. It is important to note, however, that 
inducing people to marriage before they had planned to do so may not ensure children 
are raised in two parent homes – as these couples may face a higher risk of divorce.  
                                                 
50 Offner, “Reducing Non-Marital Births.” 
51 Sawhill, “What Can Be Done to Reduce Teen Pregnancy and Out-of-Wedlock Births?” 
52 Freya Sonenstein et al., Involving Males in Preventing Teen Pregnancy (The Urban Institute, 1997).  
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Teen Pregnancy and Welfare Dependence 
The minor parent provisions (requiring teens to live at home and stay in school 
as a condition of benefits) in the 1996 Act are designed to address the connection 
between teen pregnancy and welfare receipt. The reduction of teen pregnancy seemed 
relevant to the broader goal of reducing not only non-marital childbearing, but also 
welfare dependence because 75% of teens relied on welfare benefits within 5 years of 
a non-marital birth, and 55% of welfare mothers were teens at the time of their first 
birth.
53 
According to Sawhill,
54 there are several important reasons for focusing on 
teen pregnancy prevention as a way to reduce the overall rate of non-marital births. 
1.  Half of all first non-marital births are to teens;  
2.  Once teens have had their first child they are more likely to 
have additional children out of wedlock. 
3.  Half of all current welfare recipients had their first child as a 
teenager. 
4.  All single mothers face challenges raising children;  
o  Teens are at an even greater disadvantage. 
  Only 20% of teen mothers receive ANY support 
from fathers, and 80% of them end up on welfare; 
and 
  They have longer spells on welfare. 
5.  Teen childbearing is more costly than adult non-marital 
childbearing.
55  
                                                 
53 U.S. Committee on Ways & Means, Summary of Welfare Reform Made by P.L. 104-193—Personal 
Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996 and Associated Legislation 
(Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1996). 
54 Sawhill, “What Can Be Done to Reduce Teen Pregnancy and Out-of-Wedlock Births?”  
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The disadvantage related to early childbearing is not only a direct result of the 
early birth, but also the disadvantaged background of the mother in the first place 
(e.g., poverty, lack of education). However, regardless of the mother’s background, it 
is well documented that teen mothers are less likely to finish high school or get 
married in their lifetime.
56 In addition, they are more likely to have additional children 
outside of marriage, and unwed mothers who eventually marry still have higher rates 
of divorce, poverty and welfare dependence.
57 These rates illustrate that encouraging 
marriage is not always the best solution for many women, and efforts to prevent 
pregnancy are also important to increase the odds of success for young women at risk.  
The link between teen childbearing and subsequent welfare receipt has been 
well established and it is important to also remember that adolescent mothers are not 
yet adults. As such, the consequences of an early birth are experienced by both the 
teen mother and her child(ren). Appendix D provides a detailed list of the 
consequences for both mother and child due to adolescent childbearing. Consequences 
for the child born out of wedlock include low birth weight, higher rates of chronic 
illness,
58 lower academic performance,
59 higher rates of abuse and neglect,
60 and 
poverty.
61 Adolescent mothers are less likely to complete their education,
62 have lower 
                                                                                                                                              
55 Ibid. For example, Mathematica Policy Research estimates $7 billion a year, $3200 per teen birth 
(Rebecca A. Maynard, ed., Kids Having Kids: Economic Costs and Social Consequences of Teen 
Pregnancy [Washington, DC: Urban Institute Press; Lanham, MD, 1997]). 
56 D. Lichter and D. Graef, “Finding a Mate? The Marital and Cohabitation Histories of Unwed 
Mothers,” in Out-of-Wedlock: Causes, and Consequences of Nonmarital Fertility, ed. L. L. Wu and B. 
L. Wolfe, 317–343. (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 2001). 
57 Sawhill, “What Can Be Done to Reduce Teen Pregnancy and Out-of-Wedlock Births?” 
58 Rebecca A. Maynard, ed., Kids Having Kids: A Robin Hood Foundation Special Report on the Costs 
of Adolescent Childbearing (New York: Robin Hood Foundation, 1996); B. Wolfe and M. Perozek, 
“Teen Children’s Health and Health Care Use, in Maynard, Kids Having Kids: Economic Costs and 
Social Costs of Teen Pregnancy, 181–203. 
59 Maynard, Kids Having Kids: A Robin Hood Foundation Special Report on the Costs of Adolescent 
Childbearing; R. H. Haveman, B. Wolfe, and E. Peterson, “Children of Early Childbearers as Young 
Adults,” in Maynard, Kids Having Kids: Economic Costs and Social Costs of Teen Pregnancy, chapter 
9. 
60 Sawhill, “What Can Be Done to Reduce Teen Pregnancy and Out-of-Wedlock Births?” 
61 National Campaign to Prevent Teen Pregnancy, President Isabel Sawhill, Analysis of the 1999 
Current Population Survey, a Monthly Survey of about 50,000 Households Conducted by the Bureau of  
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incomes,
63 have more children out of wedlock,
64 and face decreased marriage 
prospects.
65 The consequences experienced by both the mother and child are severe 
and long term, and the children of teens face greater problems than those born to older 
mothers.  
Non-marital Pregnancy Prevention: What’s been done so far? 
Pregnancy prevention programs vary in the governmental level at which they 
are implemented, target population they are intended to reach, type of program, and 
the theoretical underpinning of the program.
66  
Implementation Level. Prevention efforts differ by the level of government 
responsible for their implementation. Two primary types of programs exist to reduce 
out of wedlock births: national programs that help finance contraceptive services like 
Medicaid and Title X of the Public Health Service Act; and community-based 
pregnancy prevention programs.  
Target population. The general population for pregnancy prevention programs 
includes all women of childbearing age, from 15 years old to 44 years old. Preventing 
non-marital births involves a varied population of women who are usually targeted 
through community based prevention programs. However, most programs focus on 
reaching younger women in their teens or early twenties. 
                                                                                                                                              
the Census for the Bureau of Labor Statistics (Washington, DC: National Campaign to Prevent Teen 
Pregnancy, 2000). 
62 V. J. Hotz, S. W. McElroy, and S. G. Sanders, “The Impacts of Teenage Childbearing on the Mothers 
and the Consequences of those Impacts for Government,” in Maynard, Kids Having Kids: Economic 
Costs and Social Costs of Teen Pregnancy, 55–94. 
63 National Campaign to Prevent Teen Pregnancy, President Isabel Sawhill, Analysis of the 1999 
Current Population Survey. 
64 D. S. Kalmuss and P. B. Namerow, “Subsequent Childbearing among Teenage Mothers: The 
Determinants of Closely Spaced Second Birth,” Family Planning Perspectives 26, no. 4 (1994): 149–
153, 159. 
65 D. Lichter and D. Graef, “Finding a Mate?” 
66 K. Moore, B. Sugland, C. Blumenthal, D. Glei, and N. Snyder, Adolescent Pregnancy Prevention 
Programs: Interventions and Evaluations (Washington, DC: Child Trends, Inc., 1995).  
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Types of teen prevention programs. The National Campaign to Prevent Teen 
Pregnancy identified five main types of prevention programs: sex and HIV education 
programs; programs designed to improve access to contraceptives; sex education for 
parents and their children; multiple component programs; and youth development 
programs.
67 In addition to these community based programs, there are several national 
media campaigns that focus on teen pregnancy because a higher proportion of teens 
experiencing a birth out of wedlock are likely to be welfare dependent, despite the fact 
that 70% of out of wedlock pregnancies are to women over the age of twenty.  
Programs for women over 20. Where do women over 20 at risk of a non-
marital birth receive their services if not through the programs listed above? Many 
poor women over age 20 receive services through Title X and Medicaid (a brief 
history and description of family planning efforts follows in the next section). Women 
with more financial resources receive their services through private health care and are 
by definition, not as great a risk of non-marital childbearing as women from 
disadvantaged backgrounds. 
Theoretical Underpinnings. Most well designed prevention programs start with 
a theoretical model of the major components involved in the problem they are 
intending to ameliorate. In the area of out of wedlock births, the research literature 
cites eight theories of learning believed to explain the dynamics of issues surrounding 
an out of wedlock pregnancy. Appendix E provides a summary of each theory. In 
addition, the provisions set forth in the legislation, and how they relate to each theory 
is discussed in the next chapter. Regardless, it is important to note that program 
content will vary according to the basic philosophical tenets to which administrators 
subscribe.  
                                                 
67 D. Kirby, No Easy Answers: Research Findings on Programs to Reduce Teen Pregnancy 
(Washington, D.C.: National Campaign to Prevent Teen Pregnancy, March 1997), 24.  
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The research literature cites eight theories of learning believed to explain the 
dynamics of issues surrounding an out of wedlock pregnancy. To understand the 
legislative sanctions placed on teen mothers under welfare reform, the three most 
popular theories are outlined and discussed in a legislative context.  
Social learning theory posits that the likelihood of an individual engaging in or 
avoiding some type of behavior is determined by the individual’s understanding of the 
association between that behavior and a particular outcome. The individual must next 
believe that he/she has the capacity to avoid the behavior, and that the method for 
avoiding the outcome will be effective. The individual must also believe there is 
benefit to avoiding the outcome. One way to develop attitudes about the behavior is 
through observation of others, witnessing the rewards or sanctions of the behavior and 
then acting out according to their own belief.
68 Relating this theory to non-marital 
childbearing it is clear that unmarried women (regardless of their age) need to perceive 
a non-marital birth as an outcome that will have a deleterious effect on either their 
present or future circumstances. In addition, this theory would also posit that those 
children raised by single mothers are less likely to make that observation, if their 
primary role model (mothers) did not perceive the impact of a non-marital birth as 
impacting their own outcomes; and thus, could explain some of the issues underlying 
intergenerational welfare dependence.  
The culture of poverty perspective is the most politically charged of the 
theories and argues that adolescent sexual and fertility behavior is “both an adaptation 
and reaction of the poor to their marginal place in society.”
69 One main tenet of this is 
that youth are aware of their limited opportunities and poor living conditions and as a 
result, adopt standards of behavior that would be considered unacceptable by 
mainstream society. Wilson argues that these behavioral norms are a result of 
                                                 
68 Moore et al., Adolescent Pregnancy Prevention Programs, 63. 
69 Ibid., 64.  
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structural factors and inequality.
70 Murray argued that welfare programs have 
rewarded this behavior over time and led to patterns of inter generational 
dependency.
71  
In PRWORA, these two theories may have influenced the inclusion of minor 
parent provisions, which require teens to live at home or in an “adult-supervised” 
setting as condition of benefit receipt. Thus, for teens who may have believed early 
childbearing would result in government supported independent living, this approach 
may serve to discourage childbearing, as the reward of living on their own is no longer 
available to them. In addition, the minor parent provisions also require teen mothers to 
attend high school or an alternative educational setting (e.g., GED, vocational training) 
as soon as their child reaches twelve weeks old. These conditions must be met to 
receive monetary benefits, and as such, these measures are intended to discourage any 
perceived reward to early childbearing. While the minor parent provisions are 
intended to remove any perceived gains from an early birth for teenaged women, they 
rely on the assumption that teens have the capacity to make rational, long-term 
decisions in their best interest.  
The minor parent provisions may have an unintended affect when analyzed 
under an opportunity cost model of fertility behavior among teens. In fact, there may 
be a portion of teens at risk of early childbearing who delay risky behavior because 
they fear being kicked out of their family home or having to drop out of school as a 
result of an early birth. The requirements set forth in the 1996 Act could have the 
reverse effect; teens may feel reassured that they would have place to live and also be 
provided means and incentives to finish school despite having a child at an early age. 
Consequently, the minor parent provisions could be seen as contrary to the opportunity 
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cost model of prevention, which is based on the assumption that young women believe 
they have nothing to lose by having an early birth. To address the notion of 
opportunity costs, prevention efforts would focus on increasing the opportunities of 
young women for meaningful employment and emphasize the utility of an education 
to facilitate that employment. 
Models of analysis 
Cost benefit. Economists have examined factors such as higher wages that 
increase the cost of non-marital child bearing and should therefore be associated with 
decreased rates of fertility. Factors that decrease the cost of non-marital child bearing, 
for example, welfare benefits that vary with the number of children a woman bears, 
should be associated with increased rates in fertility.
72 These economic factors are 
frequently discussed as a cost-benefit analysis, which examines “total cost” (which 
includes indirect/direct costs) associated with the decision to bear a child out of 
wedlock relative to the benefit of that decision. Direct costs include prenatal care, 
delivery cost, and childcare cost. Indirect costs include lower educational attainment, 
decreased employment or lost wages, poverty and decreased marriage prospects. The 
benefits commonly listed are welfare benefits and the emotional benefits of 
parenthood. The cost-benefit approach assumes that increases in teen pregnancy and 
non-marital childbearing were a result of welfare benefits in the early and mid 1990s. 
This assumption has mixed support in the research literature,
73 and it is important to 
note that, “the current policy debate over the causes of out-of-wedlock birth continues 
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to be dominated by incentive-based explanations even though virtually all past studies 
show small or no effect of welfare programs on out-of-wedlock birth.”
74  
Increasing economic opportunities for women (especially teens) should 
increase the opportunity cost of out of wedlock births, but at the same time this also 
empowers women to choose single motherhood and gives some women (e.g. middle 
class) the financial means to do so.
75 Peters et al. discuss a model of planned fertility 
that posits that a woman will weigh the costs (financial and personal) of bearing a 
child against the benefits, and choose to have the child when the benefits are greater 
than the costs. Thus, in the standard model the decision is based heavily on income 
available to support the child. Consequently, the fact that welfare benefits are only 
provided to single women with children underlies the assumption that the very 
provision of benefits may provide an incentive for a woman to choose to have the 
child outside of marriage (rather than terminate the pregnancy or marry the child’s 
father).
76 The choice of single parenthood over marriage is also more likely for a 
woman whose child is fathered by a man with little or no earning potential. 
Additionally, note that the majority of births to unmarried women were 
unintended at the time of conception – 78% of pregnancies to unmarried women, 
63% of pregnancies to formerly married women,
77 and 80% of pregnancies to teen 
aged women.
78 Thus, it is important to consider if the standard economic model can be 
applied to unplanned pregnancies – as a basis for appropriate policy measures to 
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reduce the rate of non-marital births, particularly for young, unmarried women with 
few means to support themselves or their children.  
The impact of a mistimed or unwanted pregnancy on the decision to have a 
child outside of marriage requires an understanding of each woman’s view of welfare 
at the time she discovers her pregnancy. Specifically, are the costs associated with the 
birth lower when single women are eligible for government-supported assistance, or 
does the stigma associated with welfare dependence increase the perceived cost to the 
mother? It is likely that each expectant mother’s perception of reliance on public 
assistance is contingent on her background such as the family structure she grew up in 
(as we know that daughters of single mothers are more likely to have a child out of 
wedlock).  
Lost earnings that result from leaving the labor force to care for the child are 
the primary opportunity costs for women over 20 who have a child outside of 
marriage. Peters et al. suggest that the “opportunity costs of children are lower for 
women whose earnings potential is lower because of poor education or lack of 
experience…This suggests that welfare policies that increase education require work 
or otherwise help increase women’s earnings are likely to reduce fertility.”
79 However, 
for young women (under 20 years of age) the opportunity costs of a child born out of 
wedlock are very different. For example, many teens do not yet have significant 
earning power; so lost wages are not part of their cost benefit ratio. The decision 
making process for teens is not as well understood, but research confirms the 
importance of expectations for future education and employment possibilities on 
adolescent behavior.
80 The cost-benefit approach to non-marital fertility offers insight 
into potential approaches to modify fertility behavior, and may underlie some of the 
policy measures whose impact is estimated in Chapter 4. 
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Very much related to cost benefit analysis, Bane and Ellwood
81 label the recent 
welfare reform provisions that deny additional benefits to women who have another 
child while on public assistance (family cap) as the rational choice model.
82 Peters et 
al. also apply a rational decision-making approach that focuses on financial incentives 
as primary variables of interest and stress that, “other things equal, financial incentives 
can make a difference, even for demographic behavior.”
83 The question is, if we know 
that financial incentives can impact decisions regarding out of wedlock births, what 
are the other primary factors that shape a woman’s decision to have a child outside of 
marriage? And, how does the strength of financial incentives differ by age, race and 
ethnicity of the mother?  
The rational choice model is generally appropriate for modeling planned 
fertility decisions, and is not a perfect fit for analysis of non-marital childbearing. This 
is because the choices a woman is forced to make after the discovery of an unintended 
pregnancy are much different than those made by a woman before she intentionally 
becomes pregnant. The stress alone of making choices after discovering a mistimed 
pregnancy changes the influence of every part of the cost-benefit ratio. In addition, for 
teenage women, decisions regarding sexual activity and contraception are rarely 
rational and it is unlikely that many teenagers understand that the chances are that they 
will be on welfare within five years of having a child born outside of marriage.  
Kaestner believes that the lack of explanatory power of the rational choice 
model and the commonly held view that values and culture are the cause of out-of-
wedlock births, suggests “that research efforts should be directed toward uncovering 
the empirical relationship between cultural factors and family structure.”
84 This point 
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is particularly salient when examining differences in non-marital birth rates between 
racial and ethnic groups. Schneider suggests a “holistic anthropological approach” is 
needed to facilitate “different strategies for policy makers and scholars interested in 
solutions to urban poverty.”
85 Previous discussion showed two approaches to 
addressing the structural causes of non-marital birth rates: to account for cultural 
differences when setting forth policy solutions (e.g., Wilson, 1986, 1996); or to set 
forth policies designed to modify (culturally based) behaviors that may lead to 
increased births outside of marriage (Murray, 1994.). 
Successful Teen Pregnancy Prevention Efforts 
Pregnancy prevention efforts have two primary goals, to delay sexual 
intercourse for non-active teens and/or to encourage contraceptive use for teens and 
unmarried women that are sexually active. One major obstacle to establishing (or 
continuing) these prevention programs is the notion that the programs in and of 
themselves cause increases in adolescent sexual activity and pregnancies. However, 
this idea is not supported by research, and several studies have shown no relation 
between programs and increased sexual activity or pregnancies. For example, the 
Institute of Medicine found that “programs that provide information on both 
abstinence and contraceptive use neither encourage the onset of sexual intercourse nor 
increase the frequency of intercourse among adolescents; in fact, programs that 
provide both messages appear to be effective in delaying the onset of sexual 
intercourse and encouraging contraceptive use, especially among younger 
adolescents.”
86 
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Research also shows that adolescent pregnancy is a complex problem 
associated with individual risk factors such as school achievement, risk taking, and 
personal aspirations; and family characteristics such as family structure, monitoring, 
communication, values, poverty, economic and educational opportunities.
87 The New 
York State Task Force on Preventing out of Wedlock Births found that prevention 
efforts must take into account racial, religious, and cultural, gender, age and economic 
differences in designing programs.
88  
Reduction of the national rate of births to unmarried women requires further 
examination of the capacity of successful programs to affect behavior across diverse 
communities, particularly based on race and socioeconomic class. Knowledge about 
how to reach adult men and women has always been more limited and most 
prevention efforts are targeted to adolescents who are easier to reach than adults.  
Impact of Teen Pregnancy Programs in Reducing Out Of Wedlock Births 
In the mid-1990s, despite the reports that many existing programs were making 
an impact on teen birth rates in their communities, research showed that a “stronger, 
larger, more long-term and more coherent intervention strategy was needed.”
89 Critics 
cited several deficits of programs. First, few prevention programs were theory based 
and therefore, lacked a clear operational model. This led to problems assessing the 
program’s impact if their goals and objectives were not explicated through the 
framework a model would provide. Second, many prevention programs lacked 
systematic and rigorous evaluations. In addition, many prevention programs reached a 
small population (affecting only that community’s problem), with a modest impact on 
state and national rates. Many programs were short lived either due to lack of funding 
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or due to program design. Consequently there was not enough time to refine 
intervention strategies on the basis of community feedback and evaluation results.
90  
In general, before PRWORA, these prevention efforts were rarely seen as a 
success, as the language in the 1996 legislation defined out of wedlock pregnancy, not 
just teen pregnancy, as a “major social problem.”
91 At that time, one opposing view 
was that “federal programs have slowed, but not reversed teen pregnancy rates,” and 
that given how sexually active teens had become, “these programs are a success, but 
are seen as a failure.”
92 Thus, at the time of PRWORA’s passage, the evidence of 
program successes and opinions offered on that success were conflicted, at best.  
Recent research confirms the success achieved by teen pregnancy prevention 
efforts, as the Centers for Disease Control 2002 report that the teen pregnancy rate is 
at a new record low, after falling for the last ten years,
93 and since 1991, the teen birth 
rate has declined by 26 percent. While there has been a consistent decline in the teen 
birth rate, it is hard to know the extent of influence Federal policies and state programs 
has had on that reduction. However, researchers from the National Campaign to 
Prevent Teen Pregnancy believe that it is likely that the increased flexibility granted to 
states in program design and delivery under PRWORA is a factor in the increased 
effectiveness of these programs.
94 
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State Program Efforts: Teen Pregnancy 
Early efforts under PRWORA focused both Federal policy and state program 
efforts on decreasing the welfare rolls and moving people to work. In the late 1990s, 
however there was a noticeable increase in state efforts to reduce teen pregnancy and 
adult non-marital childbearing [see Appendix F]. 
Child Trends
95 reports that 23 states provide contraceptive education in public 
schools, 26 provide abstinence only programs, and 15 have a mixed curriculum that 
incorporates more than one component in program delivery. Table 3.2 shows an 
increase in most types of teen pregnancy prevention programs from 1997 to 1999.  
Table 3.2: State Teen Pregnancy Prevention Programs. 
Policy  Number of States 1997  Number of States 1999 
Pregnancy prevention policy 
in public schools 
 
18 
 
28 
Family planning services to 
teens 
 
33  
 
44 
Contraceptive education in 
public schools 
 
14 
 
23 
Contraceptive clinics in 
public schools 
 
3 
 
3 
Abstinence Education in 
schools 
 
20 
 
26 
Media Campaign  15  36 
Source: R. Wertheimer, J. Jager, and K. Moore, “State Policy Initiatives for Reducing Teen and 
Adult Non-Marital Childbearing: Family Planning to Family Caps,” New Federalism Issue and 
Options for States, Series A, No. A-43 (Washington, DC: Urban Institute, November 2000). 
Reliance on abstinence education as a means to reduce teen pregnancy occurs despite 
the evidence
96 that more comprehensive sex education has a greater impact on both 
delaying onset of teen sexual activity and an increased use of contraception. Further, 
only 14% of states have a “truly comprehensive policy that teaches about both 
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abstinence and contraception as a part of a broader program designed to teach 
adolescents to become sexually healthy adults.”
97 While the increase in various types 
of prevention programs has played a role in the substantial declines of unintended 
pregnancy among teens in the 1990s, research by the Alan Guttmacher Institute 
indicates that this rate could decline even more if the focus on abstinence was coupled 
with contraceptive education.
98 
Targeting Males in Prevention Efforts 
There is growing attention to the responsibilities of boys and young men in 
preventing teen pregnancy and 40 states have strategies to prevent unwanted or too-
early fatherhood by 1999.
99 The best available data show that after increasing 32 
percent between 1986 and 1991, the teen birth rate for fathers aged 15-19 remained 
fairly constant until 1994, then decreased 16 percent between 1994 and 1999.
100 
Although pregnancy prevention programs in high schools are an important way to 
reach young men at risk, many of the fathers of children born to teen mothers are 
older; almost half of young men who impregnate a minor teen (under 18) are three or 
more years older.
101 As are result, a critical step needed to further impact teen 
pregnancy rates is to focus on men in their late teens and early twenties. Thus, the 
1996 Act identifies two possible avenues to reach males at risk of fathering children 
outside of marriage are; to enforce statutory rape laws, and/or to use a national media 
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campaign to raise awareness of tougher penalties against men who father children 
outside marriage, especially involving teenaged women.
102 
Adult Non-marital Childbearing 
One component of prevention efforts that is key to reducing unintended 
pregnancies among women (teens and older) is increased access to effective 
contraception.
103 As shown in Table 3.3, 32 states are trying to improve access to 
contraception among adult women to reduce their likelihood of a non-marital birth. In 
addition, 17 states had general media campaigns to discourage non-marital 
pregnancies, and Georgia, North Dakota and Tennessee had programs to encourage 
expectant couples to marry. Another popular approach in more than 40 states is 
increasing the financial disincentives toward men that father a child out of wedlock, 
through both mandatory paternity establishment by mothers receiving welfare and 
increased child support enforcement.  
Table 3.3. State Non-marital Pregnancy Prevention Policies & Programs. 
Policy  Number of States 
Family cap  19 
Improved access to contraceptives  32 
Media Campaign  17 
Programs to encourage abstinence before marriage  14 
Programs to encourage expectant couples to marry  3 
Changes to tax code to encourage marriage  1 
Paternity establishment programs  43 
Child support enforcement  42 
Youth employment and education programs  26 
Source: R. Wertheimer, J. Jager, and K. Moore, “State Policy Initiatives for Reducing Teen and 
Adult Non-Marital Childbearing: Family Planning to Family Caps,” New Federalism Issue and 
Options for States, Series A, No. A-43 (Washington, DC: Urban Institute, November 2000). 
Adoption of the family cap (the denial of additional benefits for subsequent children 
born to a mother receiving welfare) is another direct effort by states to reduce non-
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marital births. Research on the impact of this measure to date has had inconclusive 
results
104 perhaps because the family cap was instituted at the same time several other 
important measures were undertaken (e.g., time limits) either under welfare waivers or 
post PRWORA. The only state to report a noticeable effect of family caps on non-
marital births was New Jersey, which also reported a corollary increase in abortions – 
a direct opposition to the stated goals of PRWORA. 
Title X and the U.S. Family Planning Effort 
Family planning programs have been a feature of U.S. welfare policy for a 
long time. In 1965, as part of the War on Poverty, bipartisan support for voluntary 
family planning programs emerged with the following four goals:  
1.  to expand economic development; 
2.  alleviate poverty; 
3.  avoid welfare dependency; and 
4.  improve women and children’s health.
105 
Title IV-A of the Social Security Act was amended in 1967 to require state welfare 
agencies to offer and provide family planning services to women receiving public 
assistance. President Nixon passed legislation in 1970 (with bipartisan support) 
creating the first comprehensive federal program devoted to provision of family 
planning services nationally – Title X of Public Health Service Act.  
Throughout the 1970s more clinics were established and subsequently, 
expenditures rose. In 1972 Title XIX of the Social Security Act was amended to 
mandate inclusion of family planning services in all state Medicaid programs.
106 
During the 1980s the Federal Government spent almost $340 million in federal and 
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state funds to provide family planning services to 5 million women at nearly 5200 
clinics. Conservative and fiscal pressures emerged in the 1980s that restricted services 
that could be provided as a condition of funding. Specifically, President Reagan added 
restrictions that affected teens and poor women’s access to abortion. Before Roe v. 
Wade, 75% of teens carried their pregnancy to term, after the Supreme Court’s 1973 
decision, the rate dropped to 50% – as of 1988 the rate was up to 60%.
107 
In 1990, $622 million were spent in public funds on contraceptive services, 
and were disbursed in the following manner (in ascending order): Medicaid; Title X 
family planning program; Maternal and Child Health Services Block Grant; Social 
Services Block Grant; Community health centers; and Migrant/ rural health centers. 
Of these programs, Medicaid and Title X serve the greatest number of women. In 
2002, the U.S. Congress allocated $265 million to Title X Family Planning, and 
requested the same amount for fiscal year 2003. 6.6 million women receive services 
through these programs each year,
108 and only 30% of women served are teens, 50% 
are 20-29 and 20% are older than 30.
109 Thus, the Title X programs are critical to 
addressing the needs of women at risk who are not reached by teen pregnancy 
prevention programs. 
Importance of Title X to PRWORA 
The Alan Guttmacher Institute estimated in 2002 that in the last 20 years, 
“family planning clinics have helped women avoid 20 million unintended pregnancies, 
9 million of which would have ended in abortions.”
110 Thus, family planning services 
under Title X further the dual goal in the PRWORA – to reduce non-marital births 
without increasing abortion. As a result, in 2001 the Alan Guttmacher Institute 
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advocated that Title X programs be supported and funding needs increased to the 
levels it experienced prior to President Reagan’s Administration (in constant dollars, 
funding for the Title X program declined by over 65% in the last decade.)
111 
Research on family planning is emphasized in welfare reform discussions 
because Title X clinics are an established national network of community-based 
services that adhere to uniform federal regulations and guidelines, but only half of 
those eligible for Title X programs are served.
112 In addition, over 83% of Title X 
clients have incomes below 150 percent of the poverty level and many clients are 
uninsured and do not qualify for Medicaid. Therefore, Title X clinics may be the only 
affordable way for poor women over 20 to receive family planning services (including 
counseling, contraception and health check ups). Most importantly, Title X provides 
services to women before they are pregnant, unlike Medicaid – which generally 
provides family planning services after a pregnancy occurs. Thus, to prevent non 
marital births, Title X clinics are already in place, and can reach many women over 20 
who would be at risk of an unintended pregnancy. 
According to Campaign for our Children, 50% of pregnancies to young, 
unmarried women will end in abortion, 43% will end in an unintended birth, and 7% 
will end as an intended birth.
113 Providing birth control to unmarried women on 
welfare has a great deal of public support, yet family planning has had little emphasis 
as a solution to the problems of non-marital births and poverty in 1996 legislation. As 
already stated, research shows that another reason to emphasize family planning for 
women over 20 is that they account for 69% of abortions, and the current restrictions 
placed on both family planning and access to abortion affect the women who account 
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for a majority (70%) of non-marital births.
114 The PRWORA includes very specific 
goals for states to reduce out of wedlock births, without a corollary increase in 
abortion rates. Available research indicates that a comprehensive prevention effort 
aimed at this group of women is crucial to reduce the out of wedlock birth rate, the 
abortion rate, welfare dependence and poverty.  
Impact of Family Planning Programs 
Research conducted by the Alan Guttmacher Institute in 2001 and 2002 shows 
that publicly funded family planning services have prevented large numbers of 
unintended pregnancies, abortions and births among low-income women, especially 
unmarried women and teens. They also estimate that contraceptive services provided 
helped women avoid 1.3 million unplanned pregnancies each year, which would have 
resulted in 534,000 births and in the absence of family planning, it is estimated that an 
additional 386,000 teens would become pregnant each year, resulting in 155,000 
births.
115 Moreover, without publicly funded family planning services, AGI believes 
an additional 356,000 women who had never been married would give birth each year, 
increasing out of wedlock births by one quarter. They also postulate that every public 
dollar spent to provide family planning services, saves the public an average of $3.00 
in pregnancy related and newborn care.
116  
The Institute of Medicine also affirms the importance placed on Title X 
programs in the effort to reduce unintended pregnancies. 
Financial barriers to contraception should be reduced by increasing the 
proportion of all health insurance policies that cover contraceptive services and 
supplies …extending Medicaid coverage for all postpartum women… and 
continuing to provide public funding for comprehensive contraceptive services, 
especially those for low income women and adolescents who face major 
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financial barriers in securing such care. This last point speaks to the major role 
that public financing programs, such as Title X and Medicaid, have played in 
helping millions of people secure contraception…it is essential that such public 
investment be maintained.
117 
These programs are an important source of services for many women, as 25% of US 
counties relied on Title X as their only source of family planning.
118 
One way to judge the impact of current prevention programs and family 
planning services is the non-marital birth rates in the U.S. relative to other 
industrialized countries. The United States’ out of wedlock birth rate ranked fourth as 
shown by Table 3.4.  
Table 3.4. International Percentages of Births to Unmarried Women. 
Rank  Country  Percentage of Births 
To Unmarried Women 
1 Sweden  50% 
2 Denmark  48% 
3 United  Kingdom  31% 
3 France  31% 
4 United  States  30% 
5 Canada  28% 
6 Germany  15% 
7 Italy  7% 
8 Japan  1% 
Source: M. Abrahamson, Out of Wedlock Births: The U.S. in Comparative Perspective (Westport, 
CT: Praeger Publishers, 1998). 
It is important to note, however, that although the United States’ non-marital birth rate 
ranked fourth, the United States does have the highest rate of teen pregnancy, and this 
further supports the emphasis on reduction of teen pregnancies as a way decrease 
overall rates of non-marital childbearing in the U.S.  
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Relationship between Welfare and Non-marital childbearing 
Adolescent women, poor women over the age of twenty and middle class 
women experience different situations when faced with a non-marital pregnancy. Of 
the three groups, middle class women are likely to have the educational attainment 
needed to support themselves and a child by working. Teens and poor women are 
faced with a different set of circumstances surrounding the choice to have a child out 
of wedlock. Many are forced to rely on welfare as a means to support their children. 
This has reinforced the notion that welfare receipt encourages out of wedlock 
childbearing. However, the relationship between welfare and non-marital births is not 
always clear. On one hand, increasing economic opportunities for women (especially 
teens) should increase the opportunity cost of out of wedlock births. On the other 
hand, increasing the labor market opportunities of women also empowers women to 
choose single motherhood and gives some women (e.g. middle class) the financial 
means to do so.
119 
Denying benefits to unwed mothers appears to be a viable solution to save 
money and decrease non-marital childbearing. Prior to PRWORA, the General 
Accounting Office (GAO) reported that the average income earned by an unmarried 
mother (through AFDC benefits and working) in 1992 was $4,731 a 34% drop (in 
constant dollars) from the average income of $7,161 in 1976. More recently, increases 
in non-marital childbearing are coupled with a decline in the real value of welfare 
payments,
120 and thus, it is hard to argue that there is a direct relationship between 
welfare receipt and out of wedlock pregnancy. Moffitt conducted an extensive review 
of 68 studies specifically looking at the effects of AFDC on fertility, and was able to 
only conclude that there is some effect, the magnitude of which cannot be 
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determined.
121 He further posited that the “evidence is too weak to support definite 
policy recommendations.”
122 
The research to date reports mixed results as to the strength of association 
between non-marital childbearing and welfare dependence. There is also mixed 
evidence regarding the effect of specific state measures taken to reduce out of wedlock 
child bearing and absence of concrete evidence does not allow the conclusion that no 
relationship exists between the policies and the outcomes thus far. The next chapter 
provides both the theoretical considerations and regression analysis if the impact of 
state policies on non-martial birth rates in 13 states.  
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CHAPTER FOUR 
METHOD AND FINDINGS 
Introduction 
Thorough review of the research on the relationship between non-marital 
childbearing and welfare dependence provides mixed results as to the strength of 
association between the two phenomena. One widespread assumption is that the 
provision of benefits to single women if they had a child outside of marriage was a 
primary factor for a woman to choose to have such a birth. While the increase of 
single parent families varies across geographic regions and population groups, 
children, mothers and the public bear the consequences of the upward trend in out of 
wedlock births. The resultant Congressional action was due to both the consequences 
experienced by individuals, and the public’s frustration with the rising costs of welfare 
provision in the mid 1990s (with few noticeable results). In 1995, the Report to 
Congress on Out of Wedlock Childbearing the U.S. Department of Health and Human 
Services found seven primary determinants of a woman having a child out of wedlock: 
family structure; income; education; race; location; availability of contraceptive and 
family planning services; and employment opportunities for men. Despite these 
findings, research on non-marital childbearing and welfare dependence has 
increasingly focused on the role of economic incentives to reduce out of wedlock 
births and subsequent welfare dependence.  
This chapter begins with a general overview of sociological and cultural 
factors related to women’s decisions to bear a child out of wedlock. In addition, 
demographic characteristics of recipients (such as family structure, race and ethnicity, 
and educational attainment) are identified, as well as other explanatory theories 
offered regarding non-marital fertility. All of these factors are highlighted to show 
why certain demographic and policy variables (six specific measures in the 1996  
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legislation) are included in the regression model that estimates their influence on the 
non-martial birth rates in 13 states.  
Determinants and/or Antecedents of Non Marital Births 
General factors related to non-marital fertility include population changes, 
trends in marriage, divorce and employment rates of women, as well as social norms 
or values towards premarital sex and childbearing. In addition, cultural and structural 
characteristics of communities play a role in fertility decisions of unmarried women. 
While these broader issues are not specifically estimated in the empirical analysis 
presented in the next chapter, these factors must be acknowledged when examining 
non- marital fertility and childbearing. 
Sociological Trends 
The rise in single parent families over the last two decades was not only due to 
the economic incentives many thought existed in the welfare system, but also a result 
of several factors related to general changes in the population of women between age 
15-44. First of all, there has been a slow but steady increase in the number of women 
between 15-44 years of age.
123  
Additionally, women now spend a greater percentage of their reproductive 
years outside marriage because of later age at first marriage, higher rates of divorce, 
and lower rates of remarriage, increasing the risk of a non-marital birth.
124 Unmarried 
pregnant women are now less likely to marry before the birth, increasing both the rate 
of cohabitation and the incidence of children growing up with single parents.  
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Finally, society is more accepting of premarital sex and of childbearing outside 
of marriage
125 and as a result, attitudes about non-marital childbearing have changed. 
Cultural Factors 
There are two well-known views on the importance of cultural and structural 
issues to decisions about marriage and fertility. Murray emphasizes the influence of 
cultural norms among different communities, as well as the changes in social norms 
regarding marriage and childbearing as important factors to explain the higher rates of 
non-marital childbearing among minority populations.
126 Wilson believes that the rise 
in out of wedlock childbearing among African American women is a result of the lack 
of “marriageable” men, and that increasing the earning potential of men is a good way 
to promote marriages in the African American community.
127 
Wilson favors welfare measures that account for the impact of cultural norms 
on trends in non-marital births and welfare dependence in various communities (e.g. 
lack of employment opportunities for African American men); whereas Murray 
suggests that although the trends may be a result of cultural factors, policies should try 
to modify (culturally based) behaviors of various groups through incentives and 
sanctions (e.g., denying benefits to unmarried women). These two views both relate to 
the culture of poverty perspective on how to change fertility behavior among welfare 
recipients and is discussed below at greater length. 
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Demographic factors 
Demographic characteristics also influence a woman’s decision to bear a child 
out of wedlock, and whether or not to marry prior to the child’s birth. As a result, 
analysis of out of wedlock births requires examination of the importance of 
demographic factors such as family structure, race or ethnicity and education on 
fertility decisions. Other explanatory variables considered in existing research
128 
include religious affiliation, access to family planning services, parental educational 
attainment, and birth order. Again, although all of these factors are not estimated in the 
empirical analysis, their importance needs to be identified to provide a complete 
analysis of factors impacting fertility decisions. 
One example of the importance of family background on the non-marital birth 
rate is that children of teen mothers are more likely to be teen mothers and high school 
dropouts themselves. Sandefur and McLanahan offer three hypotheses regarding the 
inter-generational transmission of family structure: 
1.  Family structure and parents’ education may have economic effects
129 
on a child’s development; 
2.  Transmission of outcomes may reflect an explicit or implicit 
transmission of values; and  
3.  Outcomes may be the result of diminished expectations and resources 
in neighborhoods where poor families live.
130 
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They further conclude that causality between poverty and non-marital childbearing 
could run either or both ways – or could be determined by a mutual set of exogenous 
factors such as family background and culture.
131 As a result, it is difficult to 
appropriately model and identify effects of non-marital childbearing and poverty on 
each other, so many analyses focus on determinants of the decision to bear a child out 
of wedlock as a means to reduce welfare dependence.  
Family structure is key to understanding child outcomes and the high incidence 
of intergenerational welfare dependence. As we know from the literature review 
provided in Chapter 3, children raised in single parent homes have poorer outcomes 
(including higher incidence of non-marital births and welfare dependence) than those 
raised by two biological parents, especially if the parents are married.
132 More 
importantly, Driscoll confirms that girls who experience frequent changes in family 
structure are at “increased risk of having premarital sex during adolescence and of 
having a premarital birth”
133 which increases the intergenerational cycle of welfare 
dependence. Peters et al. point out that “research has not directly addressed how some 
changes in family structure affect child well-being…if welfare increases incentives to 
cohabit or to live in a three-generational household, is that good or bad for children, 
relative to living in an independent female headed household?”
134 As a result, the 
importance of family structure on non-marital fertility requires further analysis, but 
existing data does not allow for that estimation in the regression model provided in the 
next chapter. 
                                                 
131 Ibid. 
132 S. McLanahan and G. Sandefur, Growing Up with a Single Parent: What Hurts, What Helps 
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1994). 
133 Driscoll et al., “Nonmarital Childbearing among Adult Women,” 180. 
134 H. E. Peters, R. D. Plotnick, and J. Se-Ook, “How Will Welfare Reform Affect Childbearing and 
Family Structure Decisions?” (Revision of paper presented at “Changing Welfare” Conference, 
University of Illinois at Chicago, July 2001), 31.  
  71
Race has also been shown to be an important factor in non-martial birth rates. 
To investigate the hypothesis that the difference in non-marital birth rates were caused 
by cultural differences between races, Murray examined the relationship between out-
of-wedlock birth and race-specific measures of population density and found the 
“variations in the black out-of-wedlock birth rate are correlated with the racial density 
of the geographic area, a measure that he asserts is a proxy for the strength of cultural 
factors that determine out-of-wedlock birth.”
135  
The importance of race to employment rates also plays a role in unmarried 
women’s decision to have a child outside of marriage. This is supported by Wilson’s 
theory about the lack of marriageable males in African American communities, and by 
Willis, who states, “after decades of progress, black men have suffered 
disproportionately as the widening of the wage distribution during the past two 
decades has reduced the earnings of those at the bottom of the skill distribution.”
136 
They believe that this lower earning potential reduces the attractiveness of marriage to 
low-income women who can rely on public assistance as a source of income for their 
children. As a result, non-marital birthrates are estimated for women by race in this 
empirical analysis. 
Education is a key predictor of not only future employment, but also whether 
or not the opportunity cost of an out of wedlock birth is high. Kaestner found that  
…the only variable that had a consistently significant effect on the probability 
of having an out-of-wedlock birth is education…the magnitude of the effect is 
relatively large. For example, evaluated at the mean value, an additional year 
of education lowers the probability of having an out-of-wedlock birth by 
approximately one percentage point. Thus, a non-black male with a college 
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degree has a probability of fathering a child out-of-wedlock that is four 
percentage points lower than a non-black male with a high school degree.
137 
Increasing educational opportunities and attainment will raise women’s expectations 
for future employment, and could further reduce the non-marital birth rates by making 
an unplanned pregnancy less desirable to women at risk of an out of wedlock 
pregnancy. Efforts to increase educational attainment of males will theoretically 
increase subsequent employment and marriage rates. This is especially true for lower 
income men and women – under an economic model of marriage – as higher earnings 
make the spouse better able to provide for his family, and thus marriage becomes a 
more attractive option than single parenthood. 
Although access to family planning services, parental educational attainment 
and birth order are considered important factors to fertility decision among unmarried 
women, the regression model provided in this chapter does not estimate their 
influence, as the data set used in the analysis did not include such factors. The 
empirical analysis presented explores the importance of race, age, educational 
attainment, employment, and religious affiliation on an unmarried woman’s likelihood 
of having a child outside of marriage and further estimates the impact of recent 
welfare policies in reducing non-marital births and teen pregnancy.  
Policy Measures 
The 1996 PRWORA sets forth seven provisions specifically to reduce the non-
marital birth rate among both teenage and older women who are not married. Two of 
these apply to teenaged women and the other 5 apply to all unmarried mothers. They 
include: 
1.  The requirement that teen mothers live at home or with a 
responsible adult; 
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2.  The requirement that teen mothers attend school; 
3.  Family caps; 
4.  Time limits for welfare receipt; 
5.  Tougher work requirements of program participants; 
6.  The mandatory 25% benefit reduction imposed on unmarried 
mothers who do not help with paternity establishment; and 
7.  The provision of entitlement funding for abstinence education.
138 
Minor Parent Provisions 
The requirement that a teen mother live at home or with a responsible adult is 
based on the idea that many teens, unhappy with their family living arrangements, 
could become pregnant, move out on their own, and be supported by government 
provision of welfare. Therefore, this requirement is designed to remove that specific 
incentive to have a child outside of marriage. Wertheimer and Moore show that 75% 
of teen mothers rely on welfare within 5years of a non-marital birth,
139 and thus, this 
provision is particularly important for shaping decision made by teens at risk of an out 
of wedlock birth. 
The second requirement of teen mothers to attend school has two primary 
purposes, to emphasize the importance of education for a successful future, and to 
increase the opportunity costs associated with bearing a child outside of marriage. In 
general, if a woman’s expectations for her future are high, she is less likely to become 
pregnant, and if she does discover a pregnancy, she is less likely to have the baby.
140 
Additionally, Horvath and Peters found a connection between high levels of school 
engagement and reduced teen pregnancy, and as such, “findings support the potential 
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for school attendance and performance requirement waiver to decrease non-marital 
fertility rates among teens from welfare families.”
141 
Family Cap 
The third measure designed to directly impact fertility behavior is the 
imposition of a family cap, the elimination of any increase in benefits after the birth of 
an additional child born to a mother on welfare. Horvath and Peters found that of all 
welfare waivers, the family cap has the greatest potential as an effective policy tool to 
impact non-marital birth rates.
142 However, research to date provides inconclusive 
results regarding the impact of the family cap on non-marital birthrates. For example, 
O’Neill examined the impact of family cap in New Jersey (the first state to implement 
it under waivers) and found that the “potential benefit reduction may be significant to 
induce families to consider carefully the decision to have another child with out first 
securing the means to support it.”
143 In contrast, Acs concluded that “while restricting 
benefits for young mothers who have additional children while on welfare may carry a 
significant symbolic message – that long term dependence on public assistance is not 
an acceptable lifestyle – it is unlikely to have a substantial affect on women’s 
childbearing decisions.”
144  
Time Limits and Work Requirements 
The imposition of time limits and work requirements are designed to indirectly 
affect fertility decisions by making welfare receipt less attractive.  
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The Federal requirement is a 5-year lifetime limit on benefits, but states were 
given the flexibility to impose even shorter time limits ranging from 1 to 5 years in the 
PRWORA. The time limit placed on welfare receipt embodies the idea that assistance 
is only temporary. This lack of long-term support presumably changes the cost benefit 
ratio for women at risk of a non-marital birth by reducing any perceived economic 
incentives to having a child outside of marriage.  
Increased work requirements are also imposed to make public assistance less 
desirable, and to remove any perceptions of that provision of benefits without any 
requirements on the recipient’s part to find employment may induce women to have a 
child outside of marriage to receive welfare.  While the family cap has been shown to 
impact fertility decisions, time limits and work requirements do not have a clear 
connection to non-marital birth rates, although researchers at Child Trends find that 
they do have an effect on reductions in caseloads.
145 
Mandatory Paternity Establishment  
Welfare measures (set forth under state waivers or the 1996 provisions) 
involving mandatory paternity establishment and tougher state measures to increase 
child support are designed to increase fathers’ responsibility for their children born 
outside of marriage. In addition, this enforced financial responsibility of men who 
father children to women reliant on welfare is pursued to offset the cost of benefit 
provision to the resultant female-headed household. In general, the idea behind such 
measures is that the shift of costs to fathers may lower the rates of non-marital births, 
as men change their fertility behavior to avoid the financial cost of child support.  
There is some evidence
146 that states with tougher child support enforcement 
have lower non-marital birthrates, which supports the potential of this policy to reduce 
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births outside of marriage. It is critical to note, however, that stronger child support 
enforcement is not a perfect solution, as many women bear children to men with little 
or no earning power, and hence, no ability to pay child support. 
Stronger enforcement of laws concerning establishment of paternity and 
payment of child support tend to reduce the prevalence of out-of-wedlock childbearing 
by altering opportunity costs for men significantly.
147 However, many studies of non-
marital fertility and welfare dependence of women do not address the antecedents of 
fertility decisions made by men who father children outside of marriage.  
The policy measures designed to reduce the incidence of non-marital births are 
estimated in the regression analysis, including minor parent provisions, time limits, 
work requirements, and mandatory paternity establishment. Entitlement funds provide 
to states for abstinence education are not included in the regression model at this time. 
Regression Model 
Policy measures to reduce non-marital births are directed at changing women’s 
behavior in both childbearing and childrearing. Driscoll suggests that “circumstances 
in which such births occur, their timing in the life course of women, and women’s 
subsequent behavior all are important factors to consider” when examining the causes 
and consequences of non-marital childbearing.
148 Public policies based on a rational 
model of planned fertility and the standard economic cost benefit ratio may not 
“account for the diversity within the welfare population or the ways that both macro 
structural and individual factors influence individual experience.”
149 Therefore, 
exploration of the interaction among economic, cultural and demographic factors of 
non-marital childbearing may yield a more thorough understanding of the predominant 
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determinants of women’s fertility decisions and the impact of specific policy measures 
set forth under welfare waivers and PRWORA.  
As a result, this chapter provides an estimation of the impact that demographic 
factors such as state of residence, age of mother, race, religious activity and 
educational attainment have on rates on non-marital births in 13 states. In addition, 
waiver data was used to generate policy variables representing the 6 provisions 
specifically designed to reduce non-marital births: minor parent provisions; family 
cap; time limits; work requirements; and mandatory paternity establishment (Figure 
4.1).  
The model was estimated to examine if the recent success in reducing non-
marital births (particularly for teens) to determine the strength of association between 
state welfare policies and incidence of non-marital births. This analysis also assessed 
the impact of demographic characteristics of both teens and older women, as well as 
the influence age and race (that could be co-variates in the relationship of interest).
150 
The next chapter outlines the method and findings generated by the empirical analysis 
of the impact of both demographic variables and state policies on non-martial birth 
rates in 13 states.  
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The effect of specific state measures taken to reduce out of wedlock child 
bearing is not yet clear, as shown by the mixed evidence reviewed in Chapter 3. 
Studies that focus on specific structural issues or groups of people yield important 
information. However, examining the “interaction between individual factors and 
macrosocial structures also yields much richer policy analysis than arguing that simply 
addressing either structural problems or individual deficits will solve the complex 
nature of poverty in the United States.”
151  
The influence of demographic variables on the probability that a woman will 
have a non-marital birth, as well as of policy measures on non-marital birth rates in 13 
states are estimated by regression models that test the hypothesis that education, 
religion, race and ethnicity have important effects on non-marital birth rates. In 
addition, analyses were conducted on a split sample based on the mother’s age at time 
of a non-marital birth, to explore the different effect of each variable on teenage 
women and women over the age of 20. Previous chapters provide the justification for 
this split, which is quite simply, that teens and older women behave differently, and 
the policy measures designed to reach teens and women over 20 are different and thus, 
require separate estimations.  
The strength of the association between specific state welfare policies and the 
state’s propensity for non-marital births is also estimated in the regression model, and 
further allows for questions about the likely success of the provisions in the PRWORA 
of 1996. Policy variables were created using welfare waiver data (between 1989 and 
1995) from the period before PRWORA, to take advantage of the variation across 
states provided by the waivers. This captures each state’s “policy environment” in 
which non-marital births do or do not occur. This empirical analysis relies on a 
regression model to estimate the probability that a child is born outside of marriage as 
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a function of the welfare policies in the state at the time of his birth and other socio-
demographic characteristics of the mother. 
Data 
This analysis uses micro data from the 1997 National Survey of American 
Families (NSAF), a nationally representative survey that gathered information on 
more than 48,000 households with and without children – which includes 145,574 
total persons on whom information was gathered.
152 Low-income households (< 200% 
of poverty) were over sampled in the NSAF, because the policy changes under study 
are expected to affect them the most.  
The NSAF data collects information on the economic, social and health status 
of adults under 65, children, and their families across 13 states. The NSAF is primarily 
conducted via a telephone survey, but does include non-telephone households as a 
second sample based on geographic areas. (Households without a telephone comprise 
approximately 3.5% of the total sample). The majority of interviews were conducted 
with adults with children in their household, and questions were asked about no more 
than two children per household. One child is selected from among all children under 
age six and the other is selected from among all children between the ages of 6 and 17; 
and the respondent is the household member who is most knowledgeable about the 
children. Respondents are asked about several dimensions of well-being, including 
(but not limited to) questions regarding demographics (age, race, sex), employment, 
education, economic hardships, child well-being and participation in religious 
activities. (Appendix G provides greater details on the NSAF research design).  
The results of the NSAF are noteworthy because many “state-representative 
surveys do not capture important dimensions of well-being and have small sample 
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sizes in many states, particularly for low-income families.”
153 Westat, Inc. fielded the 
initial survey between February and November of 1997 and the follow-up survey was 
fielded in 1999 with a Fall 1999 release of the entire microdata set. The survey 
included representative samples in 13 states; Alabama, California, Colorado, Florida, 
Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, New Jersey, New York, Texas, 
Washington, and Wisconsin. These 13 states were chosen by Urban Institute because 
they “account for over half of the U.S. population and have a broad array of 
government programs, fiscal capacity and economic well being.”
154 As a result, 
researchers at the Urban Institute believe that the NSAF data provides a baseline from 
which many changes brought about by “new federalism” can be assessed or 
measured.
155 
Data from the National Survey of America’s Families (NSAF) is used to 
estimate a logistic regression model of out of wedlock births and its antecedents. The 
NSAF data was chosen for the analysis in this chapter for the following reasons: 
1.  The NSAF collected information on most of the variables of 
interest needed to estimate the effect of many demographic 
characteristics on non-marital births; 
2.  Researchers at the Urban Institute
156 were able to assist in the 
creation of a variable needed to isolate a sub-sample of children 
who were born outside of marriage;
  
3.  Data collected on both the most knowledgeable adult (MKA) and 
focal child were able to be merged from two separate files into one 
file using SAS. This allowed for the identification of households 
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relevant to the sub sample of women between ages of 15-44 with 
children present.  
4.  NSAF data was easily sorted by state, allowing for the creation of 
policy variables that could then be merged with the NSAF files on 
women with children, and thus, facilitated a better understanding of 
the “policy environment” in which non-marital births did or did not 
occur. 
The NSAF yielded a total sample of 42,973 households. Analysis of the 
correlates to non-marital births required the identification of households with children 
under the age of 6 to capture those households most likely to have been affected by the 
welfare reform provisions adopted prior to the passage of PWRORA via the state 
waiver process. Although the data only include births that occurred prior to the 
passage of PRWORA, many of the prior state welfare waivers included provisions that 
were similar to provisions adopted by states after PRWORA, and variation in these 
policies is relevant to assessing the likely effect of the PRWORA provisions. As a 
result, the analysis in this chapter uses a sub-sample of 12,615 households with 
children under the age of six (i.e. children born between 1992 and 1996) to facilitate 
the estimation of effects of policy measures in each of the 13 states included in the 
NSAF. 
State welfare policies 
Policy variables were established for welfare reform policies that influence the 
decision to bear a child out of wedlock (e.g., family caps, minor parent provisions). 
Inclusion of policy provisions required compilation of welfare plans and waiver 
information for these 13 states to create policy variables needed to estimate the 
influences of each state’s welfare programs on the probability that a woman living in 
that state would have a child outside of marriage. Six policy variables (Table 4.1) were  
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coded as dichotomous variables for each of the 13 states for five consecutive years 
(1992-1996 inclusive).  
Table 4.1. Welfare Policy Variables. 
VARIABLE DEFINITION 
Minor Parent Provision 
(MPP)  
Requirement of teen mothers to live at home or with a 
responsible adult to receive benefits. 
Stay in School 
Requirement of Teens 
(SIS) 
Requirement of teen mothers to attend school to receive 
benefits.  
Mandatory Paternity 
Establishment (PE) 
A mandatory 25% benefit reduction is imposed on 
unmarried mothers who do not help with paternity 
establishment; 
Family Cap (FC)  The restriction of benefits for additional children born 
to women receiving TANF. 
Time limit (TL)  Each  state  sets  a maximum time that families may 
receive assistance, ranging from 1-5 years – this varies 
by state.  
Work requirements (WR)  Includes  job  training activities, part or full time 
employment as a condition of benefit receipt.  
Note also that to assess the impact of these policies on the out of wedlock birth 
rate, the regression analysis controls for each state’s out of wedlock birth rate before 
the 1996 legislation to estimate each state’s specific propensity for out of wedlock 
births. All 13 states were coded for six policy variables from 1992-1996 (inclusive), 
and then matched to the individual data on the subset of the 12,615 households in the 
sub-sample by state of residence and the year in which the non-marital birth occurred.  
Method 
This analysis estimates a logistic regression model of the probability that a 
child is born outside of marriage as a function of the welfare policies in the state at the 
time of his birth and other socio-demographic characteristics of the mother. The 
estimated equation is: {NMAR = ß (demographic variables) + 6(policy variables) + 
ε} or more specifically, {Non marital birth = β¹Education + β²Race + β³Religious  
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activity + Ѕ(Welfare policies) + ε}. The logistic regression estimating the probability 
that NMAR=1 (a woman has a birth out of wedlock) includes the variables listed in 
Table 4.2. 
Table 4.2. Variables Included in Regression Model. 
VARIABLE DEFINITION 
 
Dependent 
 
NMAR            Focal child born out of wedlock 
   
Control  
NMBR             State’s non-marital birth rate, 1989, percent of total births for 
the state  
   
Demographic  
MOMBIRTHAGE    Mother’s age at time of birth 
Education  
HSDROP          Mother is high school drop out 
HSGRAD        Mother is high school graduate 
COLLEGE        Mother has some college 
Race  
BLACK            Race of mother – African American 
WHITE            Race of Mother – Caucasian 
OTHER            Race of mother – Hispanic, Asian, others 
Religious Activity   
LOWRELIG  Mother attends religious service a few times a year or less 
MODRELIG   Mother attends religious service a few times a month 
HIGHRELIG   Mother attends religious service once a week or more 
  
Policies  
MPP              Minor Parent Provision 
SIS              Stay in School Requirement of Teens 
PE              Mandatory Paternity Establishment 
FC              Family Cap 
TL              Time limit 
WR              Work requirements 
Variables 
The dependent variable, whether or not a child was born out of wedlock is 
expressed as a dichotomous variable (0=marital birth, 1=non-marital birth). For this  
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analysis, this includes the 12,615 women in the sub sample who had a child between 
1989 and 1996. It is important to note that the variable for identifying children out of 
wedlock includes only those children whose biological parents did not later marry 
each other, a total of 3,368 non-marital births (27.71% of the total sample). In 
addition, this variable was not included as part of the Urban Institute’s original public 
release files, and was part of a separate (supplementary) data set provided to the 
author.
157 Finally, the use of a dichotomous dependent variable is not necessarily the 
best estimate of the impact of welfare policies on non-marital births -- as welfare 
programs are primarily aimed to reduce out of wedlock pregnancy – therefore, the use 
of a non marital birth rate actually measures the failure of those policies to prevent 
such a pregnancy. 
Independent variables include several antecedents of a non-marital birth, 
specifically, demographic characteristics of mothers who had a birth outside of 
marriage including: mother’s race; mother’s age; educational attainment; employment; 
and extent of religious activity. These variables were included in the NSAF 
questionnaire fielded in 1997 and the source questions are listed in Appendix H. The 
NSAF does not include welfare policy and program information for each state. As a 
result, policy variables were created based on each state’s welfare plans and approved 
waivers from 1992 to 1996. The policy variables used to estimate the impact of state 
welfare programs on the out of wedlock birth rate and include those listed in Table 4.1 
(above). 
Descriptive Statistics 
Independent variables included in this analysis included both policy variables 
and demographic factors of unmarried mothers – such as educational attainment, race, 
and extent of religious activity. The sample comprised of 12,615 households with a 
                                                 
157 Provided by Fritz Scheuren at the Urban Institute, May 2000.  
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child under the age of 6 included families living in 13 states previously identified. 
Table 4.3 provides basic descriptive statistics on each variable estimated in the model. 
Table 4.3. Descriptive Statistics, Demographic Variables. 
Variable  Frequency Percent 
Focal Child Born out of Wedlock (NMAR)     
Marital births  8786 72.29 
Non-marital births  3368 27.71 
Total  12154 100.0 
Missing 461   
LEVEL OF RELIGIOUS ACTIVITY     
No religious activity (NORELIG)  2265 18.17 
Low level of religious activity (LOWRELIG)  3348 26.86 
Moderate level of religious activity (MODRELIG)  2601 20.87 
High level of religious activity (HIGHRELIG)  4249 34.09 
Total  12463 100.0 
Missing  152   
EDUCATION     
High School Dropout   2143 17.1 
High School Graduate  4480 35.7 
Some College  5911 47.2 
Total  12534 100 
Missing  81   
RACE     
White  10091 79.99 
Black  2013 15.96 
Other, includes Hispanic  511 4.05 
Total  12615 100.00 
Mother’s age at time of birth (MOMBIRTHAGE) 
Mean=29.01 years (SD=7.28 years) 
   
Under 18  309 2.5 
18-20  1093 8.7 
21-25  2876 22.8 
26-30  3454 27.4 
31-35  2810 22.3 
35-40  1356 10.8 
41-45  424 3.4 
46-50  117 1.0 
Over 50  176 1.4 
Total  12615 100.3  
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Respondent characteristics. Among the 12,154 households that provided data 
on the dependent variable – 28% of mothers (3,368) had given birth to a child outside 
of marriage. Table 4.3 also shows that the majority (80%) of the sample was 
comprised of White families, had completed some college (41.2%), and reported 
varied levels of religious activity. 
State policies. The mean percentage of births to unmarried women among the 
women sampled in all thirteen states sampled was 24.7%, and those rates ranged from 
19 to 32% among the states. In addition, the percent of this sample (N=12,615) 
affected by each state welfare policy estimated in this analysis also varied, and Table 
4.4 provides the number of households affected by each policy. 
Table 4.4. Welfare Policies, Percent of Sample Affected. 
Welfare Policy  Number Of WOMEN 
AFFECTED BY POLICY 
Percent OF TOTAL SAMPLE 
(N=12,615) 
Paternity Establishment  644  6.6 
Minor Parent Provision  926  9.4 
Stay in School  1294  13.2 
Time Limits  2535  25.9 
Family Cap  2764  28.2 
Work Requirements  4629  47.2 
Note: column totals do not equal 100 due to multiple policies in each state. 
Table 4.4 shows that the almost half (47.2%) of households sampled were in states 
that imposed work requirements as a condition of welfare benefits. In addition, both 
time limits and family cap policies were imposed in about a quarter of states (25.9 and 
28.2% respectively.) 
The policies estimated in the model include the family cap, time limits, work 
requirements, mandatory benefit reduction for non-compliance with paternity 
establishment, and two minor parent provisions, one requiring young mothers to live 
at home with a “responsible” adult (usually their parent) and the requirement that a 
minor parent must stay in school as a condition of benefit receipt. All 13 states were  
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coded for six policy variables from 1992-1996 (inclusive), and then matched to the 
individual data on the subset of the 12,615 households in the sub-sample by state of 
residence.  
All of the welfare policy variables were assigned a “0” if the state examined 
did not include the policy in its welfare plan and a “1” if it did. Table 4.5 provides a 
list of waivers in place for each of the 13 states examined, between the years of 1992-
1996.  
Each policy variable entry was merged with the NSAF’s data by the state in 
which they reside, and then input by year (cross listed with the child’s age to match 
years). Each of the 12,615 observations of households with children under 6 was 
cross-referenced with both the state in which he/she was born and the birth year to get 
the most accurate picture of the policy environment in which the mother had a child 
outside of marriage. In addition, the state’s non-marital birthrate is included in this 
estimation to better capture the differences across states that influence a woman’s 
decision to bear a child out of wedlock.  
 
8
9
Table 4.5: State Waivers, 1992–1996 (■ indicates policy in place). 
  APPLY TO MINOR PARENTS ONLY         
WAIVERS Æ  LIVE AT HOME  STAY IN SCHOOL  PATERNITY EST.  FAMILY CAP  TIME LIMITS  WORK REQ. 
STATE   9
2 
9
3 
9
4 
9
5 
9
6 
9
2 
9
3 
9
4 
9
5 
9
6 
9
2 
9
3 
9
4 
9
5 
9
6 
9
2 
9
3 
9
4 
9
5 
9
6 
9
2 
9
3 
9
4 
9
5 
9
6 
9
2 
9
3 
9
4 
9
5 
9
6 
ALABAMA                                         ■                    
CALIFORNIA                                     ■  ■ ■                 ■ ■
FLORIDA                                       ■ ■     ■ ■ ■     ■ ■ ■
MASS.          ■  ■                  ■ ■       ■ ■       ■ ■       ■ ■
MICHIGAN   ■  ■  ■  ■  ■                                ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■
MINNESOTA                                                         ■ ■ ■
NEW JERSEY                                 ■ ■  ■  ■ ■           ■ ■ ■ ■ ■
NEW YORK                                                              
TEXAS                                                   ■         ■
WASHINGTON                                                 ■ ■       ■ ■
MISSISIPPI                                               ■       ■ ■ ■ ■
WISCONSIN                                     ■  ■ ■       ■ ■       ■ ■
COLORADO                                       ■ ■       ■ ■   ■ ■ ■ ■
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Findings 
The birth propensities for unmarried women were estimated for those living in 
states with welfare policies designed to discourage non-marital childbearing already in 
place under welfare waivers in the early 1990s. After analyzing the entire sample of 
women, the sample was divided into women under 20 years of age and women over 
the age of twenty, and those models were estimated to detect any difference in the 
influence of the pregnancy reduction policies on women by age. Logistic regression 
analyses explore the relationship between the probability of a non-marital birth 
(NMAR=1) and the explanatory variables, both demographic characteristics of the 
mother, and state welfare policies in place at the time of the birth. [Appendix I 
provides the full SAS output for each model examined.] The models listed in Table 
4.6 were analyzed to determine the variation in non-marital births that could be 
accounted for by the explanatory variables in the model – both demographic and state 
policies. 
Table 4.6. Model Specifications. 
 Sample  N  % of sample 
NMAR=1  Variables in model 
Model 1  Women ages 15-44   8700  26.8 
(2329) 
Demographic  
State welfare policies 
Model 2  Women age 15-19  637  68.6 
(437) 
Demographic  
State welfare policies 
Model 3  Women over 20  7770  22.4 
(1738) 
Demographic  
State welfare policies 
Model 4  Women ages 15-44   8700  26.8 
(2329)  Demographic only 
Model 5  Women age 15-19  637  68.6 
(437)  Demographic only  
Model 6  Women over 20  7770  22.4 
(1738)  Demographic only 
These separate models allow for an examination of the different impact all the 
variables have for both teenage women and women over 20. In addition, models were  
91 
examined without including the policy variables to test the significance of the all 
policy variables entirely for women in the sample, and then again for women by age 
(teens versus older women in the sample). Table 4.7 provides the results from the 
logistic regression analysis on six different models. 
Estimation of six separate models provided detailed coefficient estimates for 
demographic and policy variables in the several iterations of the regression analysis. 
When looking at the model that includes demographic and policy variables for all 
women in the sample, all the demographic characteristics -- educational attainment, 
race and extent of religious activity – and two policies, minor parent provisions and 
school requirements have statistically significant effects on non-marital childbearing 
[Table 4.7]. 
Race. Whether or not the mother is of African American descent is correlated 
with an increase in non-marital births, regardless of age of the mother. The effect is 
more pronounced for teen mothers and is statistically significant at the .01 level. In his 
study of teenage fertility and high school completion, Ribar also found African 
American origin of the mother to be the most influential, statistically significant 
predictor of whether or not a teenager would become pregnant (among 22 total 
independent variables).
158 In this analysis, the full model of both demographic and 
policy variables was estimated for a sample of women over 20 years of age and race 
showed significant effects on out of wedlock childbearing. In addition, statistically 
significant effects were found at the .05 level that show that there is a negative 
correlation between being white and having a child outside or marriage. This was true 
for all women, with a more noticeable impact for women over 20. 
                                                 
158 David Ribar, “A Multinomial Logit Analysis of Teenage Fertility and High School Completion,” 
Economics of Education Review 12, no. 2 (1993): 153–164.  
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Table 4.7. Regression Coefficients, All Models. 
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  Estimate 
(SE) 
Estimate 
(SE) 
Estimate 
(SE) 
Estimate 
(SE) 
Estimate 
(SE) 
Estimate 
(SE) 
Intercept  -1.7349* 
(.2472) 
-.0697 
(.7520) 
-2.1273* 
(.2807) 
-1.3496* 
(.1943) 
.7622 
(.6278) 
-1.6197* 
(.2184) 
State’s non-marital 
birth rate, 1989 
1.235 
(.7850) 
1.6185 
(2.5532) 
2.0391‡ 
(.8822) 
.1803 
(.6102) 
-.6198 
(2.0378) 
.6734 
(.6829) 
Mother is high 
school drop out 
1.4046* 
(.0729) 
-.0381 
(.2478) 
1.3922* 
(.0825) 
1.4668* 
(.0666) 
-.0879 
(.2307) 
1.4160* 
(.0750) 
Mother is high 
school graduate 
.6208* 
(.0618) 
-.0826 
(.2461) 
.5880* 
(.0685) 
.6687* 
(.0568) 
-.1546 
(.2333) 
.6258* 
(.0627) 
Race, African 
American          
1.8911* 
(.1467) 
2.2475* 
(.4679) 
1.9237* 
(.1660) 
1.8613* 
(.1333) 
2.3970* 
(.4523) 
1.8614* 
(.1489) 
Race, Caucasian      -.2575‡ 
(.1344) 
.2588 
(.3778) 
-.2571 
(.1538) 
-.2438‡ 
(.1217) 
.1783 
(.3575) 
-.2649‡ 
(.1373) 
Moderate 
Religious Activity  
-.4750* 
(.0721) 
-.5654‡ 
(.2337) 
-.5193* 
(.0815) 
-.4766* 
(.0658) 
-.4689‡ 
(.2124) 
-.5366* 
(.0744) 
High Religious 
Activity  
-.9035* 
(.0662) 
-.5133‡ 
(.2350) 
-.9205* 
(.0739) 
-.8985* 
(.0610) 
-.6117* 
(.2183) 
-.9133* 
(.0678) 
Minor Parent 
Provision 
.2589‡ 
(.1067) 
1.1405‡ 
(.3735) 
.0906 
(.1198) 
   
Stay in School 
Requirement of 
Teens 
.3079* 
(.0941) 
.6291‡ 
(.3317) 
.3436* 
(.1053) 
   
Mandatory 
Paternity 
Establishment 
.2110 
(.1250) 
.4543 
(.3949) 
.1527 
(.1428) 
   
Family Cap  .0214 
(.0810) 
.2618 
(.2735) 
-.0465 
(.0915) 
   
Time limit  .0721 
(.1066) 
-.7474‡ 
(.3695) 
.1320 
(.1188) 
   
Work 
requirements 
.0396 
(.1004) 
.1965 
(.3482) 
.0983 
(.1133) 
   
Likelihood Ratio  1690.39  92.88 1376.65  1920.35 89.68 1523.91 
*Significant at the 1% level, ‡Significant at the 5% level, SE=standard error  
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Religiosity. Extent of religious activities also correlates with lower 
probabilities of a non-marital birth for both teens and older women. Therefore, it 
appears that greater involvement in church related activities or religious communities 
decreases the likelihood of a woman bearing a child out of wedlock, regardless of her 
age. However, the strength of the effect shown by the coefficients is larger and 
statistically significant for women over 20 years of age.  
Education. The highest coefficient (significant at the .01 level) estimates the 
effect of education on non marital birth rates and is found for women over 20 who 
have dropped out of high school. The estimates are also statistically significant for 
women over 20 who have graduated high school, but yielded lower estimated 
coefficients.  
State Welfare Policies. Interpretation of the coefficient estimates for the six 
policy variables is a little more problematic.  
For women over 20 years of age, the family cap policy – a provision that 
eliminates the marginal increment in welfare benefits for women who have another 
child while on welfare – does not significantly affect on fertility decisions of 
unmarried women. While Horvath-Rose and Peters
159 suggest family caps may be an 
effective policy measure to reduce non-marital births, review of many other studies on 
this policy measure show that the evidence is still inconclusive on the strength of 
impact a family cap has on non-marital fertility for both teens and women over 20 
years of age. 
The estimates in Table 4.8 show that the two policy provisions specifically 
designed to discourage teen pregnancies – minor parent provision and stay in 
school requirements – are positively correlated with non-marital births for these 
                                                 
159 Anne Horvath-Rose and H. Elizabeth Peters, “Welfare Waivers and Non-Marital Childbearing,” in 
Welfare Reform: For Better, for Worse, ed. Greg Duncan and Lindsey Chase Lansdale (New York: 
Russell Sage Foundation, 2001).  
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women (consistent with Horvath and Peters
160). The highest effects are found for 
teens, and show a noticeable positive correlation with non-marital births. Although 
this finding may be in direct conflict with the goals of the provision, one unanticipated 
consequence of this measure could be the reduction of opportunity costs teens may 
face when becoming pregnant, as they may be less likely to be kicked out of their 
family homes. This finding serves as an interesting point for further analysis. 
Table 4.8. Maximum Likelihood Estimates. 
Group  Model  -2 log L  Ratio  Chi-square  Accept/Reject Ho? 
All women  Full 
Reduced 
8418.290 
9931.001 
 
1.179 
 
24.103 
 
Reject 
Women over 20  Full 
Reduced 
6883.288 
8140.813 
 
1.183 
 
24.103 
 
Reject 
Teenage women  Full 
Reduced 
699.847 
831.103 
 
1.187 
 
24.103 
 
Reject 
Another interesting finding is that time limits appear to discourage 
childbearing by women under 20, which may be consistent with the goals of such a 
provision – that welfare dependence should only be a short term solution, not a way of 
life. In addition, time limits were adopted by many states under welfare waivers, and 
continue to be a widely utilized provision in state welfare policies. In fact, Duncan et 
al. estimate that more than 40% of the current caseload will reach their 60-month limit 
by 2003.
161 Consequently, research on the effect of time limits is an area that requires 
attention, especially as more families continue to reach their five-year limit of 
assistance regardless of consecutive or intermittent reliance. Finally, more detailed 
information from state’s incorporating time limits as part of their welfare programs is 
becoming available, and as such, will allow for more detailed research efforts in this 
area. 
                                                 
160 Anne Horvath-Rose and H. Elizabeth Peters, Welfare Waivers and Non-marital Childbearing 
(Ithaca, NY: Cornell University, September 1999). 
161 G. Duncan, K. Harris, and J. Boisjoly, “Time Limits and Welfare Reform: New Estimates of the 
Number and Characteristics of Affected Families,” The Social Service Review 74, no. 1 (2000): 55–75.  
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The absence of an effect also presents opportunity for further study; as both the 
mandatory paternity establishment and work requirements imposed on welfare 
recipients shows no significant effect for any of the models estimated. This is of 
particular note because both of these approaches to welfare are not new, and precede 
the 1996 welfare reform by many years. As such, opportunity for more extensive study 
of these measures may be possible, given the number of years each measure has been 
part of welfare law. 
The probability of obtaining these results – or the likelihood that a woman 
would have a non-marital birth as a function of the model parameters provided – is 
tested by the maximum likelihood function. The first model specification (the “full” 
model) includes independent variables including demographic factors such as the 
state’s non-marital birth rate, whether or not a woman was a high school dropout or 
high school graduate (omitted category is “some college”), race, and extent of 
religious activity (omitted category is “low religious activity”). In addition, the “full” 
model estimates the six-policy measures; minor parent provisions, stay in school 
requirement, mandatory paternity establishment, time limits, family cap, and work 
requirements. To assess the appropriateness of estimating separate effects for each of 
the policy variables, the second model specification (the “reduced” model) excluded 
all policy variables and estimated effects only for the demographic variables.  
The likelihood ratio is distributed as χ2 with 6
162 degrees of freedom. The test 
statistic is computed with the formula [ –2 log (L)Ho/(L)Ha ], and is significant at 
.05% level. Table 4.8 summarizes the calculations between full and reduced models 
for three groups of women drawn from the study sample: all women; women over 20 
years of age; and teenaged women to explore if the policy measures as a group have 
any impact on the dependent variable. While some of the policy variables individually 
                                                 
162 [13 parameters in full model – 7 parameters in model without policies]  
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may not show an effect, the maximum likelihood estimate tests the joint significance 
of all the policy variables when estimated as a group for each of the six models 
specified earlier.  
The decision to reject the null hypothesis indicates that separate estimates 
(coefficients) for each policy may not be needed. Specifically, the maximum 
likelihood ratio test shows that the difference between the two model specifications is 
not large enough to be statistically significant. These estimates support the hypothesis 
that the most influential factors in the model on the probability of a non-marital birth 
were the demographic variables estimated; even though a few models specified earlier 
did show important, sometime unanticipated, effects of state welfare policies on non 
marital births.  
Limitations of the Analysis 
This analysis considers the relationship of demographic and policy variables 
on the probability that a given birth will be out of wedlock. But a more complete 
analysis would carefully consider the full array of choices a woman faces when she 
discovers a pregnancy outside of marriage. Specifically, Child Trends, Inc.
163 created a 
decision matrix regarding non-marital births that further illustrates the nature of a 
woman’s choice when faced with a non-marital pregnancy (see Appendix J). As such, 
more thorough analysis would estimate a multinomial logit in which the dependent 
variable, the out of wedlock birth rate, takes one of five values.  
(0)  Out of wedlock pregnancy, no birth 
(1)  Out of wedlock pregnancy, non marital birth 
(2)  Out of wedlock pregnancy, marital birth 
(3)  Marital pregnancy, marital birth 
                                                 
163 K. Moore, B. Miller, B. Sugland, D. Morrison, D. Glei, and C. Blumenthal, Beginning Too Soon: 
Adolescent Sexual Behavior, Pregnancy, and Parenthood (Washington, DC: Child Trends, Inc., June 
1995).  
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(4)  No pregnancy 
The values assigned to a multinomial logit are consistent with previous studies on the 
decision to bear a child out of wedlock. Additionally, use of the five value logit would 
allow for a better understanding of the point in a woman’s decision making process 
that welfare polices may or may not have had an impact. More specifically, the use of 
a multinomial logit as a dependent variable allows for estimation of the greater range 
of possible impacts that policies may or may not have on women’s childbearing 
decisions. The model estimated in this analysis only estimates one possible outcome 
among five possibilities – the decision to bear a child outside of marriage. Use of a 
multinomial logit allows for exploration of the impact of policies on the decision to 
terminate the pregnancy, or to marry the child’s father either before or after delivery of 
the child conceived out of wedlock. (The data used in this analysis did not allow for 
this type of estimation.) 
It is important to note that family background, as measured by whether or not a 
woman was raised in a single parent home, and access to family planning services are 
also hypothesized to have a strong influence on a woman’s likelihood of having a 
child outside of marriage. Although these are two areas needing further examination, 
this empirical analysis does not estimate their impact; the NSAF data used for this 
sample do not capture family background, and access to family planning services are 
not collected at the state level at this time.  
Another important shortcoming of this analysis is the exclusion of an 
independent variable that estimates the influence of each state’s family planning 
services. Women’s access to contraception is obviously an important factor in 
reducing the risk of an out of wedlock pregnancy and subsequent non-marital birth. 
This information was not included in the NSAF data and as such, did not lead to the 
creation of a specific policy variable that captures this state information. Inclusion of  
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“access to contraception” as a state policy would require examination of each state’s 
family planning laws, or family planning expenditures. Ribar suggests another 
possible way to estimate this variable would be to examine the percentage of women 
eligible for Medicaid who are at risk of non-marital pregnancy to measure interstate 
differences in the cost and availability of contraceptives.
164 Therefore, including this 
information as part of the “state policy environment” in any future estimation would 
allow for a more complete picture of influential factors on women’s childbearing 
decisions in many states. 
Conclusion 
These findings confirm the hypothesis that demographic variables have 
important effects on fertility decisions made by single women. In particular, these 
results show the importance of race and religiousness as predictors of a woman’s 
propensity to have a child outside of wedlock regardless of her state of residence. 
These results also support the contention that the pregnancy reduction policies have 
different impacts on teen mothers and unmarried women over 20. The welfare 
programs put into place specifically to reduce non-marital births have interesting 
results: the family cap, time limits and work requirements designed to primarily 
impact women over 20 showed no effect. However, the requirements to live at home 
and stay in school placed on teens are positively correlated with non-marital births, 
while time limits appear to discourage teens from early childbearing. These results 
seem to show that although the policy measures are impacting fertility behavior, it is 
not clear that they will bring about the desired changes set forth by Congress in the 
1996 legislation, and as such, warrant further investigation. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
POLITICAL ANALYSIS OF WELFARE  
Introduction 
The rise in single parent families coupled with a decrease in real wages, the 
decrease in high paying manufacturing jobs and the disincentives of the welfare 
system itself led to an increased stratification of income in the U.S. in the mid to late 
1990s.
165 As such, the 1996 reforms of welfare redistributed resources to assist poor 
families in the short run, under the assumption that society would gain in the long run 
through decreases in unemployment and welfare dependency of both children and 
adults.  
Establishing a policy that provides an adequate benefit to unmarried mothers 
frequently (unintentionally) creates incentives for welfare receipt in the first place. 
“Welfare benefits have traditionally made it easier for single mothers, a group at high 
risk of poverty, to live independently, without the aid of their children’s father or 
families.”
166 Thus, the existence of a “safety net” influences decisions regarding births 
outside of marriage in both positive and negative ways.  
Welfare Policy 
Lowi believes that the welfare system has four main purposes. The first is 
“fiscal maintenance of the economic system” to ensure a steady flow of income to 
Americans. Another purpose is to “give the maximum number of people a stake in the 
system,”
167 specifically in the political process itself. A third purpose of welfare is to 
regulate the poor, usually through fiscal policies that turn benefits on and off to 
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influence their behavior – particularly work – and now also fertility (as demonstrated 
by PRWORA). The final, most important purpose of the welfare system is to alleviate 
poverty. This highlights the need for a critical interpretation of post PRWORA 
“success,” as it is known that there has been an unprecedented decline in caseloads 
(53%), yet the child poverty rate has not fallen at the same rate.
168 It cannot be 
assumed that a decline in caseloads (the criteria by which politicians judge success) 
has had a corollary reduction in poverty amelioration. As such, future research efforts 
should focus on the connection between the two phenomena, and the implications for 
future policy and program decisions. 
Welfare policy under PRWORA of 1996 had two primary goals regarding 
family structure: to reduce the rate of births to unmarried mothers (especially teens); 
and to increase the formation of two parent families.
169 Congress made the following 
findings in the first section of the PRWORA:  
•  Marriage is the foundation of a successful society; 
•  Marriage is an essential institution of a successful society that 
promotes the interests of children; 
•  The negative consequences of an out-of-wedlock birth on the 
mother, the child, the family, and society are well documented; and  
•  Therefore, in light of this demonstration of the crisis in our Nation, 
it is the sense of the Congress that prevention of out-of-wedlock 
pregnancy and reduction in out-of-wedlock birth are very important 
Government interests and the policy contained in part A of title IV 
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of the Social Security Act (as amended by section 103(a) of this 
Act) is intended to address the crisis.
170 
These dual goals were based on the association of increased child poverty to 
the rise in female-headed households. In addition, a large body of research
171 showed 
the deleterious effects experienced by children growing up in single parent homes 
(above and beyond the effect of poverty). Welfare reform included changes in benefit 
eligibility to reduce out of wedlock pregnancy and to promote marriage and work – 
through measures such as time limits, family caps, and strict child support 
enforcement and increased paternity establishment. 
Characteristics of Redistributive Policy 
A primary characteristic of redistributive policy is that it imposes costs on 
some citizens (taxpayers) to benefit others, in hopes of providing a net gain to society. 
The PRWORA illustrates this premise by providing temporary assistance to families 
in need through TANF in hopes of reducing longer-term dependence and costs of the 
system. The goal of reducing both teen pregnancy and non-marital births is also 
geared towards reducing the cost born to society to maintain the system because of 
lower unemployment and fewer single parent families.  
Redistributive policy is distinct from other public policies because it is based 
on the categorization of conduct and characteristics of groups of people. This 
categorization is based on “systems thinking” – the premise that human beings must 
be understood as a part of a system instead of individually.
172 Therefore, it is through 
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welfare policy that people are seen as interdependent and placed in categories to 
determine the allocation of resources. In many ways, the extent of commitment 
embodied in our welfare policies reflects the extent of our ethical obligations to one 
another. Katz offers another insight, that the “redefinition” of the welfare system 
through PRWORA illustrates changes in the way we view the nature of citizenship.
173 
For example, in the 1940s there existed a notion of “social citizenship”
174 which 
provided a minimum amount of economic security as a right of citizenship, derived 
simply from birth in the United States. After welfare reform in 1996, Katz argues that 
citizenship is viewed as an achieved status contingent on one’s contribution to society. 
Thus, “citizenship” as an American ideal is not limitless, but bound by one’s merit and 
obligations to contribute to society as a whole.  
Redistributive policy manipulates the environment of individual conduct to 
bring about change in behavior. The policy is coercive through “primary rule,” which 
authorizes the government agency to enforce behavioral requirements on recipients as 
a condition of receiving government assistance.
175 This characteristic of redistributive 
policies is clearly shown by the imposition of behavioral obligations upon welfare 
program recipients to achieve program goals. 
Specifically, PRWORA sets out to change marital and fertility behavior of 
those at risk of out of wedlock pregnancy, and also of recipients already on welfare as 
a result of a child born outside of marriage. Mink criticizes the Republican emphasis 
on the “moral necessity of marriage…and sanctions against out of wedlock 
childbirth… that compel poor single mothers to surrender basic constitutional rights to 
associational freedom and reproductive privacy as a condition of receiving economic 
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assistance for their families.”
176 The question is how can we devise a policy that both 
assures women these rights and holds fathers responsible for (at the very least) 
financial responsibility for their children? If the regulation of parental behavior is the 
only way to maximize child outcomes and reduce the costs of welfare provision it 
seems e both necessary and ethical to do so (allowing of course, for exceptions in 
cases of domestic violence, etc. which clearly do not maximize outcomes for anyone 
involved). Finally, the purpose of mandatory paternity establishment is not to force 
interaction between the mother and father, but rather to establish a legal relationship 
between the father and child – to collect needed resources on that child’s behalf – and 
hopefully facilitate other beneficial involvement in the child’s life. 
Welfare policy is different from other public policies because the 
categorization of people as parts of a social system conflicts with the basic idea that all 
citizens are equal, especially citizens placed in various categories. In addition, 
changing public attitudes about the appropriate balance between government activities 
to help the poor and relying on the market economy constantly challenge the 
legitimacy of these policies. Notions of the deserving and undeserving poor and the 
extent of responsibilities for our neighbors are also obstacles to creating effective 
welfare policy. Perhaps the most difficult barrier faced in setting welfare policies is 
the disagreement on the goal of the welfare policy in the first place highlighted in 
legislative debates around PRWORA. 
Some argue that equality is the goal of welfare, others equity; where equality 
refers to evenly proportioned shares of resources among citizens, equity involves 
issues of fairness. When looking at welfare policy, these ideas frequently contradict 
one another because equality would require such an enormous shift of 
income/resources from the middle and top fifth of society to the bottom, that it may 
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seem unfair to many. So, some could argue that inequality is fair under American 
meritocracy, where citizens must contribute to the system to gain from it. As a result, 
reaching an appropriate balance between American tenets of individualism and the 
need to provide poor families with the basic necessities is difficult. This struggle 
among political, economic, social and moral factors in establishing effective welfare 
policy makes it a seemingly intractable task. Formulating a redistributive policy is 
complicated at the onset, shown by the difficulties faced when determining the goal and 
objectives of the policy.  
The Policy Process 
Public policy is “an action (or an inaction), usually undertaken by the 
government, directed at a particular goal and legitimated by the commitment of public 
resources.”
177 Dobelstein believes policies are set forth for following reasons: 
1.  Solve a social problem; 
2.  Serve the public interest;  
3.  Legitimate specific social policy goals with respect to a given 
problem;  
4.  Provide an environment for resolving conflicting values; and 
5.  Establish the direction for future social action with respect to the 
issue under consideration.  
The reasons for setting policies are important to understanding not only the goal of the 
policy, but the content as well. For example, policies set forth to “serve the public 
interest” require input from individual constituents and groups to determine if an issue 
warrants a policy solution, and develop an appropriate policy. Thus, policies signed 
into law should reflect the public’s concerns about the issue at hand; upholding the 
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fundamental tenet of democracy that the government was established to serve the 
people. In the mid 1990s, public concerns around welfare focused on the cost of 
welfare provision and the harmful effects on children raised in single parent homes in 
the mid 1990s. Reduction of poverty and the costs of welfare thus become “specific 
social policy goals” that were legitimated through the passage of a policy and 
allocation of public resources to address the problem.  
Intergovernmental Perspective 
Further complicating the policy process is the interaction between the different 
levels of government. In addition, our government is bipartisan system coupled with 
checks and balances create conflicts which require cooperation, negotiation, 
bargaining and compromise for Congress to solve problems. Additionally, the size of 
each level of government is not a constant, and recent trends show a decline in the size 
of the Federal government and an increase in size of both the state and local 
governments [Appendix K].  
Welfare reform has played a large role in this trend, as the Federal government, 
through the last two major pieces of welfare legislation, gave states more flexibility 
and autonomy in delivery of welfare services. The 1996 welfare reform fundamentally 
changed the relationship between federal, state and local governments that has led to 
greater variation in states’ approaches to policy and programs.
178 Note also the 
importance of people who work in government agencies that have responsibility for 
carrying out programs because they make a many “smaller” policy decisions in the 
course of implementing policies or programs. This local phenomenon may be an 
important factor in the original (successful) results of welfare reform.  
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Policy-making Process 
The policy process is complex and involves both several branches and levels of 
government. Ziegler characterizes the process as a “policy wheel” that illustrates the 
steps of policymaking.
179 Table 5.1 summarizes each step in the process [see 
Appendix L for the full policy wheel]. 
Table 5.1: Stages of the Policy Process. 
Stage Description 
Problem Definition  Identifies the problem that requires solution. 
Policy Formulation  Sets forth the policy to solve the problem. 
Planning  Involves identifying objectives of the policy, clarification of goals. 
Program Design  Sets forth how to accomplish objectives. 
Program 
Development 
Includes pilots and demonstration projects before a full commitment 
of resources is made and allows the input of formative information to 
guide actual program operation stage. 
Program Operation  Delivery of services and monitoring of results. 
Evaluation  Determine if accomplished intended goal of policy. 
Redefinition & 
Reformulation 
Identify successful and unsuccessful components of programs and 
incorporate lessons to new policy and program measures. 
As previously discussed, welfare policy is problematic at several stages of the policy 
process. First and foremost, problem definition involves very different views, as some 
believe that poverty is a fault of the individual, others of the social system; others see 
welfare as an injustice based on unequal distribution of resources. Obviously, the 
definition of the problem shapes the solution set forth. For welfare policy this simple 
idea is further complicated by the variety of actors involved in the process, each 
infusing their own values and morals into the debates about the root cause of non-
marital childbearing and welfare. Thus compromise is a key element to setting 
policies, and also a major criticism of our policy making body – because as a result, 
legislation sometimes appears “watered down” by the time it is passed. 
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The evaluation of welfare policies is also challenging, especially if the goals of 
the policy were not explicated at the implementation stage or if monitoring efforts 
were not carefully conducted to collect the types of data needed to assess the 
program’s impact. In addition, evaluations must account for the organizational context 
in which the policy was implemented, and the specific characteristics of the policy’s 
target population. Time and budgetary constraints of the policy process make planning 
and evaluation almost a luxury in the policy process, despite the fact that careful 
attention at these two points on the policy wheel will increase a program’s likelihood 
of success. Finally, the critical step of redefinition or reformulation in the policy 
process connects program evaluation back to the early stages of either problem 
definition or policy formulation in hopes of capitalizing on successes and learning 
from mistakes. This ability to recast both the problem definition and solution is the 
very basis of the incremental nature of policy today. 
The policy wheel is an important tool for characterizing stages of the policy 
process. However, the wheel does not reflect two important facets that influence the 
policy making process: the impact of values and politics on the process, and the lack 
of perfect information underlying decisions made. Policymaking is a value-laden 
process as social values, professional values, and personal values play a role in 
problem definition, the range of solutions entertained in policy debates, and certainly 
the solution that is chosen and implemented. The influence of politics (defined as 
“methods or tactics involved in managing a government or state”
180) on policymaking 
occurs at most stages, particularly problem definition, policy formulation, and 
evaluation. Finally, at each stage of the policy process, decision makers are provided 
various types of research and information upon which they base their decisions. Policy 
makers have no choice but to make important decisions based on the information they 
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receive, which is rarely perfect and complete. As a result, a policy may fail simply 
because its formulation was based on incomplete, biased or faulty information.  
Legislative Considerations: PRWORA 
There are three components of the 1996 welfare legislation that may be 
illustrative of policy makers’ reliance on imperfect information and/or the influence of 
politics on the policy process: the emphasis on reducing teen pregnancy; reliance on 
threats to modify fertility behavior of welfare recipients; and the absence of efforts to 
regulate fathers’ behavior as a means to reduce non-marital pregnancies.  
Emphasis on Reducing Teen Pregnancy 
Most pregnancy reduction efforts focus on teens, despite the fact that teens 
only account for 30% of non-marital births, and 70% are to women over 20 years of 
age. The question is, is it logical to place emphasis on reducing teen pregnancy to 
reduce poverty given the dynamics of the welfare population?  
The general consensus from the hearings around welfare reform was that teen 
pregnancy is a primary causal factor of poverty/welfare receipt. This may be true, as 
about half of women on welfare did have a child as a teen. While teens are not the 
majority of women who have children outside of marriage, 75% of them will be 
dependent on welfare within 5 years. The implications of this are important because it 
is these women who face the greatest difficulties in trying to get off welfare because: 
they are less likely to have a high school diploma; more likely to have incomes below 
50% of poverty line; have larger families; and are more likely to never be married. 
At first glance, this emphasis on teens may seem misplaced because the 
majority of pregnancies occur to women over 20, but close examination welfare 
population dynamics show that many of the women experiencing a non-marital birth 
over 20 are better educated, more likely to support themselves through work, or are  
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cohabitating with the child’s father. However, while the emphasis on teens is 
appropriate, it should not preclude serious efforts to reach women over 20 at risk of 
non-marital pregnancy.  
One way to reach women over 20 is through family planning services under 
Title X of the PHS Act, which stated “no American woman shall be denied access to 
family planning services because of her economic condition,” and also through 
Medicaid – both of which are crucial to reducing the non-marital birth rate for women 
over 20. Note that family planning was not emphasized in the 1996 legislation – 
despite the fact that the network of Title X clinics is well established nationally, has 
high rates of success in reducing unintended pregnancies, and reaches only half of 
women eligible for family planning services. The level of funds
181 provided to Title X 
programs reflects a lack of commitment by Congress to use an already viable program 
to further reach its fertility goals in the PRWORA. Yet family planning has been given 
little attention as a solution to reducing both non-marital births and poverty. This 
contradicts public opinion which favors providing birth control to unmarried women 
on welfare.  
The 1996 legislation rewards reductions in non-marital births without 
subsequent increases in abortion, implying that an implicit goal of the policy measure 
is to reduce the need for abortion. Women over 20 account for 69% of abortions, and 
reduced funds and lack of emphasis for family planning will do little to reduce the 
need for women to have abortions. It is important to remember that Title X services 
are available to women before they become pregnant (unlike Medicaid). It appears that 
politics dominated the debates about abortion, and other reproductive issues faced by 
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poor women will continue to be a barrier to implementing a solution that has potential 
to reduce both the out of wedlock birth rate and the need for abortion.  
It is important to examine family planning in the context of TANF 
reauthorization, which does not include any additional funds for Title X programs at 
this time, even though they are the primary means to reach women over 20 who are at 
risk of an unplanned pregnancy. This point also confirms the need for future analysis 
that includes estimation of the influence of each state’s sexuality education policies in 
the public schools, where we have greatest access to teens at risk of pregnancy. 
Finally, examining this policy measure allows for the discussion of the current 
Administration’s strong emphasis on abstinence only programs as a means to reduce 
non-marital childbearing. 
“Primary Rule” to Change Behavior 
The 1996 pregnancy reduction provisions set forth in PRWORA rely on threats 
to change behavior, implying that a strong enough connection exists between 
receiving welfare and out of wedlock pregnancy that reducing benefits will reduce 
non-marital pregnancies and/or births. This approach has been taken even though 
research has provided inconclusive evidence that there is a direct causal relationship 
between benefit levels and childbearing by teens and poor women over the age of 
20.
182 The causality between poverty and non-marital child bearing could run either or 
both ways -- if you take the view that benefits increase pregnancies, it is logical to cut 
benefits to reduce pregnancies. Many studies show the real value of welfare payments 
has decreased while the pregnancy rates increased while others show corollary rises in 
both the poverty rate and the non-marital birth rate.
183 Thus, if you think that it may be 
a set of external life circumstances that cause women to believe they have nothing to 
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lose by becoming pregnant (because their social and economic future seems dim), the 
approach in the legislation will not impact the non-marital birth rate significantly.  
The question is – is it the pregnancy itself or the environment in which the 
pregnancy occurs that causes negative outcomes for poor women and their children? 
Findings from Chapter 4 support the hypothesis that family background, religion, race 
and ethnicity, and access to family planning have more important effects on decisions 
regarding a non-marital birth than the sanctions and incentives in the legislation will. 
Therefore, increasing social and economic opportunities of all youth (e.g. enhancing 
school quality, etc.) through education and employment incentives could lead to 
delayed childbearing and have a greater impact on the non-marital birth rate than the 
punitive approach embodied in the welfare legislation. 
What about Daddy? 
Policy measures to reduce non-marital pregnancy primarily focus on changing 
women’s behavior. Efforts to alter male behavior typically involve actions to establish 
a legal connection (and subsequent financial support) between the father and child 
after he/she is born. One plausible way to impact the overall rate of out of wedlock 
pregnancy (and subsequent non-marital births) would be to incorporate large-scale 
programs to impact males’ fertility decisions. Studies have shown that boys have sex 
earlier, more often and with more partners than girls, and data from successful past 
efforts to include males in local prevention programs shows that they can change 
males’ contraceptive behavior.
184 This has been illustrated by the increased use of 
condoms in the 1990s, showing that men can, and do, change their behavior. Finally, 
males, especially teens, are connected to many organizational settings that are good 
sites for prevention efforts (e.g., schools, athletic activities/clubs, churches, boy 
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scouts, etc.). Finally, increases in statutory rape (coupled with the knowledge that on 
average, males are 2–3 years older than their female partners) makes intervention 
efforts aimed at men in their late teens and early 20s another important measure that 
could be taken to reduce teen pregnancy.  
Analysis  
Analysis of welfare policy and its potential for success requires an 
understanding that although we can not expect perfect information from social science 
research, reliable information should considered when designing policies to reduce 
non-marital births. Additionally, when good information is available but seemingly 
unnoticed in policy debates, the influence of politics on the policy process may be the 
underlying reason. One explanation for what appears to be a large influence of politics 
in the welfare debates is the moral principles [Table 5.2] that are involved in setting 
forth welfare policy (particularly with regards to women’s fertility) 
Table 5.2. Moral Principles Underlying Welfare Policy. 
Autonomy: the right to make critical decisions about one’s own destiny. 
Freedom: the right to hold and express personal opinions and take personal actions. 
Preservation of Life: the right to continued existence. 
Honesty: the right to fair and accurate information. 
Confidentiality: the right to privacy. 
Equality: the right of individuals to receive the same services, resources, opportunities, or 
rights as other persons. 
Social Justice: the right of equal access to social resources. 
Due Process: the right to procedural safeguards when accused of crimes or when benefits 
or rights are withdrawn. 
Beneficence: the right to receive those treatments, services or benefits that allow one to 
establish or maintain a decent standard of well-being. 
Societal/Collective Rights: the right of society to maintain and improve itself by 
safeguarding the public health and welfare, avoiding unreasonable or unnecessary 
expenditures, and preserving public order. 
Source: Bruce Jansson, The Reluctant Welfare State (Belmont, CA: Wadsworth Publishing 
Company, 1988). 
These underlying moral principles may be an intervening factor between putting 
reliable information about non-marital births and welfare to use, and the previously  
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mentioned shortcomings in the Congressional response embodied in PRWORA. In 
general, the difference between what we know (research) and what we do (practice) is 
mediated by the influence of politics on the process through which knowledge is 
translated to action. This process, the politicization of knowledge, shapes policy at 
each, if not all of the stages of the policy process (formulation, implementation, 
evaluation). The short and long-term impact of this filtration of knowledge on the 
outcomes of actions taken is not clearly understood and is an interesting dimension to 
the analysis of any social policy. Thus, the mediating (confounding) effect of 
politicization of the issue may be a primary reason for the shortcomings in the 
legislative efforts regarding non-marital births and their link to welfare receipt, and is 
an area where greater examination may increase understanding of any social policies 
involving family structure and fertility decisions. 
Recommendations 
The efforts to reduce teen pregnancy under PRWORA have continued the 
decline in rates prior to the legislation, and the rates of births outside of marriage to 
women over 20 leveled off in the late 1990s, and recently increased slightly each year 
(averaging about 1% annually). The relationship between these trends and PRWORA 
is not known at this time, and it is important to acknowledge that these rates are also 
impacted by reductions in marital fertility. In addition, more children born outside of 
marriage are living with two parents (sometimes both biological) as a result of 
increase in cohabitation (Table 5.3).
185  
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Table 5.3. Children’s Living Arrangements, 1997–1999. 
 
  Total U.S. 
  1997 
(%) 
1999 
(%)  Difference 
Married biological/adoptive parents  59.8  60.2  +0.4 
Married blended parents
a 8.3  8.3  +0.0 
Single mother  21.3  19.2  -2.1* 
Single father  2.9  2.9  -0.2 
Cohabitating parents with common 
children
b  2.0 2.8  +0.8* 
Cohabitating partners with no children in 
common
c  2.6 3.2  +0.6* 
No parents (foster or kinship or non-
relative parents)  3.1 3.5  +0.5* 
Other 0.1  0.1  +0.0 
 Source: Urban Institute calculations from the 1997 and 1999 NAF. 
*Statistically significant difference at the 90 percent confidence level. 
a.  The category “married blended parents” refers to children living with a biological parent who 
is married to either a stepparent or an adoptive parent. 
b.  Children living with cohabiting parents with common children are living with both of their 
biological parents, who are unmarried. 
c.  Children living with cohabiting partners with no children in common are living with one 
biological parent and that parent’s boyfriend or girlfriend. 
Recommendation 1: Continue Efforts to Reduce Non-marital births 
States must continue attempts to reduce out of wedlock pregnancy, both for 
teens and women over 20. To further reduce the rate among teenagers, additional 
funding for the provision of contraceptives is needed in more than half the states. 
While more than 35 states have abstinence education as part of their curriculum, less 
than half incorporate contraceptive education (see Appendix K), and only 5 states 
provide a clinic to increase teens access to birth control. 
Reducing non-marital births among women over 20 years of age requires an 
increase in funding for family planning services under Title X – the only program that 
provides services to poor women before they become pregnant. Title X funding has 
seen no significant increase since the 1980s, and as a result, less than half of eligible 
women receive services. The importance of Title X programs to reaching poor women  
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at risk of births outside of marriage cannot be overstated. The lack of emphasis on 
these programs to reduce non-marital births to date is baffling given the reported high 
rates of program success
186 and the public support of providing birth control to poor 
unmarried women.  
Recommendation 2: Expand Efforts To Change Male Fertility Decisions 
Clear disincentives have been established for men who father children out of 
wedlock, most notably through increases in both paternity establishment and child 
support enforcement. The child support system underwent a major overhaul under the 
Family Support Act of 1988, and the additional provisions under PRWORA build on 
the success of mechanisms put into place under the 1988 legislation. To further 
improve the child support system, policies need to be created that help poor fathers 
who are unable to pay child support gain both skills and training needed to gain 
employment, and more importantly increase access to their children regardless of their 
inability to pay child support. As such, the connection between non-payment and loss 
of visitation needs to be removed to foster greater involvement of fathers in children’s 
lives.  
Equally important is the idea that policies and programs should help current 
and potential fathers succeed at work so they are able to support a family and commit 
themselves to a family. Promoting work is based in the premise that working parents 
provide a better environment for raising children than parents who rely on public 
assistance. Research shows that parental work only benefits children if it increases 
family income.
187 This is not the case for many low-income parents, as Loprest shows 
that many working welfare leavers live on resources below the federal poverty level; 
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many low-income families are not receiving benefits they are eligible for; and a higher 
proportion of recipients are living in extreme poverty.
188 It is too soon to declare 
welfare a success in the increases in work, as the critical role of the strong economy in 
the 1990s must be acknowledged as an important factor in the welfare caseloads and 
employment rates. 
Another justification for work promotion as a welfare policy was to increase 
child outcomes, but research by the Urban Institute (2002) confirms that children in 
those families that leave welfare are at similar risks for poor outcomes as children who 
remain in welfare families. Child only cases account for more than 30% of TANF 
caseloads, because of parents’ ineligibility for benefits increased under sanctions.
189 In 
addition, gains in child well-being do not become evident immediately after a parent 
gains employment, thus, no general conclusion can be drawn about the impact of work 
on child outcomes to date. Therefore, the focus on male responsibility should be 
expanded to include: reduction of pregnancies outside marriage through prevention 
programs in public schools and other organizational settings; and job training and 
education programs to equip men to be responsible fathers, financially and otherwise.  
Recommendation 3: Promote Marriage by Removing all Marriage Disincentives 
Welfare policy embodies a clear preference for marriage to reduce the 
disadvantage of children who grow up in a single parent home. It is not clear that 
welfare policy can change the value placed on marriage by society as a whole. As 
such, an effective way to increase marriage among low-income women is to remove 
the remaining disincentives for marriage. According to Rowe
190 33 states have 
established similar eligibility requirements for one and two parent families. This is a 
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positive trend, but the fundamental problem is that TANF is a means-tested program 
that phases out benefits after income rises. “Thus, family-structure neutral eligibility 
rules that include an income test continue to disadvantage married parent families.”
191 
Marriage penalties are highest for low-income families as a percentage of total 
income, in addition to penalties of lost benefits such as food stamps and Medicaid – 
these two combined can cost married couples up to 30% of income.
192 The result is, of 
course, a substantial disadvantage to low income married couples. 
The promotion of marriage is a good way to try to reduce the number of 
children born into single parent homes, but is not the perfect solution for all women. In 
particular, poor women with low marriage prospects will be heavily influenced by the 
marriage penalties listed above. Higher asset limits and income disregards have also 
been important measure to encourage marriage. One other important way to increase 
marriage is to increase the labor force potential of men in poor neighborhoods. This 
falls in line with the work of Wilson,
193 who believes that the disparity in marriage 
rates between African American and White communities is largely due to a lack of 
employable and marriageable men in poor areas. In general, a clear connection 
between labor force policies and education quality should be drawn to the problem of 
non-marital childbearing, and specific efforts to draw this connection need to attend 
to the importance of cultural factors to fertility behavior.  
Conclusion 
The reauthorization of TANF provides an excellent opportunity to examine 
both the assumptions underlying the definition of the problem of welfare dependence, 
and the criteria by which we measure success of our welfare policy and programs. 
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This analysis can lead to important modifications of both our overall approach to 
welfare policy and also to specific programs and efforts designed to ameliorate the 
hardships experienced by America’s vulnerable families.   
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CHAPTER SIX 
CONCLUSION 
Criteria for success 
How we view success of the PRWORA will influence what measures we 
believe are needed to improve the welfare system. For example, since 1994 the huge 
decline (unprecedented) in caseloads could mean that either families are no longer in 
need, or families in need are no longer receiving assistance. The effect of economic 
trends must be considered in conjunction with changes in welfare dependence, and it 
is also important to note that the drop in welfare participation (almost 50%) was much 
more rapid than the drop in child poverty (21.8% in 1994 to 16.9% in 1999).
194 Why 
the measures led to the decline in caseloads are also not reducing child poverty 
requires further examination. It is possible that although fewer families are on welfare, 
a high number of children are still experiencing poverty and hardship. We know that 
many adults left welfare for work, but did not earn enough to live above the poverty 
line, and that in some cases, families left welfare participation without finding work or 
were forced off due to time limits. Finally, some families who need assistance were 
unable to get it, either from barriers to enrollment or failure to apply.
195 In the course 
of TANF reauthorization, we need to assess and strongly consider the effect(s) on 
children that “trickle down” from Congressional regulation of their parents.  
Reauthorization and Non-marital childbearing 
Marriage is not a perfect solution to all the issues involving non-marital 
childbearing as one third of unmarried births are to women ages 15-18, fathered by 
men who are on average, 3 years older. National statistics show that more than 50% of 
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marriages end in divorce, and those who marry at younger ages are at greatest risk. 
Thus, family formation initiatives may better serve women over 20. In general, 
though, marriage may solve an immediate problem faced by women who discover an 
out of wedlock pregnancy, but in the long run, it may not provide a two-parent home 
for much of that child’s life.  
The question is can public policies discourage unintended pregnancies and 
support women who choose to have a child out of wedlock? In other words, are both 
aims mutually exclusive or does the support provided to women who have children 
outside of marriage inherently provide incentive to make that choice? If future welfare 
legislation passes (e.g., HR 4737) the primary focus on marriage promotion may be at 
the cost of other important issues regarding family formation and stability such as: 
teen pregnancy prevention; family planning efforts for women over 20 at risk of non-
marital births; increasing educational and employment opportunities of young parents 
(whether they are married or not); and targeting very specific efforts to increase the 
“employability” and “marriageability” of young men.  
Marriage accounts for 26% of exits from poverty for unmarried women with 
children (whereas 33% of women lift their families out of poverty through work).
196 
Recently, President Bush’s Administration unveiled the Personal Responsibility, Work 
and Family Promotion Act (HR 4737), which emphasizes marriage as a critical means 
to reduce poverty and non-marital childbearing. The legislation “express the sense of 
the Congress that increasing success in moving families from welfare to work, as well 
as promoting healthy marriage and other means of improving child well-being, are 
very important government interests.”
197 The commitment to this interest is an 
authorization of $200 million to conduct marriage promotion programs and research 
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and $20 million to fund “fatherhood programs.” When all family formation programs 
are accounted for, it is estimated that the bill allocates $1.6 billion
198 for these 
purposes.  
The underlying assumption of these policy measures is that marriage will 
improve the status of poor women with children. Mothers who receive TANF after a 
non-marital birth are less likely to marry than those who are not reliant on public 
assistance, and among those who marry, their husbands, on average, have lower 
incomes.
199 Thus, it is important to consider the marriage prospects for women on 
welfare and consider the employability of poor men as a way to encourage two-parent 
family formation.  
The notion of assortative mating suggest that “higher male incomes tend to 
strengthen traditional marriage whereas higher female incomes, by reducing women’s 
dependence on male resources, may weaken traditional marriage and increase the 
likelihood that childbearing will take place outside of marriage.”
200 When welfare 
benefits provide income only to unmarried women with children, it weakens the 
likelihood that she will marry. Therefore if the joint income between a man and a 
woman of limited means remains low or is reduced as a result of benefit reduction, 
there is no incentive to have a child within marriage. This is a strong factor in why 
marriage promotion is a less viable option for women currently receiving welfare, and 
for women who are at risk of non-marital birth whose only prospect for marriage is a 
low-income male.  
As it stands, reauthorization legislation is worded such that it may be difficult 
for states to provide aid to unmarried, two-parent families and their children and some 
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analysts believe that the requirements placed on states to assist two-parent families to 
the same extent as single-parent families are not strong enough.
201 More importantly, 
as the TANF reauthorization process is underway, shouldn’t legislators stop and ask 
themselves if the allocation of so much money to marriage promotion is appropriate 
given the limited knowledge we have on the government’s role in marriage and the 
potential impact of investing those funds, possibly at the expense of other needed 
services?  
Reframing the Approach 
On important aspect of reframing the approach taken to welfare is to think 
about the consequences to children each time we punish or regulate a mother. Why do 
we constantly focus on child outcomes in justification for regulating mothers when we 
don’t consider the consequences of such regulations on the child outcomes in the first 
place? The question that must be asked today is how can we both change the 
“irresponsible” behavior of parents – mothers and fathers – and maximize outcomes of 
children in families dependent on the welfare system? In other words, could welfare 
policy and programs be redesigned to include the primary purpose of maximizing 
child outcomes?  
President Bush’s proposal to require women receiving welfare to work 40 
hours a week without addressing who will care for their children (and no additional 
allocation of money for child care) is a good example of the need to reframe the 
current approach to welfare policy. Under PRWORA states have the option of shifting 
TANF money to the Child Care and Development (CCDF) block grant, and many 
states have exercised that option. Despite this, Bush’s increased work requirements 
will necessitate an increased level of direct funding for childcare from the Federal 
government to help states meet the aggressive goal that will likely be part of the 
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reauthorized legislation. The need to regulate parental behavior, in this case, 
overshadowed a more important discussion about how women with children can meet 
the requirement without additional subsidies for day care? 
This proposal highlights an interesting view of motherhood. In essence, work 
requirements of mothers reliant on welfare send the message that a poor woman’s 
place is in the labor force, not at home caring for her children. Yet, we criticize 
women who work for a lack of priority placed on their children’s well being, and we 
blame them for any negative outcomes their child exhibits. Welfare policy, as it 
stands, places poor women in a no-win situation. This situation is exacerbated by 
policies that place strict requirements on their behavior as a condition of benefit 
provision, with little or no supportive mechanisms to help women meet the 
requirements in the first place. 
To remedy this situation, welfare policy must support a broader base of family 
types, non-working and working poor through workplace polices and day care 
provision. In general, there needs to be greater value placed on child rearing as an 
activity
202 because if women are caring for children at home, they can only participate 
in the labor force marginally. The difficulty of achieving equality for women because 
of childcare duties is exacerbated for poor women. 
Achieving better outcomes for both unmarried mothers and their children 
requires attention to the dilemmas women face when forced to comply with welfare 
regulations that fail to provide adequate supportive services. Legislative modifications 
need to be made under TANF reauthorization to enhance the likelihood that women 
who are already disadvantaged are not destined to fail under a harsh, illogical 
government policy. It is also critical to try to impact men’s behavior, because every 
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child born out of wedlock has both a mother and a father who bears a moral, physical, 
legal, emotional responsibility for that child.  
Welfare policies have been trying to modify family structure since their 
inception. The problem is the underlying assumptions of policy measures are based on 
the notion that two parent biological families are possible in most cases of an out of 
wedlock pregnancy. This assumption does not hold true, given the changes in attitudes 
about both sex and marriage in the 1990s. While it is admirable to try to create the 
family situation in which children thrive the most, it may be unrealistic to expect to 
accomplish this through regulation of welfare benefits.  
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Appendix A. Legislative history of the Personal Responsibility and Work 
Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996 (P.L. 104-193). 
Date and Action 
1993 
January 20. President Clinton is inaugurated. He popularized the idea of "end[ing] 
welfare as we know it" during his presidential campaign.  
 
January 21. U.S. Senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan (D-N.Y.) reintroduces the Work 
for Welfare Act, which would provide full federal funding for the Job Opportunities 
and Basic Skills Training Program (JOBS).  
 
February 2. House Ways and Means Committee Republicans introduce a welfare 
reform bill with two tiers of AFDC, the transition program and the work program. 
After a total of five years’ participation by clients in both programs, states could opt 
to drop clients from the rolls of Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC).  
 
June 21. The Clinton Administration names a 27-member task force to develop a 
welfare reform plan. The effort is led by Bruce Reed, deputy assistant to the 
president for domestic policy; David T. Ellwood, assistant secretary for planning 
and evaluation, U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (HHS); and Mary 
Jo Bane, HHS assistant secretary, Administration for Children and Families.  
 
November 10. House Republicans unveil H.R. 3500, a welfare reform proposal 
sponsored by Minority Leader Robert H. Michel (R-Ill.) and cosponsored by 160 
Republican lawmakers. The proposal requires that by 2002, 90 percent of those 
who receive AFDC for two years or more would work in exchange for their benefits. 
The proposal allows states to convert AFDC to block grants, requires paternity 
establishment in exchange for AFDC benefits, and denies AFDC to minor parents 
under age 18. It would save $19.5 billion over five years.  
 
1994 
 
January 11. APWA releases a bipartisan plan for reforming the nation’s welfare 
system, Responsibility, Work, Pride: The Values of Welfare Reform, that was 
developed by state human service commissioners. The plan calls for expanded job 
training and work, stronger child support enforcement, increased federal support for 
the JOBS Program, improved health care coverage, and streamlined administration 
of services.  
 
January 18. U.S. Senator John Breaux (D-La.) calls for Congress to address 
welfare reform in 1994 year with the same urgency as health care reform.  
 
January 25. Sixteen Senate Republicans, including U.S. Senators Bob Dole (Kan.) 
and Hank Brown (Colo.), introduce the Welfare Reform Act of 1994, S. 1795. It 
gives states the option of ending AFDC after two years, requires teen mothers to 
live at home, preserves the AFDC entitlement, and allows for the establishment of 
a voucher program in which the combined value of AFDC and food stamp benefits 
can be used as a wage subsidy.   
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February 18. House Republicans this week say they will file a discharge petition to 
force a vote on the House floor on H.R. 3500, the House Republican welfare 
proposal.  
 
April 15. U.S. Senators Tom Harkin (D-Iowa) and Christopher Bond (R-Mo.) 
introduce the first bipartisan welfare bill, the Welfare to Self-Sufficiency Act, S. 
2009. The bill is modeled after Iowa’s Promise Jobs Program. 
 
April 22. Two additional welfare reform bills are introduced this week: U.S. 
Representatives. Lynn Woolsey (D-Calif.) and Ralph Regula (R-Ohio) introduce 
legislation that would federalize child support collection and triple funding for the 
JOBS Program. The Working Off Welfare Act seeks to strengthen transitional 
services as families move off welfare.  
 
Reps. Jim Talent (R-Mo.) and Tim Hutchison (R-Ark.) introduce the Real Welfare 
Reform Act, which denies benefits to unmarried mothers under age 21, imposes a 
3.5 percent cap on welfare spending, and requires 50 percent of welfare recipients 
to work for benefits by 1996.U.S. Sens. Lauch Faircloth (R-N.C.), Charles Grassley 
(R-Iowa), and Hank Brown(R-Colo.) introduce the bill in the Senate.  
 
May 11. The Mainstream Forum, a group of 90 Democrats led by Rep. Dave 
McCurdy (Okla.), introduces a welfare reform bill with a two-year lifetime limit on 
AFDC, followed by a mandatory community service requirement in which recipients 
could participate for a maximum of three years. The bill denies benefits to most 
noncitizens.  
 
May 27. Rep. Patsy Mink (D-Hawaii) and 30 House Democrats announce welfare 
reform legislation that would provide cash assistance, food stamps, and housing 
assistance for two years to welfare recipients who obtain jobs and leave AFDC and 
whose income is less than 300 percent of poverty. The bill does not call for time-
limited benefits.  
 
June 14. President Clinton unveils the Work and Responsibility Act in Kansas City, 
Missouri. The proposal calls for $9.3 billion in additional federal funding over five 
years and imposes a mandatory work requirement after two years on AFDC for 
recipients born after 1971 who are unable to find jobs. The proposal expands the 
JOBS Program and strengthens regulations regarding paternity establishment and 
child support. The bill requires minors to live at home as a condition of receiving 
aid. All but $2.1 billion in new funding will be offset through reductions in 
entitlements, such as Supplemental Security Income (SSI). 
 
June 24. The Clinton welfare bill is officially introduced in the Senate as S. 2224 
and the House of Representatives as H.R. 4605. 
 
July 14-15. House Ways and Means Chair Sam Gibbons (D-Fla.) asks Human 
Resources Subcommittee Chair Harold Ford (D-Tenn.) to hold hearings on the 
Clinton bill and draft a welfare reform bill by early August.  
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July 22. Rep. Robert Matsui (D-Calif.) introduces H.R. 4767, the Family Self-
Sufficiency Act of 1994. The bill increases funding for JOBS and calls for 
comprehensive child care services for AFDC recipients leaving welfare. 
 
July 29. The House Ways and Means Subcommittee on Human Resources holds 
hearing on the Clinton welfare reform bill.  
 
August 19. The Ways and Means Subcommittee on Human Resources holds 
hearing on time-limited cash assistance for welfare recipients.  
 
November 8. Republicans win a majority in both houses of Congress. The new 
congressional leaders promise to bring the "Contract With America" to the House 
and Senate floors within 100 days. The contract includes the Personal 
Responsibility Act, which proposes to reform welfare by curbing out-of-wedlock 
births through denial of benefits. The legislation also imposes a work requirement 
and caps spending growth of welfare programs. The bill requires all families to be 
off of AFDC after a total of five years of benefits. It is the first proposal to remove 
entitlement status from AFDC, SSI, and a number of nutrition programs.  
 
1995 
 
January 5. The House Ways and Means Committee begins hearings on "Contract 
With America" items, including welfare reform.  
 
March 8. The House Ways and Means Committee approves, 22-11, a welfare 
reform bill—the Personal Responsibility Act--that would modify 40 federal 
programs, end the entitlement status of AFDC, and give states considerably more 
control over public assistance through block grants. The Senate Finance 
Committee begins hearings on welfare reform.  
 
March 21. The House opens debate on the Personal Responsibility Act.  
 
March 22. The Congressional Budget Office estimates that, although the Personal 
Responsibility Act will save $66 billion over five years, all 50 states will fail to meet 
its job requirements.  
 
March 23. The House rejects, 228-205, a Democratic proposal sponsored by Rep. 
Nathan Deal (D-Ga.) that would have provided job training and education to adults 
on welfare.  
 
March 24. The House votes 234-199 to approve H.R. 4, the Personal 
Responsibility Act. Only nine Democrats supported the measure; five Republicans 
voted against it.  
 
March 25. President Clinton denounces major elements of the House-passed 
welfare bill in his weekly radio address.  
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April 27. The Senate Finance Committee convenes its final hearing on welfare 
reform.  
 
May 18. Sen. Daniel Patrick Moynihan (D-N.Y.) introduces his welfare reform bill, 
the Family Support Act of 1995, which retains the individual entitlement status for 
low-income families.  
 
May 26. The Senate Finance Committee approves, 12-8, a welfare reform proposal 
from Sen.Bob Packwood (R-Ore.) that would provide $16.7 billion in block grants to 
the states for temporary assistance to needy families. Similar to the House bill, it 
includes a $1.7 billion loan fund to states, a five-year lifetime time limit on 
assistance, and a state option to deny assistance to noncitizens.  
 
July 20. Sen. Phil Gramm (R-Tex.) releases an outline of an alternative welfare 
reform bill that addresses the concerns of senators displeased with the Finance 
Committee bill--most specifically the formula for distributing block grants.  
 
July 31. Senate Majority Leader Bob Dole (R-Kan.) announces a compromise 
welfare proposal at the National Governors’ Association (NGA) summer meeting in 
Burlington, Vermont. At the NGA meeting, President Clinton announces that he has 
directed HHS to provide "fast-track demonstration approval"--within 30 days--to 
states with certain waiver requests for welfare reform.  
 
August 8. Majority Leader Bob Dole halts Senate consideration of welfare reform 
legislation, S. 1120, the Work Opportunity Act of 1995, after two days of debate.  
 
August 11. Dole announces 26 modifications to the Work Opportunity Act.  
 
September 6. The Senate resumes debate of legislation, now called H.R. 4, the 
Welfare Reform Act.  
 
September 7. The Senate votes 54-45 to defeat the Democrats’ welfare reform 
plan. The bill would have preserved the entitlement to welfare while increasing the 
number of recipients enrolled in education, training, and work.  
 
September 19. Following a week of debate, the Senate votes 87-12 to pass the 
Welfare Reform Act. Senators approve over 40 amendments to the bill, including a 
compromise leadership amendment, before final passage. The estimated savings 
is $67 billion over seven years.  
 
October 24. Over 40 House and Senate welfare reform conferees convene to begin 
working out the differences between the House and Senate bills.  
 
November 8. An analysis of the Senate welfare reform bill by the Office of 
Management and Budget finds that proposed policy changes would result in one 
million more children living in poverty.  
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November 14. Welfare reform conferees release a preliminary outline of a 
compromise bill that will be included in budget reconciliation. President Clinton 
vows to veto the measure.  
 
December 7. The Clinton Administration releases a budget plan proposing $46 
billion in savings over seven years for welfare reform.  
 
The president vetoes the budget reconciliation bill, which contains welfare reform 
provisions.  
 
December 21. The House votes 245-178 to pass the welfare reform conference 
report.  
 
December 22. The Senate votes 52-47 to pass the conference report. The 
estimated savings is $58 billion over seven years.  
 
1996 
 
January 9. President Clinton vetoes H.R. 4, the welfare reform conference 
committee bill. He says that an acceptable welfare reform bill must include more 
funding for child care, health coverage for low-income families, requirements for 
state funding, and additional funding during times of economic downturn or 
population growth.  
 
February 6. The National Governors’ Association unanimously approves bipartisan 
agreements on welfare and Medicaid reform at their winter meeting in Washington, 
D.C. Both House Speaker Newt Gingrich (R-Ga.) and Senate Majority Leader Bob 
Dole (R-Kan.) pledge that both houses of Congress will give the governors’ policy 
statements serious consideration.  
 
February 20. The House Ways and Means Subcommittee on Human Resources 
holds hearings on the NGA policy statement for welfare reform.  
 
February 22. The Senate Finance Committee holds hearings on the NGA policy 
statement.  
 
February 28. HHS Secretary Donna Shalala, testifying before the Senate Finance 
Committee, announces that the president cannot support the NGA welfare proposal 
"in its current form." She says that the proposal needs to be modified to provide 
vouchers for children of parents terminated from assistance, to retain the 
entitlement status of child welfare services and food stamps, and to include 
fundamental revision of the immigration section.  
 
March 5. President Clinton notes in a speech before the National Association of 
Counties that his administration has approved waivers for 53 different welfare 
reform projects in 37 states, covering nearly 75 percent of all welfare recipients.  
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April 26. The White House proposes a new welfare reform bill with estimated 
savings of $38 billion over seven years. HHS Assistant Secretary Mary Jo Bane 
tells Congress the bill "promotes work, encourages parental responsibility, and 
provides a safety net for children."  
 
May 4. President Clinton announces executive actions urging states to tighten 
eligibility for teen mothers on welfare.  
 
May 18. President Clinton announces his support for a Wisconsin proposal for 
welfare reform, Wisconsin Works, (or W-2) that would end the guarantee of welfare 
benefits and would require work.  
 
May 22. Congressional Republicans introduce revised welfare reform bills in both 
the House and Senate that are modeled, in part, on the NGA policy statements. 
The legislation retains federal control of child protection and adoption programs 
and allows legal immigrants who are who are not yet citizens to be eligible for cash 
welfare. Republicans say they will attach to the welfare bill a plan to give states 
control of Medicaid.  
 
June 6. The House votes 289-136 to approve H.R. 3562, the Wisconsin Only bill, 
which would authorize the state of Wisconsin to implement its statewide welfare 
reform demonstration project, Wisconsin Works.  
 
June 18. President Clinton announces actions to strengthen child support 
enforcement through implementation of a new federal system to track delinquent 
parents across state lines. The administration hopes to increase collections by an 
additional $6.4 billion and reduce federal welfare payments by $1.1 billion over 10 
years.  
 
June 26. Senate Finance Committee approves S. 1795, the Personal 
Responsibility and Work Opportunity Act of 1996, the Senate Republican 
leadership’s welfare and Medicaid reform legislation.  
 
July 11. House and Senate Republican leadership announce their decision to split 
the welfare and Medicaid reform bills contained in H.R. 3507 and S. 1795. 
President Clinton had threatened to veto the reform bill, objecting to the Medicaid 
provisions.  
 
July 18. The House of Representatives passes, by a vote of 256 to 170, its budget 
reconciliation package, H.R. 3734, which contains a modified version of the 
Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Act of 1996, H.R. 3507.  
 
July 23. The Senate passes its welfare reform bill by a vote of 74 to 24.  
 
July 25. House and Senate conferees begin meeting to work out the differences 
between their respective welfare reform measures.  
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July 30. House-Senate conferees complete work on H.R. 3734 and send bill to 
House for final passage.  
 
July 31. President Clinton announces he will sign H.R. 3734. House of 
Representatives passes bill by a vote of 328 to 101.  
 
August 1. Senate passes H.R. 3734 by vote of 78 to 21.  
 
August 22. President Clinton signs the Personal Responsibility and Work 
Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996.  
 
August 27. Administration for Children and Families sends letter to each lead state 
agency for the Child Care and Development Block Grant asking them to submit an 
interim application-planning document that will enable them to receive the new 
mandatory and matching child-care funds available under H.R. 3734.  
 
September 9–10. APWA, NGA, and the National Conference of State Legislatures 
(NCSL) hold joint briefing, bringing together nearly 600 state and local officials to 
discuss the new welfare reform law, P.L. 104-193. The briefing includes 
explanations of the new law, workshops with federal agencies and departments, 
and open discussions among the states.  
 
September 11. Mary Jo Bane, assistant secretary for HHS’ Administration for 
Children and Families, and Peter B. Edelman, acting assistant secretary for HHS 
Planning and Evaluation, resign, citing concerns about the new welfare reform law.  
 
September 17. APWA testifies, with NGA and NCSL, on behalf of states, regarding 
six technical corrections to the P.L. 104-193: problems with the $50 pass-through 
on child-support payments, transferring Temporary Assistance to Needy Families 
(TANF) dollars to child care and Title XX, using maintenance-of-effort dollars for 
legal immigrants, treating disabled parents in two-parent families, making the “look-
back” dates for children’s eligibility for Medicaid or foster care/adoption consistent, 
and repealing the mandate on the state supplemental payment to Supplemental 
Security Income (SSI).  
 
September 19. Clinton Administration withdraws August 19 approval of waiver that 
would have allowed the District of Columbia an exemption from the five-year ceiling 
on lifetime benefits after Sen. Don Nickles (R-Okla.) introduced legislation, S. 2060, 
to require D.C. to comply with the five-year limit.  
 
September 30. P.L. 104-208, the omnibus spending measure, funds the Social 
Services Block Grant (Title XX) at $2.5 billion for FY 97, superseding the amount 
($2.38 billion) allocated by the welfare reform act.  
 
October 1. Deadline for states to file their plans to opt into the TANF Block Grant 
Twenty-three states submit plans; two states, Wisconsin and Michigan, were 
authorized on September 30 to begin their TANF program.   
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October 11. Twenty-six states file TANF state plans. The Red Cliff Tribe of 
Wisconsin becomes first Native American tribe to file their own TANF plan. Florida 
is third state to receive HHS approval for its TANF plan.  
 
The Health Care Financing Administration (HCFA) informs state Medicaid directors 
that “in absence of submitting a State Plan Amendment, you are expected to 
continue providing Medicaid eligibility for all the groups you covered on July 16, 
1996, including permissible legal immigrants.”  
 
October 25. The Social Security Administration (SSA) sends letter to state human 
service administrators detailing the timetable for redetermining noncitizens 
currently receiving SSI. In February and March 1997, SSA will send notices to 
noncitizens informing them that their eligibility is under review. After a 90-day 
response period, SSA will notify beneficiaries if their benefits are to be stopped.  
 
SSA issues a guidance to state agencies on administering the 40 quarters of 
qualifying work determination used in assessing noncitizen eligibility for food stamp 
benefits.  
 
October 28. HHS alerts state human service administrators to a December 1996 
Federal Register notice and comment period to address the proposed distribution 
and allocation formula for $500 million in enhanced funding for Medicaid eligibility 
changes necessitated by the new welfare reform law.  
 
November 18. Thirty-five states and one Native American tribe have filed state 
TANF plans. Thirteen TANF state plans are determined to be complete.  
 
November 29. HHS still works on recommendations for technical corrections to the 
welfare reform law, which was due to Congress on November 22. The earliest date 
for legislative action would be when Congress meets in January 1997.  
 
December 4. HHS issues revised list of publication dates for welfare reform 
regulations. Title I, TANF: state plan submissions, financial management and 
reporting, individual development accounts (date uncertain); tribal program 
requirements (March 1997); audits, penalties, and corrective action (January 1997); 
data collection and reporting (March 1997) methodology for determining child 
poverty (February 1997); illegitimacy rate reduction bonus (March 1997); high 
performance bonus (April 1997); omnibus conforming regulation (October 1997). 
Title II, Child Support: state directory of new hires (January 1997); state case 
registry and expansion of federal parent locator service (June 1997); state laws 
concerning paternity establishment (January 1997); automated data processing 
(ADP) requirements (August 1997); ADP funding limitation (January 1997); grants 
to states for access and visitation programs (March 1997); tribal program (May 
1997); omnibus conforming regulation (October 1997). Title VI, Child Care: child 
care program (December 1996).  
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Date and Action 
December 15. Clinton Administration sends Congress its recommendations on 
needed technical corrections to P.L. 104-193, which were required by legislation to 
be submitted by November 22, 1996. Over 130 pages long, this document includes 
over 70 recommended changes with a description of technical problems, proposed 
legislative language, and a budget impact analysis.  
 
December 20. HHS determines that 20 TANF state plans are complete. Thirty-nine 
states have filed state TANF plans.  
 
Source: American Public Welfare Association, downloaded from 
http://www.apwa.org/reform/timeline.htm  
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Appendix B. Legislative Hearings related to Welfare Reform, 102
nd-104
th 
Congresses. 
Hearing Title 
102nd Congress 
"Beyond Public Assistance: Where Do We Go from Here?" hearings before the 
House Select Committee on Hunger, Mar. 25, 1992.  
 
"Federal Policy Perspectives on Welfare Reform: Rhetoric, Reality, and 
Opportunities," hearings before the House Select Committee on Hunger Domestic 
Task Force, Apr. 9, 1992.  
 
"State and Local Perspectives on Welfare Reform: Rhetoric, Reality, and 
Opportunities," hearings before the Select Committee on Hunger Domestic Task 
Force, June 4, 1992.  
 
"Administration’s Welfare Reform Proposal," hearings before the Subcommittee on 
Social Security and Family Policy, Committee on Finance. Senate, Aug. 4, 1992.  
 
"Rethinking Poverty Policy," hearings before the House Select Committee on 
Hunger, Oct. 2, 1992. 
 
103rd Congress 
 
"Trends in Spending and Caseloads for AFDC and Related Programs," hearings 
before the Subcommittee on Human Resources, Committee on Ways and Means. 
House, Mar. 11, 1993.  
   
"Selected Aspects of Welfare Reform," hearings before the Subcommittee on 
Select Revenue Measures and the Subcommittee on Human Resources, 
Committee on Ways and Means. House, Mar. 30, 1993.  
 
"Impact of Immigration on Welfare Programs," hearings before the Subcommittee 
on Human Resources, Committee on Ways and Means. House, Nov. 15, 1993.  
   
"Welfare Reform," hearings before the Subcommittee on Social Security and 
Family Policy, Committee on Finance. Senate, Jan. 18, Feb. 25, 1994.  
 
"Fraud in Federal Nutrition Programs," hearings before the Committee on 
Agriculture, Nutrition, and Forestry. Senate, Feb. 2, 1994.  
   
"Ending Welfare As We Know It: Progress or Paralysis?," hearings before the 
Subcommittee on Human Resources and Intergovernmental Relations, Committee 
on Government Operations. House, Mar. 10, 1994.  
  
"Welfare Reform, Special Hearing," hearings before the Subcommittee on Labor, 
HHS, and Education Appropriations, Committee on Appropriations. Senate, Apr. 
11, 1994.  
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Hearing Title 
"Work and Responsibility Act of 1994," hearings before the Committee on Finance. 
Senate, July 13, 1994.  
 
"Welfare Reform Proposals, Including H.R. 4605, the Work and Responsibility Act 
of 1994, Part 1," hearings before the Subcommittee on Human Resources, 
Committee on Ways and Means. House, July 14, 26-28, 1994.  
 
"Welfare Reform Proposals, Including H.R. 4605, the Work and Responsibility Act 
of 1994, Part 2," hearings before the Subcommittee on Human Resources, 
Committee on Ways and Means. House, July 29, Aug. 9, 16, 1994.  
 
"Hearing on H.R. 4605, Work and Responsibility Act of 1994," hearings before the 
Committee on Education and Labor. House, Aug. 2, 1994.  
 
"Hearing Regarding the Impact of Welfare Reform on Child Care Providers and the 
Working Poor," hearings before the Subcommittee on Human Resources, 
Committee on Education and Labor. House, Sept. 20, 1994.  
 
"Field Hearing on Welfare Reform," hearings before the Subcommittee on Human 
Resources, Committee on Education and Labor. House, Oct. 28, 1994.  
 
"Reforming Welfare, Special Hearing," hearings before the Subcommittee on 
Labor, HHS, and Education Appropriations, Committee on Appropriations. Senate, 
Dec. 9, 1994.  
 
104th Congress 
  
"Contract with America: Overview," hearings before the Committee on Ways and 
Means. House, Jan. 5, 10-12, 1995.  
 
"Contract with America: Welfare Reform, Part 1," hearings before the Committee 
on Ways and Means. House, Jan. 13, 20, 23, 27, 30, 1995.  
 
"Contract with America: Hearing on Welfare Reform," hearings before the 
Committee on Economic and Educational Opportunities. House , Jan. 18, 1995.  
 
"Reinventing Government," hearings before the Committee on Governmental 
Affairs. Senate, Jan.25, Feb. 2, 1995.  
 
"Enforcement of the Food Stamp Program," hearings before the Committee on 
Agriculture. House, Feb. 1, 1995.  
 
"Hearing on the Contract with America: Nutrition, the Local Perspective," hearings 
before the Committee on Economic and Educational Opportunities. House , Feb. 1, 
1995.  
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Hearing Title 
"Contract with America: Welfare Reform, Part 2," hearings before the Committee 
on Ways and Means. House, Feb. 2, 1995.  
 
"Concurrent Resolution on the Budget for FY96, Vol. IV," hearings before the 
Committee on the Budget. Senate, Feb. 2, Apr. 18, 19, 1995.  
 
"Child Care and Child Welfare," hearings before the Subcommittee on Human 
Resources, House Ways and Means Committee and the Subcommittee on Early 
Childhood, Youth, and Families, House Economic and Educational Opportunities 
Committee, Feb. 3, 1995.  
 
"Child Support Enforcement Provisions Included in Personal Responsibility Act As 
Part of the CWA," hearings before the Subcommittee on Human Resources, 
Committee on Ways and Means. House, Feb. 6, 1995.  
 
"Reforming the Present Welfare System," hearings before the Subcommittee on 
Department Operations, Nutrition, and Foreign Agriculture, Committee on 
Agriculture. House, Feb. 7-9, 14, 1995.  
 
"Child Care and Development Block Grant: How Is It Working?," hearings before 
the 
Subcommittee on Children and Families, Committee on Labor and Human 
Resources. Senate, Feb.16, 1995.  
 
"Impact of Welfare Reform on Children and Their Families," hearings before the 
Committee on Labor and Human Resources. Senate, Feb. 28, Mar. 1, 1995.  
 
"States’ Perspective on Welfare Reform," hearings before the Committee on 
Finance. Senate, Mar.8, 1995.  
 
"Broad Policy Goals of Welfare Reform," hearings before the Committee on 
Finance. Senate, Mar. 9, 1995.  
 
"Administration’s Views on Welfare Reform," hearings before the Committee on 
Finance. Senate, Mar. 10, 1995.  
  
"Teen Parents and Welfare Reform," hearings before the Committee on Finance. 
Senate, Mar. 14,1995.  
 
Hearings on welfare recipient transition to work before the Senate Finance 
Committee, Mar. 20, 1995. (Not available at time of publication.)  
  
"Rising Costs of Social Security’s Disability Programs," hearings before the 
Subcommittee on Social Security and Family Policy, Committee on Finance. 
Senate, Mar. 22, 1995.  
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Hearing Title 
"Simulation Hearing on Obtaining Federal and State Assistance," hearings before 
the Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations, Committee on Economic and 
Educational Opportunities. House , Mar. 27, 1995.  
 
"Growth of the Supplemental Security Income Program," hearings before the 
Committee on Finance. Senate, Mar. 27, 1995.  
 
"Child Support Enforcement," hearings before the Committee on Finance. Senate, 
Mar. 28, 1995.  
   
"Welfare Reform: Views of Interested Organizations," hearings before the Senate 
Finance Committee, Mar. 29, 1995. (Not available at time of publication.)  
  
"Earned Income Tax Credit," hearings before the Committee on Governmental 
Affairs. Senate, Apr.4, 5, 1995.  
 
"Child Welfare Programs," hearings before the Committee on Finance. Senate, 
Apr. 26, 1995.  
 
"Welfare Reform Wrap-Up," hearings before the Committee on Finance. Senate, 
Apr. 27, 1995.  
 
"Food Stamp Program and Electronic Benefit Transfer Systems," hearings before 
the Subcommittee on Department Operations, Nutrition, and Foreign Agriculture, 
Committee on Agriculture. House, May 10, 1995.  
 
"Federal Nutrition Programs," hearings before the Committee on Agriculture, 
Nutrition, and Forestry. Senate, May 23, 1995.  
 
"Review of the Administration’s Proposals To Reform the Food Stamp and 
Commodity Distribution Programs," hearings before the Subcommittee on 
Department Operations, Nutrition, and Foreign Agriculture, Committee on 
Agriculture. House, June 8, 1995.  
 
"Child Support Enforcement and Supplemental Security Income," hearings before 
the Subcommittee on Human Resources, Committee on Ways and Means. House, 
June 13, 1995.  
 
"Earned Income Tax Credit," hearings before the Subcommittee on Oversight and 
Subcommittee on Human Resources, Committee on Ways and Means. House, 
June 15, 1995.  
 
"Welfare Reform Success Stories," hearings before the Subcommittee on Human 
Resources, Committee on Ways and Means. House, Dec. 6, 1995.  
 
Hearings on immigration and welfare reform before the Subcommittee on 
Immigration, Senate Judiciary Committee, Feb. 6, 1996.   
138 
Hearing Title 
"National Governors’ Association Welfare Reform Proposal," hearings before the 
Subcommittee on Human Resources, Committee on Ways and Means. House, 
Feb. 20, 1996.  
 
"Unanimous Bipartisan National Governors Association Agreement on Medicaid," 
hearings before the Committee on Commerce. House, Feb. 21, Mar. 6, 1996.  
 
Hearings on views of the National Governors’ Association on welfare reform before 
the Senate Finance Committee, Feb. 22, 28, 29, 1996.  
 
"Concurrent Resolution on the Budget for FY97," hearings before the Committee 
on the Budget. Senate, Mar. 6, 12, 14, 20, Apr. 18, 1996.  
 
"Causes of Poverty, with a Focus on Out-of-Wedlock Births," hearings before the 
Subcommittee on Human Resources, Committee on Ways and Means. House, 
Mar. 12, 1996.  
 
Hearings on teen pregnancy prevention before the Subcommittee on Human 
Resources and Intergovernmental Relations, House Government Reform and 
Oversight Committee, Apr. 30, 1996. 
 
Hearings on welfare reform before the Subcommittee on Human Resources, House 
Ways and Means Committee, May 22, 23, 1996.  
  
Hearings on H.R. 3507 before the House Commerce Committee, June 11, 1996.  
  
Hearings on S. 1795 before the Senate Finance Committee, June 13, 19, 1996.  
 
Source: Library of Congress, http://www.thomas.loc.gov  
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Appendix C. Congressional Actions, Welfare Reform, 104
th Congress. 
141 Congressional Record, 104th Congress, 1st Session – 1995  
   Mar. 21, House consideration of H.R. 4, p. H3343.  
   Mar. 22, House consideration of H.R. 4, p. H3436.  
   Mar. 23, House consideration of H.R. 4, p. H3581.  
   Mar. 24, House consideration and passage of H.R. 4, p. H3742.  
   Aug. 5, Senate consideration of H.R. 4, p. S11575.  
   Aug. 7, Senate consideration of H.R. 4, p. S11735.  
   Aug. 8, Senate consideration of H.R. 4, p. S11803.  
   Aug. 11, Senate consideration of H.R. 4, p. S12428.  
   Sept. 6, Senate consideration of H.R. 4, p. S12680.  
   Sept. 7, Senate consideration of H.R. 4, p. S12757.  
   Sept. 8, Senate consideration of H.R. 4, p. S12873.  
   Sept. 11, Senate consideration of H.R. 4, p. S13143.  
   Sept. 12, Senate consideration of H.R. 4, p. S13315.  
   Sept. 13, Senate consideration of H.R. 4, p. S13481.  
   Sept. 14, Senate consideration of H.R. 4, p. S13558.  
   Sept. 15, Senate consideration of H.R. 4, p. S13627.  
   Sept. 19, Senate consideration and passage of H.R. 4 with amendments, p. 
S13770.  
   Oct. 25, House consideration of H.R. 2491, p. H10781.  
   Oct. 25, Senate consideration of S. 1357, p. S15599.  
   Oct. 26, Senate consideration of S. 1357, p. S15707.  
   Oct. 26, House consideration and passage of H.R. 2491, p. H10853.  
   Oct. 27, Senate consideration of S. 1357, consideration and passage of H.R. 2491 
with an amendment, and return to the calendar of S. 1357, p. S15979.  
   Nov. 17, House agreement to the conference report on H.R. 2491, p. H13148.  
   Nov. 17, Senate agreement to the conference report on H.R. 2491, with an 
amendment, p.S17227.  
   Nov. 20, House concurrence in the Senate amendment to the conference report on 
H.R. 2491, p. H13379.  
   Dec. 21, House agreement to the conference report on H.R. 4, p. H15317.  
   Dec. 21, Senate consideration of the conference report on H.R. 4, p. S19086.  
   Dec. 22, Senate agreement to the conference report on H.R. 4, p. S19154.  
   
142 Congressional Record, 104th Congress, 2nd Session – 1996  
   July 17, House consideration of H.R. 3734, p. H7745.  
   July 18, House consideration and passage of H.R. 3734, p. H7784.  
   July 18, Senate consideration of S. 1956, p. S8070.  
   July 19, Senate consideration of S. 1956, p. S8329.  
   July 22, Senate consideration of S. 1956, p. S8395.  
   July 23, Senate consideration of S. 1956, consideration and passage of H.R. 3734 
with an amendment, and return to the calendar of S. 1956, p. S8493.  
   July 31, House agreement to the conference report on H.R. 3734, p. H9403.  
   Aug. 1, Senate agreement to the conference report on H.R. 3734, p. S9322.   
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Appendix D. Consequences of Adolescent Childbearing. 
Outcomes  Research shows… 
 
Child Health 
 
The children of teen mothers are more likely to be born prematurely 
and at low birth weight, raising the probability of infant death, 
blindness, deafness, chronic respiratory problems, mental 
retardation, mental illness, cerebral palsy, dyslexia, and 
hyperactivity.a 
 
 
Child’s Academics 
 
Children of teen mothers do worse in school than those born to 
older parents. They are 50 percent more likely to repeat a grade, 
are less likely to complete high school than the children of older 
mothers, and have lower performance on standardized tests.b 
 
 
Child Abuse 
 
Children of adolescent mothers have high rates of abuse and 
neglect, and more likely to end up in foster care (higher public 
costs).c 
 
 
Mother’s Education 
 
Teen mothers are less likely to complete the education necessary 
to qualify for a well-paying job — only 41 percent of mothers who 
have children before age 18 ever complete high school compared 
with 61 percent of similarly situated young women who delay child 
bearing until age 20 or 21.d 
 
 
Family Poverty 
 
Two-thirds of families begun by a young unmarried mother are 
poor.e 
 
 
Subsequent Births 
 
Teen mothers are likely to have a second birth relatively soon — 
about one-fourth of teenage mothers have a second child within 24 
months of the first birth — which can further impede their ability to 
finish school or keep a job, and to escape poverty.f 
 
a R. A. Maynard, ed., Kids Having Kids: A Robin Hood Foundation Special Report on the Costs of 
Adolescent Childbearing (New York: Robin Hood Foundation, 1996); B. Wolfe and M. Perozek, “Teen 
Children’s Health and Health Care Use,” in Maynard, Kids Having Kids: Economic Costs and Social 
Costs of Teen Pregnancy, 181–203. 
b Maynard, Costs of Adolescent Childbearing; R. H. Haveman, B. Wolfe, and E. Peterson, “Children of 
Early Childbearers as Young Adults,” in Maynard, Kids Having Kids: Economic Costs and Social Costs 
of Teen Pregnancy, chapter 9. 
c Isabel Sawhill, “What Can Be Done to Reduce Teen Pregnancy and Out-of-Wedlock Births?” Welfare 
Reform and Beyond Policy Brief No. 8 (Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, October 2001). 
d V. J. Hotz, S. W. McElroy, and S. G. Sanders, “The Impacts of Teenage Childbearing on the Mothers 
and the Consequences of those Impacts for Government,” in Maynard, Kids Having Kids: Economic 
Costs and Social Costs of Teen Pregnancy, 55–94.  
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e National Campaign to Prevent Teen Pregnancy, President Isabel Sawhill, Analysis of the 1999 Current 
Population Survey, a Monthly Survey of about 50,000 Households Conducted by the Bureau of the 
Census for the Bureau of Labor Statistics (Washington, DC: National Campaign to Prevent Teen 
Pregnancy, 2000). 
f D. S. Kalmuss and P. B. Namerow, “Subsequent Childbearing among Teenage Mothers: The 
Determinants of Closely Spaced Second Birth,” Family Planning Perspectives 26, no. 4 (1994): 149–
153, 159. 
g D. Lichter, Marriage as Public Policy (Washington, DC: Progressive Policy Institute, 2001). 
h D. Lichter and D. Graef, “Finding a Mate? The Marital and Cohabitation Histories of Unwed 
Mothers,” in Out-of-wedlock: Trends, Causes, and Consequences of Nonmarital Fertility, ed. L. L. Wu 
and B. L. Wolfe, 317–343 (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 2001). 
i B. Miller, Families Matter: A Research Synthesis of family influences on adolescent pregnancy 
(Washington, DC: National Campaign to Prevent Teen Pregnancy, 1998).  
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Appendix E. Behavioral and Social Learning Theories. 
Behavioral and Social Learning Theories 
 
Social and Cognitive 
Skills Prevention Model 
Asserts that for behavior to change, individuals need specific cognitive an
social skills to resist pressures and to negotiate interpersonal encounte
successfully (p. 62) – so, need both the knowledge and the capacity to a
on that knowledge. 
 
 
 
Social Learning Theory 
Posits that the likelihood of an individual engaging in or avoiding some 
type of behavior is determined by the individual’s understanding of the 
association between that behavior with a particular outcome.  The 
individual must next believe that he/she has the capacity to avoid the 
behavior, and that the method for avoiding the outcome will be 
effective.  The individual must also believe there is benefit to avoiding 
the outcome.  One way to develop attitudes about the behaviors is 
through observation of others, witnessing the regards or sanctions of 
the behavior and then acting out according to his/her own belief (p. 63).  
 
Health belief Model 
Based on the belief that the probability that an individual will perform a 
preventive action is based on a number of personal perceptions. These 
include: 1) perceived susceptibility of the outcome, 2) perceived 
seriousness of developing or experiencing the outcome, and 3) 
perceived benefits minus the perceived costs to performing the 
preventive action. Thus, the costs, seriousness and susceptibility must 
be perceived as high to engage in preventive action. 
 
Theory of Reasoned 
Action  
 
States that individual beliefs are what motivate action, whether they are 
rational or logical or not.  Depends on 1) perceived outcome of action 2) 
evaluation of such outcomes 3) what others think about the action and 
4) motivation to comply with others. 
 
Culture of poverty 
perspective  
 
Argues that adolescent sexual and fertility behavior is “both an 
adaptation and reaction of the poor to their marginal place in society 
(Moore et al, p. 64).”  These behaviors become norms and inter-
generational.  One main tenet of this is that youth are aware of their 
limited opportunities and poor living conditions and as a result, adopt 
other standards of behavior.   
Opportunity Cost 
perspective 
Based on assumptions by young women who view themselves as 
having nothing to lose by having early births.  
 
Utility maximization 
theory 
Asserts that young men and women assess varied costs and benefits of 
sex, pregnancy and parenthood and behave in a way that maximizes 
their own personal utility. 
 
Ecological perspective 
Identifies the many levels of influence in an individual’s environment 
that impact his/her behavior.  At each level, factors are noted that play a 
role in out of wedlock pregnancy, and thus a programmatic response 
should be designed to address those factors identified.  
Source: K. Moore, B. Sugland, C. Blumenthal, D. Glei, and N. Snyder, Adolescent Pregnancy 
Prevention Programs: Interventions and Evaluations. (Washington, D.C.: Child Trends, Inc., 1995). 
Source (ecological perspective): New York State Task Force on Out of Wedlock Pregnancy and 
Poverty, interim report, January 1998.  
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Appendix F. State Participation in Teen Pregnancy Prevention Programs. 
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Source: R. Wertheimer, J. Jager, and K. Moore, “State Policy Initiatives for Reducing 
Teen and Adult Non-Marital Childbearing: Family Planning to Family Caps,” New 
Federalism Issue and Options for States, Series A, No. A-43 (Washington, DC: Urban 
Institute, November 2000). 
  
144 
Appendix G: Design Features of the National Survey of American Families.
203 
 
The NSAF is primarily a random digit dial telephone survey but roughly 3.5% of the total 
sample is with non-telephone households; the size of the non-telephone sample varies from 
state to state, depending on the share of the population without phones.  
 
1. Interviews with Adults with Children  
 
Questions are asked about up to two focal children per household (one focal child is selected 
from among all children under age six and the other is selected from among all children 
between the ages of 6 and 17). The respondent is the household member who is most 
knowledgeable about the selected focal children (where appropriate, there are multiple 
respondents per household).  
 
The NSAF encompasses economic, health, and social dimensions of well-being, averaging 40 
minutes to administer:  
 
Household/Family Characteristics:  
 
•  Household composition, age, sex, birthplace, citizenship, race, and ethnicity.  
 
Adult and Family Well-being:  
 
•  Current and past year’s employment and earnings, past year’s income by source, 
educational attainment and participation in training activities, economic hardship, 
food insecurity — receipt or loss of AFDC and food stamps, housing arrangements 
and cost, health insurance coverage, access to care and health services use, health 
status and functional limitation, psychological well-being, participation in religious 
and volunteer activities, knowledge about places or programs to receive different 
types of services, attitudes toward welfare, work, and child-bearing.  
 
Child Well-being:  
                     
•  Educational attainment and school engagement, child care arrangements, child’s 
participation in work and recreational activities, behavioral problems, child support 
and contact with non-custodial parent, health status, functional limitation, health 
insurance coverage, health services use and access to care. 
 
2. Interviews with Other Non-aged Adults  
 
The sample includes about 1,200 interviews with adults without children in each state (with a 
larger sample in Wisconsin). These are non-aged adults in households without children under 
age 18 and with non-aged adults in households with children who are not parents/guardians of 
the children in those households. The respondents were randomly selected from among the 
non-aged adults who were eligible. The instrument contains a subset of the questions asked of 
families with children, averaging 25 minutes to administer. It includes the household/family 
characteristics and adult and family well-being measures.  
                                                 
203 K. Wang, NSAF Questionnaire, NSAF Methodology Report Number 12, November 1997.  
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Appendix H: Survey source questions for several NSAF variables. 
 
Variable Source  Question 
(1) State respondent resides in  Question SC 14 
(2) Race  Section O, Questions 1,2,3 
(3) Age  Question S 6 
(4) Educational attainment  Section L, Question 1 
(5) Employment  Section I, Question 2, 
5,6,7,8,9,10 
(6) Religious Activity  Section N, Question 13 
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Appendix I. Full SAS Output – Regression Models. 
 
Model 1: All demographics and policies, all women in sample 
 
NMAR = HSDROP + HSGRAD + BLACK + WHITE + NORELIG + MODRELIG + VERYRELIG + MPP 
+ SIS + PE + FC + TL + WR [Logistic regression results, estimating 
probability that NMAR=1 (a woman has a birth out of wedlock] 
 
Response Variable             NMAR - Focal child born out of wedlock 
Number of Response Levels     2 
Number of Observations        8700 
Response Profile:     2329 (1) 6371 (0)       
 
                                     Model Fit Statistics 
                                                          Intercept 
                                           Intercept         and 
                            Criterion        Only        Covariates 
 
                            AIC            10110.685       8446.290 
                            SC             10117.756       8545.285 
                            -2 Log L       10108.685       8418.290 
 
 
                            Testing Global Null Hypothesis: BETA=0 
 
                    Test                 Chi-Square       DF     Pr > ChiSq 
 
                    Likelihood Ratio      1690.3953       13         <.0001 
                    Score                 1733.4537       13         <.0001 
                    Wald                  1311.1275       13         <.0001 
 
 
                                     The LOGISTIC Procedure 
                           Analysis of Maximum Likelihood Estimates 
 
                                             Standard 
              Parameter    DF    Estimate       Error    Chi-Square    Pr > ChiSq 
 
              Intercept     1     -1.7349      0.2472       49.2617        <.0001 
              nmbr          1      1.2325      0.7850        2.4651        0.1164 
              HSDROP        1      1.4046      0.0729      371.6187        <.0001 
              HSGRAD        1      0.6208      0.0618      100.9429        <.0001 
              Black         1      1.8911      0.1467      166.2734        <.0001 
              HIGHRELIG     1     -0.9035      0.0662      186.0061        <.0001 
              White         1     -0.2575      0.1344        3.6727        0.0553 
              MODRELIG      1     -0.4750      0.0721       43.3895        <.0001 
              MPP           1      0.2589      0.1062        5.9478        0.0147 
              SIS           1      0.3079      0.0941       10.6970        0.0011 
              PE            1      0.2110      0.1250        2.8518        0.0913 
              TL            1      0.0721      0.1066        0.4573        0.4989 
              FC            1      0.0214      0.0810        0.0694        0.7922 
                WR            1      0.0396      0.1004        0.1556        0.6933  
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Model 2: All demographics and policies, teen mothers. 
 
NMAR = HSDROP + HSGRAD + BLACK + WHITE + NORELIG + MODRELIG + VERYRELIG + MPP 
+ SIS + PE + FC + TL + WR [Logistic regression results, estimating 
probability that NMAR=1 (a woman has a birth out of wedlock)] 
                    
 
         Response Variable             NMAR – Focal child born out of wedlock 
         Number of Response Levels     2 
         Number of Observations        637 
Response Profile:     437 (1) 200 (0) 
 
 
                                     Model Fit Statistics 
 
                                                          Intercept 
                                           Intercept         and 
                            Criterion        Only        Covariates 
 
                            AIC              794.736        727.847 
                            SC               799.193        790.242 
                            -2 Log L         792.736        699.847 
 
 
                            Testing Global Null Hypothesis: BETA=0 
 
                    Test                 Chi-Square       DF     Pr > ChiSq 
 
                    Likelihood Ratio        92.8885       13         <.0001 
                    Score                   80.5231       13         <.0001 
                    Wald                    66.4276       13         <.0001 
 
 
                           Analysis of Maximum Likelihood Estimates 
 
                                             Standard 
              Parameter    DF    Estimate       Error    Chi-Square    Pr > ChiSq 
 
              Intercept     1     -0.0697      0.7520        0.0086        0.9262 
              nmbr          1      1.6185      2.5532        0.4018        0.5261 
              HSDROP        1     -0.0381      0.2478        0.0237        0.8778 
              HSGRAD        1     -0.0836      0.2461        0.1153        0.7341 
              Black         1      2.2475      0.4679       23.0685        <.0001 
              White         1      0.2588      0.3770        0.4712        0.4924 
              MODRELIG      1     -0.5654      0.2337        5.8509        0.0156 
              HIGHRELIG     1     -0.5133      0.2350        4.7705        0.0290 
              MPP           1      1.1405      0.3735        9.3234        0.0023 
              SIS           1      0.6291      0.3317        3.5985        0.0578 
              PE            1      0.4543      0.3949        1.3238        0.2499 
              TL            1     -0.7474      0.3695        4.0921        0.0431 
              FC            1      0.2618      0.2735        0.9159        0.3385 
              WR            1      0.1965      0.3482        0.3186        0.5724 
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Model 3: All demographics and policies, mothers over 20 years of age. 
 
NMAR = HSDROP + HSGRAD + BLACK + WHITE + NORELIG + MODRELIG + VERYRELIG + MPP 
+ SIS + PE + FC + TL + WR [Logistic regression results, estimating 
probability that NMAR=1 (a woman has a birth out of wedlock] 
 
                                    
       Response Variable               NMAR             Focal child born out of wedlock 
       Number of Response Levels       2 
       Number of Observations          7770 
       Response Profile:     1738 (1) 6032 (0) 
 
                                    
                                     Model Fit Statistics 
                                                          Intercept 
                                           Intercept         and 
                            Criterion        Only        Covariates 
 
                            AIC             8261.935       6911.288 
                            SC              8268.893       7008.700 
                            -2 Log L        8259.935       6883.288 
 
 
                            Testing Global Null Hypothesis: BETA=0 
 
                    Test                 Chi-Square       DF     Pr > ChiSq 
 
                    Likelihood Ratio      1376.6467       13         <.0001 
                    Score                 1482.1519       13         <.0001 
                    Wald                  1100.1698       13         <.0001 
 
 
                           Analysis of Maximum Likelihood Estimates 
 
                                             Standard 
              Parameter    DF    Estimate       Error    Chi-Square    Pr > ChiSq 
 
              Intercept     1     -2.1273      0.2807       57.4570        <.0001 
              nmbr          1      2.0391      0.8822        5.3429        0.0208 
              HSDROP        1      1.3922      0.0825      284.7989        <.0001 
              HSGRAD        1      0.5880      0.0685       73.6694        <.0001 
              Black         1      1.9237      0.1660      134.2652        <.0001 
              White         1     -0.2571      0.1538        2.7960        0.0945 
              MODRELIG      1     -0.5193      0.0815       40.5576        <.0001 
              HIGHRELIG     1     -0.9205      0.0739      155.3022        <.0001 
              MPP           1      0.0906      0.1198        0.5714        0.4497 
              SIS           1      0.3436      0.1053       10.6540        0.0011 
              PE            1      0.1527      0.1428        1.1442        0.2848 
              TL            1      0.1320      0.1188        1.2338        0.2667 
              FC            1     -0.0465      0.0915        0.2589        0.6109 
              WR            1      0.0983      0.1133        0.7525        0.3857 
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Model 4: All demographics, no policies – all mothers. 
 
NMAR = HSDROP + HSGRAD + BLACK + WHITE + NORELIG + MODRELIG + VERYRELIG  
[Logistic regression results, estimating probability that NMAR=1 (a woman has 
a birth out of wedlock] 
 
       Response Variable             NMAR            Focal child born out of wedlock 
       Number of Response Levels     2 
       Number of Observations        10110 
       Response Profile:    2759 (1) 7351 (0) 
 
 
                                     Model Fit Statistics 
 
                                                          Intercept 
                                           Intercept         and 
                            Criterion        Only        Covariates 
 
                            AIC            11853.349       9947.001 
                            SC             11860.570      10004.771 
                            -2 Log L       11851.349       9931.001 
 
 
                            Testing Global Null Hypothesis: BETA=0 
 
                    Test                 Chi-Square       DF     Pr > ChiSq 
 
                    Likelihood Ratio      1920.3482        7         <.0001 
                    Score                 1961.9257        7         <.0001 
                    Wald                  1503.0222        7         <.0001 
 
 
 
 
                           Analysis of Maximum Likelihood Estimates 
 
                                             Standard 
              Parameter    DF    Estimate       Error    Chi-Square    Pr > ChiSq 
 
              Intercept     1     -1.3496      0.1943       48.2382        <.0001 
              nmbr          1      0.1803      0.6102        0.0873        0.7676 
              HSDROP        1      1.4668      0.0666      484.6093        <.0001 
              HSGRAD        1      0.6687      0.0568      138.4949        <.0001 
              Black         1      1.8613      0.1333      195.0206        <.0001 
              White         1     -0.2438      0.1217        4.0152        0.0451 
              MODRELIG      1     -0.4766      0.0658       52.4722        <.0001 
              HIGHRELIG     1     -0.8985      0.0610      217.1348        <.0001 
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Model 5: All demographics, no policies – teen mothers. 
 
NMAR = HSDROP + HSGRAD + BLACK + WHITE + NORELIG + MODRELIG + VERYRELIG  
[Logistic regression results, estimating probability that NMAR=1 (a woman has 
a birth out of wedlock] 
 
       Response Variable             NMAR         Focal child born out of wedlock 
       Number of Response Levels     2 
       Number of Observations        747 
       Response Profile    518 (1) 229 (0) 
 
                                
                                     Model Fit Statistics 
 
                                                            Intercept 
                                             Intercept         and 
                              Criterion        Only         Covariates 
            AIC              922.782        847.103 
                              SC               927.398        884.032 
                              -2 Log L         920.782        831.103 
 
 
 
                            Testing Global Null Hypothesis: BETA=0 
 
                    Test                 Chi-Square       DF     Pr > ChiSq 
 
                    Likelihood Ratio        89.6793        7         <.0001 
                    Score                   75.1803        7         <.0001 
                    Wald                    59.1166        7         <.0001 
 
                                      
 
 
                           Analysis of Maximum Likelihood Estimates 
 
                                             Standard 
              Parameter    DF    Estimate       Error    Chi-Square    Pr > ChiSq 
 
              Intercept     1      0.7622      0.6278        1.4743        0.2247 
              nmbr          1     -0.6198      2.0378        0.0925        0.7610 
              HSDROP        1     -0.0879      0.2307        0.1450        0.7034 
              HSGRAD        1     -0.1546      0.2333        0.4391        0.5076 
              Black         1      2.3970      0.4523       28.0818        <.0001 
              White         1      0.1783      0.3575        0.2486        0.6180 
              MODRELIG      1     -0.4689      0.2124        4.8753        0.0272 
              HIGHRELIG     1     -0.6117      0.2183        7.8481        0.0051 
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Model 6: All demographics, no policies – mothers over 20 years of age. 
 
NMAR = HSDROP + HSGRAD + BLACK + WHITE + NORELIG + MODRELIG + VERYRELIG  
[Logistic regression results, estimating probability that NMAR=1 (a woman has 
a birth out of wedlock] 
 
      
       Response Variable             NMAR                 Focal child born out of 
wedlock 
       Number of Response Levels     2 
       Number of Observations        9017 
       Response Profile    2049 (1) 6968 (0) 
 
 
 
 
                                     Model Fit Statistics 
 
                                                          Intercept 
                                           Intercept         and 
                            Criterion        Only        Covariates 
 
                            AIC             9666.722       8156.813 
                            SC              9673.829       8213.668 
                            -2 Log L        9664.722       8140.813 
 
 
                            Testing Global Null Hypothesis: BETA=0 
 
                    Test                 Chi-Square       DF     Pr > ChiSq 
 
                    Likelihood Ratio      1523.9084        7         <.0001 
                    Score                 1635.3908        7         <.0001 
                    Wald                  1237.5465        7         <.0001 
 
 
 
 
 
                           Analysis of Maximum Likelihood Estimates 
 
                                             Standard 
              Parameter    DF    Estimate       Error    Chi-Square    Pr > ChiSq 
 
              Intercept     1     -1.6197      0.2184       55.0182        <.0001 
              nmbr          1      0.6734      0.6829        0.9724        0.3241 
              HSDROP        1      1.4160      0.0758      349.1253        <.0001 
              HSGRAD        1      0.6258      0.0627       99.7399        <.0001 
              Black         1      1.8614      0.1489      156.1796        <.0001 
              White         1     -0.2649      0.1373        3.7249        0.0536 
              MODRELIG      1     -0.5366      0.0744       52.0113        <.0001 
              HIGHRELIG     1     -0.9133      0.0678      181.4844        <.0001  
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Appendix J. Non Marital Pregnancy Decision Matrix. 
Source: Moore et al., Adolescent Pregnancy Prevention Programs: Interventions and Evaluations (Washington, DC: Child Trends, 
Inc., 1995). 
Yes
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No 
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Pregnancy 
No 
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Yes          Use  
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Marriage 
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Appendix K. State Participation in Teen Pregnancy Prevention Programs. 
0 1 02 03 04 05 0
Local Control over Pregnancy Prevention Education
Program
State Coalitions Run by Nonprofit Institutions
Media Campaign
Multiagency Task Force for Teen Pregnancy Prevention
School-Based Abstinence Education
Contraceptive Clinics in Public Schools
Contraceptive Education in Public Schools
Family Planning Services for Teens
STD Education in Public Schools
HIV Education in Public Schools
Pregnancy Prevention Policy in Public Schools
Number of States
Participating, 1999
Number of States
Participating, 1997
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Appendix L. Policy Wheel. 
Source: Jerome Ziegler, “The Intergovernmental System,” class notes, Cornell University, Ithaca, New York, Fall 2000. 
 
Program 
Evaluation 
Program 
Operation & 
Implementation 
Private Needs 
[Public Wants] 
Debate 
 [Interest Groups] 
Media/Public Opinion 
Policy Formulation 
Program Planning 
Program Development 
Redefinition & Reformulation 
Problem Definition  
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